An op-ed by Caglar Ozturk.
Caglar Ozturk completed his PhD in 2023 from Loughborough University, UK. His research interests are in Europeanisation/de-Europeanisation studies and the concept of differentiated integration. Caglar published several op-eds on EU-Turkey relations and reviewed several books on populism.
The European Union (EU) has reinvigorated its most successful foreign policy tool after Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. Enlargement policy had successfully persuaded candidate countries to reform their domestic institutions and policies within a specific timeline under the credible promise of membership but it had lost steam in recent years. The EU was occupied by both internal and external challenges in the region and its commitment to enlargement gradually declined. Candidate countries, on the other hand, were not enthusiastic for more reforms in the last decade. Among these, Turkey stands out as the least successful and may even be seen as a failure. Will Ukraine be able to join the EU before 2030, or will it share the fate of Turkey? What lessons can be drawn from Turkey’s experience with the EU? I will try to disentangle these questions in this short op-ed. I argue that, in order to avoid Turkey’s fate, Ukraine should benefit from the pro-enlargement wave in the EU and it should implement reforms as much as possible with the EU’s economic, political, and technical support.
Ukraine’s EU trajectory shares some similarities with Turkey. First, both countries were regarded as developing economies and they still have economic problems. Turkey successfully managed to overcome the economic crisis of 2001 and 2002 with the help of the IMF and the World Bank. But the country has been experiencing a currency crisis since 2018 due to the political rift between Turkey and the US. The politically motivated decisions of Turkey’s Central Bank have also fueled the crisis further. Ukraine, on the other hand, has been experiencing economic catastrophe due to Russia’s aggression in both 2014 and since 2022. The country will need to restructure its economy after the war. Similar to Turkey’s Customs Union (CU), Ukraine has privileged access to the EU market via the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). This agreement will help the economy to recover economy with the assistance of the EU and gradually integrate the Ukrainian economy into the EU. The bloc has already committed €50 billion to Ukraine’s development.
Political and judicial conditions will be harder to implement for Ukraine than Turkey. Ukraine is a large country and it still needs to tackle several issues related to national minorities, the selection of judges to the Constitutional Court, fighting against corruption, and empowering an independent media regulator. The Turkish case illustrates that an independent media and judiciary will be crucial for freedom of expression. The first backsliding in Turkey’s Europeanisation process was the imposition of a heavy fine on a critical media conglomerate in 2009. This was an extremely influential move to curb critical and independent voices in the media. Another example of backsliding came in 2010 with the alleged reform of the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court by the President. Moreover, independent regulatory authorities were put under the oversight of ministries in 2011.
Turkey’s problems were more complex and the grand coalition supporting the EU membership has increasingly become more fragile. Turkish leaders had projected that the negotiation process was a technical matter that Turkey could easily follow. External issues such as the lack of solutions to the Cyprus issue were not predicted. When the problems were not solved as expected, and the gap between expectation and reality was widened, their motivations to follow Europeanisation started to decline. Even the opposition parties turned to the Eurosceptic formula. Moreover, Turkey’s then Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, initiated a foreign policy approach that prioritized Turkey’s strategic ambitions. Turkish and European leaders started to clash due to disagreements on Turkish domestic and foreign policy and this led to the stalling of Turkey’s negotiation process with the EU in 2018. The General Affairs Council in June 2018 decided to not open and close any new chapters after Turkey’s blockage of drilling activities and the deterioration in human rights and rule of law in the country.
Ukraine can follow a different trajectory to avoid Turkey’s fate. After the war ends, Ukraine needs to prioritize the fight against corruption and limit the excessive influence of the oligarchs as recommended by the EU. Eliminating corruption in the state institutions will help to accelerate the economic recovery. Additionally, the EU funds will more efficiently tackle regional economic imbalances. This would increase the support for EU membership especially in the regions affected by the war. The influence of the oligarchs in the media is a concern for the EU. Their role in the economy, politics, and public life may prevent reforms in strategic sectors of the economy and lead to politicization of EU reforms via their media power. Moreover, corruption will likely persist with the presence of strong oligarchs. Last but not the least, Ukraine needs to solve its bilateral problems with its neighbors. The bilateral issues or the negotiation process itself can be politicized in candidate and member countries. Small countries try to advance their interests with their veto power in the European Council. This would lead to increased Euroscepticism among the Ukrainian people. Moreover, the more Ukraine delays the reforms after the war, the greater that danger that the EU might experience ‘enlargement fatigue’ again.
The EU will face both economic and political challenges in accommodating Ukraine, while Russia’s continuing attacks on its infrastructure will lead to deterioration of its economy. Politically, the EU needs to sustain the support for Ukraine’s membership even if the prospects look grim. The history of EU enlargement showed that candidate countries complying with the acquis communitaire would be finally admitted to the EU. However, as the Turkish case illustrates, pro-EU politicians might change their policies and they might become increasingly Eurosceptic. Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, was hopeful for the revival of the accession process after the EU’s latest decisions on Ukraine’s candidacy but these hopes have not materialized. Instead, both sides agreed on focusing modernization of the Customs Union and visa liberalization. In 2020, the European Council had prepared a positive agenda offering the modernization of the Turkey-EU CU agreement in exchange for improving its neighborly relations. But the democratic backsliding has persisted in the country even if a major reversal in foreign policy is underway. Nevertheless, the negotiation process is not likely to resume unless the government changes its trajectory in domestic politics.
The war has created a sense of geopolitical urgency for both the EU and the countries that desire to be a member state. The EU acted in unison to offer candidacy to Ukraine and Moldova (and conditionally to Georgia) swiftly. The war has had little impact on Turkey-EU relations, even if there are signs of closer cooperation due to the geopolitical role of Turkey. However, Erdoğan’s conflicting statements and instrumentalization of foreign policy in domestic calculations have prevented him from reversing Turkey’s EU policy fundamentally. Therefore, Turkey’s EU trajectory will likely diverge from the other candidate and potential candidate countries. This might force the EU to find alternative workable solutions for Turkey-EU relations.
In collaboration with Oliver Garner.
