Among the challengers to liberal democracy in Europe, we can count populists, autocrats, and the increasingly often mentioned illiberals. But who are they and what is illiberalism? How does it relate to populism? Can illiberals be democrats at all? What are the policy implications of having illiberal politicians, especially of the radical right, in power in the EU? This interview explores these questions with Professor Cas Mudde. It covers various issues at the intersection of academic and policy research on populism, illiberalism, democracy, and the radical right. It discusses whether the growing body of literature on illiberalism addresses something that is fundamentally new on the global political agenda, how this literature relates to academic research on populism, and if illiberalism and democracy are reconcilable against the backdrop of a global trend of autocratization, which many scholars of democracy have noted, and which is often attributed to illiberal and populist leaders. Furthermore, the conversation sets out to understand how the recent election outcomes in Slovakia and Poland fit into the aforementioned trend and also predict what is in store for European democracies in the near future as illiberal actors of the radical right are readying themselves for the next European parliamentary elections in June 2024.
Cas Mudde is a professor of international affairs and a distinguished research professor at the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. His academic research agenda centres around the question how liberal democracies can defend themselves against political challenges without undermining their core values. He has published widely on uncivil society, democratization, Euroskepticism, extremism, and the practices of political parties, especially those of far right and populist inclinations.
This interview was conducted as a collaboration between The Review of Democracy and the research consortium “AUTHLIB – Neo-authoritarianisms in Europe and the liberal democratic response” by Zsuzsanna Vegh, visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in cooperation with Bálint Mikola, Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: After nearly two decades of what we refer to as the populist Zeitgeist, it seems that scholars have recently turned their attention towards studying illiberalism or illiberal democracy. How do you interpret this new scholarly trend? Does it capture something that you think is qualitatively new and different? Do you consider this concept of illiberalism analytically useful? What do you make of this new line of research in terms of conceptual coherence?
Cas Mudde: I think that to a certain extent, it is a logical evolution from the fact that populism has become more relevant. In Europe and North America – Latin America being a little bit different – populist parties and radical right parties were rarely in power or close to power at the beginning of the study of populism and the closely overlapping category of the radical right. We mostly looked at what they did, why they were successful, or why t would become successful. Now we see that populism, broadly defined, has been in power in many countries for quite some time, and as a consequence, we are now increasingly looking its effects on politics. I believe that this partly explains the move towards illiberalism and particularly towards illiberal democracy. Secondly, in a much more implicit way, I believe populism has become much less important to many of the so-called populist actors due to the simple reason that many of them have come to power or have been embraced by so-called mainstream parties. Consequently, populism makes much less sense: populism is great when everyone hates you, but if much of the establishment treats you as any other party, it is no longer particularly useful.
I also believe that a lot of the literature on European populism has traditionally come out of party scholarship. From a theoretical point of view, a lot of the literature on populism originated from democracy studies, and in Latin America, a lot of the literature was closely related to the democratization literature. Populism literature has therefore gravitated towards questions of democracy, rather than electoral behavior or party systems. In my own work, there is a significant difference between my initial writings on radical right parties, which were just party literature and barely ever touched upon questions of liberal democracy; and my work on populism, which has focused on the relationship to democracy from the start. The illiberalism literature is more in line with the literature of democratization. It is also more empirical than theoretical literature.
All that said, I have questions about the terminology. I see the term ‘illiberalism’ as an attempt to grasp a broad range of phenomena that are not perfectly captured by other terms. Populism covers a significant part of them, but not everything. Similarly, classic authoritarianism is also too narrow. However, illiberalism, by contrast, is too broad in a strictly conceptual terminological way. Furthermore, I believe illiberalism tries to provide an ideological term for capturing liberal democracy as a system, in an ideology. I believe it is mostly used to essentially describe forces that are against liberal democracy, without saying that they are illiberal democracies, which is an awkward term. Conceptually though, this is not exactly the same as illiberalism.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: Could you elaborate on the relationship between illiberalism and democracy? Can illiberals under any circumstances be democrats? And if we can speak about the spread of illiberalism – not in scholarly terms, but as empirical practice – what does this mean to democracy and liberal democracy in the world today?
Cas Mudde: The term illiberalism comes out of a concern for liberal democracy in particular. The idea of liberal democracy separates liberalism and democracy. In this limited, narrow definition of democracy, it is seen as a system of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Liberal democracy combines popular sovereignty and majority rule with a set of principles as well as institutions, including free media, independent judiciary, pluralism, rule of law and minority rights. One the one hand, some argue that democracy cannot exist without being a liberal democracy. One the other hand, a lot of people argue that there is an inherent tension between the two fundamentally different traditions and ideological ideas of liberalism and of democracy: liberalism is concerned with autonomous individuals and their rights, whereas democracy is concerned with majority rule.
I think illiberalism tries to capture everyone who is against liberal democracy. However, some disagree with liberal democracy because they are anti-liberal but pro-democratic, there are others who do so because they are anti-democratic but liberal, and then also some people who are against both liberalism and democracy. Illiberalism captures all three, which are very different. Anti-democrats are generally referred to as authoritarians, which is a problematic terminology as well. As a result of adopting a terminology wherein liberalism and democracy are separated and a minimal definition of democracy is used, illiberals can be seen as democratic because illiberals believe in popular sovereignty and majority rule despite disagreeing with minority rights or separation of powers.
How does it work in practice? To a certain extent, I agree that democracy cannot really function if it is not liberal. To have popular sovereignty and majority rule in any meaningful way, you need what Robert Dahl referred to as free and fair elections. To have free and fair elections, you need an incredibly comprehensive system, which includes far more elements than we generally accept. At the same time, I believe it is important to separate people who are fundamentally against democracy and those who pretend to be for democracy but have issues with liberal democracy. In the end, both will certainly attack liberal democracy and subvert democracy per se, but they will do so in very different ways. I always mention the example of comparing Adolf Hitler to Viktor Orban- Hitler destroyed democracy without any apologies because fundamentally, his system was based on the idea of having a leader who is smarter, better, and morally superior to the will of the people. Whereas Orban – similarly to the Republicans in the U.S. – undermines democracy in the name of saving it. While I do not equate Orban and Hitler, in the end, both might destroy democracy, but the processes they employ, and their politics and their justifications will be fundamentally different. This why I think it is important to separate people who are purely against democracy and people who pretend to support democracy but are illiberal.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: Nowadays, there seems to be an agreement that there is a global trend of autocratization. You introduce a differentiation here, but autocratization is often driven by actors whom we would otherwise categorize as populist or as illiberal. That is the case in Europe and within the European Union. However, the de-democratization patterns are mixed. In September, the Slovakian elections returned Robert Fico, who is often characterized as a populist leader, to power. Then in October, Poland’s election results indicated that a pro-democratic force will be able to form government. Do you think that such singular events can have a trend-making impact? How do they fit into the bigger picture? How much importance shall we attribute to one or the other when thinking about the state of democracy in Europe and the importance of populist illiberal leaders on democratic processes in the continent?
Cas Mudde: Your first question refers to the decline of liberal democracy or democracy as a whole due to the trend of autocratization. The argument here is that either liberal democracies are becoming less liberalor less democratic, or that autocratic regimes are becoming more autocratic e.g. China or Russia. To a certain extent, trends are just a collection of aggregate data. I am very skeptical about these trends and data sets that work over very long periods of time. I remember studying democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, and constantly hearing that before the Second World War, Czechoslovakia was a liberal democracy. By no standards of the late 20th century was Czechoslovakia a liberal democracy in the inter-war period. While our requirements for what constitutes a liberal democracy has become more encompassing, we do not actually apply the same expectations across time. We don’t mention issues that we find very disturbing at the moment, for example gender inequality or the treatment of LGBTQI, in categorising states or in identifying trends. With regards the datasets that we work with, there are those that excluded half of the population. In what world can you call a country in which women cannot vote a democracy? Yet, we do. A liberal democracy, no less. Moreover, I think we have a very rosy nostalgic picture of how the state of liberal democracy was in the 1990s. We see that romanticism in studies of Western Europe, but particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.
Among other scholars, Sean Hanley argues that a lot of the alleged decline in liberal democracy is hugely exaggerated because these countries were not liberal democratic by any standards before either. I am not arguing that the state of liberal democracy is not problematic now. However, I do not think we had a golden age. That said, I think that one of the big differences between now and the past, is that we now have people who openly say that they are illiberal and who are openly advocating for a different type of democracy. But let’s be clear, liberal democracy was being subverted by mainstream parties in many ways most of the time- think about Italy or Austria, where courts have subverted liberal democracy in ways that come very close to Poland; and courts were not the first to do so in any case. That always makes it hard for me to interpret these datasets.
Slovakia and Poland had intriguing elections, causing confusion for the media that is striving to identify trends. Articles were already being written about the demise of populism after the Polish elections, but then Robert Fico returned, leaving the media uncertain about their narrative. Poland is bigger than Slovakia, so Poland wins the story at the moment. But the next time some populist wins, they will argue that populism is back again.The problem with this approach is that it ignores that every individual election is always primarily driven by national or local factors, rather of global ones. People do not vote for or against Law and Justice (PiS) because Trump won or lost. It does not work like that. We must see things in the context. In Central and Eastern Europe, it is always remarkable when a government stays in power. It has been happening a bit more nowadays, but on average, parties in government tend to lose elections. PiS had been in government twice. You lose elections if you do not have full control of the state like Hungary. You lose particularly if you are faced with a half-decent opposition, which is another fundamental difference from Hungary. Therefore, I do not see PiS as being down and out. Rather, it is still a phenomenally strong party, despite having openly subverted liberal democracy, diminished the rights of women and LGBTQI, and mismanaged various elements of the economy, among other things. In the next elections, they are poised to return to power because the incoming government will have a hard time governing in general. The experience from Slovakia is the same. Slovak politics is incredibly volatile: the last government was completely divided and could not get almost anything done. Therefore, the opposition came back. It makes sense that Fico would return, considering the infrastructure of his party and his personal talent. Is he particularly successful? No, he actually does not have that much support. It is a very fragmented party system in which he is the strongest. Consequently, this is not a massive vote for Fico in any way, shape or form. It is not even about being pro-Russian. You have to keep in mind that only less than a quarter voted for him, and that most of the people voted against the incumbent government. I do not see any other trend than that of generally people voting the government out.
This does not mean that a trend cannot be created. That is what politicians do, that is what journalists do, and that is what opinion-makers do. After every big election, newspapers are full of articles of “this is the end of this” or “the beginning of that”. People and politicians read that and assume that populism is over and that it is time to move away from it. Ofcourse,trends can be made. However, to put it bluntly, they are generally not made by Central and Eastern European countries. They are made by Germany, the US, the UK, and France – when these countries all move in a certain direction at the same time, that is allegedly something global. What is very important to note is that such trends are created. They are hardly ever purely empirical. They are based on cherry picking – some elections show the success or the failure of populists, and those that do not, are ignored.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: As the European Parliament elections of next June are approaching, there are more speculations about how the European Parliament will look, how the far-right parties will perform, and what kind of political groupings the elections may be able to create. Over the years, we have heard a lot about the rise of the far right in Europe. If we look a bit closer, we see radical right parties breaking through in countries where they have been completely marginal before, including Spain and Portugal. We also see that Alternative for Germany (AfD) is becoming more prominent in state elections and that there seems to be a rising support for the party. Simultaneously, there are results that could indicate a different direction, as seen in the Slovak and Polish elections. In both instances, the radical right underperformed when compared to projections. The Konfederacja Party in Poland did not emerge as the influential force it was anticipated to be. Likewise, in Slovakia, the Republika Party’s performance fell short, and the Slovak National Party barely secured a place in parliament. In summary, the overall outcomes were less favorable to far-right parties than first anticipated. In this context, what can we expect from the European radical right and what should we prepare for when it comes to the new European Parliament?
Cas Mudde: The European elections are like Christmas and your birthday packed into one day for election nerds because there is so much going on. They are also very complex, and that complexity often is reduced in problematic ways. First of all, they’re not one election, but 27 independent elections. While you can make trends, every individual election is just that, an individual election. People in France are not going to vote more for the radical right because AfD does better in Germany. That is just not how it works.
In terms of popular support, the radical right is not going to do much better for the simple reason that they did really well the last time. However, in terms of seats, they are going to gain numbers. The simple reason for this is that while we talk about 27 elections, they are not 27 in terms of the number seats available. The elections in Germany are 10 times more important than the elections somewhere else. As Germany has almost 100 seats, if a party increases from 10 percent to 20 percent, that means they secure 10 more seats, which is enormous. It is equivalent to the number of seats various countries have altogether. Therefore, AfD alone is going to a compensate for some other parties losing. There are some other parties that are going to do well too, but the effect of their success will not be as significant. For instance, Vlaams Belang is doing great, but Belgium is a very small country. The difference between today and 10, but particularly 20 years ago, is that the radical right is doing well in big countries: Italy, Germany, and France, where they always did well, but also Spain and Poland. Therefore, the radical right is going to gain a lot of seats.
Nevertheless, the second point about European elections is that ideology matters much less than group alliances. As a consequence of the divisions, the radical right has been much weaker in terms of group alliances when compared to its numerical strength and popularly. For example, in the last Parliament, around one in four seats went to the radical right and yet, they have had almost no effect on what the European Parliament have done because they have been divided among themselves. There are two radical right groups, though many people do not consider one of them as radical right. The first one is the Identity and Democracy Group (ID), which is the classic group of Rassemblement National; the second one is European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR). We still misperceive the ECRas a conservative group run by PiS, even though it has only one or two non-radical right parties left in it, with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic being the only significant one. Almost every other one has transformed into a radical right party that used to be conservative, such as PiS, or is a hardcore radical right party, such as the Sweden Democrats. There are some radical right parties that are still in other groups, most notably Janša in the European People’s Party (EPP); and a significant number are in no group whatsoever, out of which Orban is the most important.
If you would have asked me this question two years ago, I would have said that we are going to get an ‘ECR Plus’ as there was a significant meeting around the time in Warsaw that tried to accomplish that. Of course, such initiatives always came from Orban for two reasons. First, PiS is a parochial party which is not really busy with anything beyond its own borders. Second, Orban is a European player who knows the European Union better than virtually any other leader. Putin saved us in that respect because as soon as he invaded Ukraine, the massive split between Orban and PiS made it impossible for PiS to be openly associated with Orban. Consequently, I cannot see ECR working together with Fidesz in the European Parliament because it would hurt PiS back home. Orban is so toxic that for most of the established radical right parties, the alliance does not bring much in terms of advantages. Clearly, Fratelli d’Italia is not going to align with Orban because Meloni is within the ECR camp, and there is not that much to gain for Salvini or others either.
We are approaching the election with a split radical right in terms of groups. At the same time, there is a courting of the ECR–and particularly certain members of the ECR–by the EPP. I think this is the most interesting question. According to rumours, the EPP aims to attract Meloni while the media appears to be actively working to mainstream her, labeling her as a conservative and downplaying any negative aspects of her government’s actions. The EPP’s election focus on immigration, especially highlighting the Tunisia deal in which Meloni played a significant role, aligns with their efforts to court her. I think Meloni is not going to join the EPP, but EPP-ECR is going to be the nexus for the radical right. The strategy of the EPP is to replace S&D. Numerically, I do not think they have a majority even with the support of ID and potential others. But in terms of pure power politics, it gives them a blackmail potential that could use to influence S&D and Renew. Therefore, I believe the Parliament will get a new face and that even if S&D and Renew hold the majority, the old alliance dominating everything will lose its power with the EPP openly flaunting itself as the alternative.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: Typically, when the mainstream right cooperates with the radical right, it gives rise a rightward position and policy shift in the given context. Should the dynamic that you mentioned come to fruition, what do you think that would really mean for the European Union?
Cas Mudde: That process has been ongoing. A majority of EPP parties have worked with the radical right at the national or the sub-national level. Several of the parties have moved so far to the right that the distinction between them and the radical right is at times incredibly difficult to make out. Of course, EPP has in the past included radical right parties like Orban’s party. Sarah De Lange showed in her dissertation that this process predates coalitions with the radical right, and that it makes sense for the mainstream right to do so because it needs to get the stigma of being radical away to be able to govern with the radical right. They do that partly by becoming closer to them so that they appear as less radical, and by describing them as being reliable, etc. By the time their coalitions are in government, their migration policy for example reflects that of the mainstream party, much more than that of the radical right party. However, the mainstream party’s position on immigration has shifted towards the radical right in the years before their entry into formal coalitions with the radical right. This has been going on, back and forth, essentially since the beginning of the century. The Christian Social Union (CSU) is a very good example because it radicalizes mostly whenever AfD rises. When it has some other considerations, it moves backwards. Several years ago, the CSU opted to return to the center. However, following a period of considerable strength, they have since shifted their stance towards the right. The CSU is important because their member, Manfred Weber, who is the leader of the EPP and going to be their Spitzenkandidat, has chosen to make immigration the focus of this election.
Generally, there is some radicalization in a few positions such as immigration and European integration. With regards to immigration, EPP – apart from some Northern members – and ECR are aligned. Apart from them, there are many parties in S&D and virtually every Central-East European party that supports restrictive immigration policies. Regarding the direction of the EU, the difference between EPP and ECR remains significant. There are some very principled Europeanists within the EPP who will not tolerate certain things; therefore, they focus on other issues. On Ukraine, they find common ground. Climate change is an issue where the EPP has moved significantly to the right and is aligning itself anti-wokeness, which is a vaguely defined concept. Anti-wokeness is very popular within the mainstream right across the world and the CDU has more and more campaigns against wokeness.
The biggest problem for the EPP-ECR collaboration is the EU, the EU structure, and the ideas and limits of restructuring. There is a strong push towards a multi-speed Europe. I believe this is almost inevitable – if the EU, for military rather than democratic or economic reasons, decides to include the Western Balkans and even more problematically, Ukraine, it is only feasible to do so with different levels of EU integration. Alternatively, collaboration could be scaled down significantly, which would be preferred by ECR. I believe the EPP would not want to go in this direction and would prefer different speeds, a concept that was already discussed in the 1990s, when it was initiated by CSU. This seemingly novel plan is rooted in an earlier idea and will allow the EPP and ECR to coexist.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: We see increasing affinity among various American and European–very often Hungarian–radical right actors, including parties and various other organizations. How should we interpret this trend and what are the consequences of the internationalization of the far right?
Cas Mudde: I believe they are conflated to a certain extent, nevertheless, there are two trends that are very different in terms of their origins and agenda, but that are starting to overlap. One of the things that requires more attention, particularly in Europe, is the religious right, which has always been better integrated as a global actor, when compared tothe radical right. They have been particularly well connected to Central and Eastern Europe, where US religious organizations saw opportunities after the fall of communism. There was an entire continent to conquer, and some radical and intolerant organizations struck deals with local organizations, particularly in Russia and Romania.
Currently, the religious right is under the radar. They do not focus on immigration. They have only recently received some attention in Europe because of Bannon and Meloni, who has spoken at rallies which have been ongoing for decades and have translated into tangible policy consequences such as anti-LGBTQ laws, particularly in Central East Asia and Africa. The religious right has radicalized over the last two decades and has come much closer to the radical right, particularly in the US and Latin America. These broad alliances, which used to be dominated by the religious right, are experiencing a shift towards dominance by the radical right. It is prevalent in the US as well as Latin America, with Brazil as a prominent example. These alliances prove somewhat challenging, with specific policies–particularly those related to abortion and LGBTQ–being notable exceptions. The making of these alliances extend beyond religious and political figures, and also involve thinkers and other actors. Nevertheless, they do not necessarily lead to party alliances and that is why they tend to be ignored. However, it is an interesting new dynamic that the religious right, and particularly religious institutions, are starting to embrace the radical right. For instance, the Catholic Church has always held its distance from the radical right in Italy, albeit formally. Now, figures like Meloni and even Salvini are actively seeking to court the Catholic Church. Similarly, in Spain, the Catholic Church has traditionally preferred the Partido Popular, but Vox is trying to establish a connection with the Church as well.
The changing landscape is further complicated by thinking about Hungary. Hungary is unique because until recently it has been one of two countries in Europe where the far right was actually in power. The difference between Hungary and Poland is that Poland is a parochial country that only focuses on Polish issues, while Orban has always been a global actor. What is his strategy? He is buying support – the Hungarian state spends a large amount of money on Anglo academics, thinkers, think tanks and journalists, which are generally second-rate at best. It is a very simple strategy to present themselves as intellectual and thereby buy some protection. Orban is becoming increasingly isolated after leaving the EPP, and he sees the UK and the US as counterweights to the EU. While Russia and China are useful for economic leverage, he needs the support of the right-wing leaders in the UK and the US in terms of political and moral leverage to stand up to the EU. Orban, who has faced historical challenges in establishing a connection with Trump, is now working to get closer, not necessarily to Trump personally, but to the conservative party–i.e. the Republican Party–and certain dissenters. This plan is oriented towards Hungarian rather than a broader European or global one, and its success remains to be seen. It took Orban two and a half years to secure a meeting with Trump in the first term, but he may be among the first leaders to be received in a potential second term for Trump, indicating that the aforementioned financial investments have paid off. However, the issue goes beyond that. I think it is deeply concerning that a growing group of people who operate in mainstream academia, think tanks, and journalists, are cheering for a far-right authoritarian leader. Organizations such as the MCC or the Danube Institute are increasingly treated as legitimate and independent think tanks. We should have a more fundamental conversation about this issue because there are people who are not aware of what these institutes are, or more importantly, what purposes and interests they serve.
