Our Assistant Editor Neil Gandhi reviews Samuel Ely Bagg’s the Dispersion of Power: A Critical Realist Theory of Democracy (OUP, 2024).
Neil Gandhi is an international development, democracy and governance expert. He works for the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and is currently the Senior Governance Adviser based in Bangladesh. Previously, he worked across Eastern Europe and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He holds a BA in History with French from Bristol University, Masters in Economic and Social History from Cambridge University and Masters in Corruption and Governance from Sussex University. Views are his own, and not those of his employer.
The canon of writing on ways to save democracy from its current perils is vast. Political scientists, economists and historians have responded in their droves to the Trump presidency, Brexit and the global ‘democratic recession’. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s ‘How Democracies Die’ typifies the response from political science: improve democratic processes and participation to encourage political inclusion. Dambisa Moyo’s ‘The Edge of Chaos’ shows the response from economics: deliver economic growth to tackle populism. David Stasavage’s ‘The Decline and Rise of Democracy’ takes the historical perspective, seeking lessons on democratic practices from the period between Ancient Greece and modern Europe. In this rush to find answers, something has fallen through the gap between politics, economics and history: power.
Samuel Ely Bagg, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, provides a compelling diagnosis and remedy for the current state of democracy. With a background in political theory,
Bagg’s book ‘The Dispersion of Power’ argues that elites are too powerful because of the concentration of political influence and wealth in too few hands.
Bagg argues that electoral reform, direct democracy, deliberation, participatory governance and other democratic innovations are all too weak to tackle the present challenge. Powerful people and groups can capture political institutions, processes and outcomes for their benefit. Bagg argues that democratic reformers should focus on tackling ‘state capture’ instead. From a ‘critical realist’ perspective, Bagg argues for dispersing power, creating countervailing forces and pushing back against elite ‘state capture’ to save democracy.
The shift towards understanding power and ‘state capture’ is a refreshing break from recent writing on democratic renewal. Bagg argues that elites tend to dominate political engagement and processes, responding to democratic innovation by finding new avenues for domination.
The ‘realist turn’ and Bagg’s repositioning to focus on the relationship between the elite and non-elite is a familiar but refreshing break from the dominant narrative of recent literature which centres on the gap between urban liberals and left-behind groups.
Bagg also explores the competition between elite groups, which is a common feature of democracy and one that is neglected behind the ideological lens of ‘one person, one vote’. Perhaps Bagg could have gone further in exploring competition between elites and its dynamics. ‘Cartel politics’ theorists argue that elites settle on democratic governance to quell demands for representation from non-elites, channeling competition between different elite groups and enabling them to continue to dominate economic wealth. Bagg’s argument for pushing back against ‘state capture’ aligns well with ‘cartel theory’; however, going further and viewing democratic governance as a competition between elites would help to unpack Bagg’s arguments on how to achieve change, particularly change involving creative destruction that disrupts the balance of power between elites.
Bagg argues for the formation of a ‘countervailing power’ of the least powerful but most numerical in society as a way to extract concessions, hold to account, and prevent ‘state capture’ by a narrow political and business elite. Bagg suggests this might be realized through trade unions, but argues we are unlikely to see the return of the mass trade unions seen in the twentieth century. Instead, he argues that new forms of unions or different groups might mobilize, such as teachers or neighbors. A mobilization outside of the trade union movement seems unlikely; it is only really trade unions that are able to amass a significant membership base and have the staying power that often dissipates from protest movements. Given the link between the trade union movement and industrialization in the West, it is also unlikely that a significant ‘countervailing power’ can form in non-industrialized countries. Even in Western countries, it is mostly left-wing and centre-left parties who are likely to open the space for the development of a ‘countervailing power’, meaning Bagg’s prescription is actually quite specific to certain contexts and political moments.
The effort to prevent and tackle ‘state capture’ is squarely aimed at the public good and delivering for as many citizens as possible.
Bagg acknowledges some of the standard prescriptions: constitutionalism, competition and universalism. He also suggests more radical change such as anti-monopoly, countervailing power and systemic redistribution. Despite his realist critique, he admits these objectives are utopian. The method is more chicken and egg. Achieving his radical demands, such as tackling monopoly, building a countervailing power and systemic redistribution would likely require a highly progressive government and institutions, as well as significant public demand. However, electing such a government would likely require tackling monopoly, building a countervailing power and systemic redistribution. This prescription is also drawn up for all democracies, no matter the level of economic development or democratic stability.
There is a fine line between tackling ‘state capture’ and the recent trend in economic theory towards ‘industrial policy’. Dani Rodrik and Mariana Mazzucato argue that governments should move away from the neoclassical economics of the 1980s and instead invest in industry, provide subsidies for specific sectors and/or businesses and design tariff policies to encourage capital formation. For some, industrial policy helps to create industries that are globally competitive which is particularly challenging for developing and non-industrialized countries. For others, this risks providing state support for specific businesses which might be a form of patronage and corruption in the form of ‘state capture’ rather than sound long-term investment.
Defining ‘state capture’ is a key challenge. Bagg defines it as ‘the use of public power to pursue private interests at the expense of the public’. This broad definition is the one adopted by the influential non-governmental organization ‘Transparency International’. Bagg claims that, instead of defining ‘state capture’ very clearly, stakeholders themselves will be able to identify it when they see it. As elites find loopholes to exert their influence, a loose definition enables stakeholders to be as flexible as elites seeking power. However, this does come at substantial risk.
Enabling judges, the media and political opponents to identify ‘state capture’ risks the term being used for political ends and even repression. Bagg suggests that democracy might be temporarily abridged to tackle ‘state capture’ and achieve democratic goals in the long-term.
There are, however, plenty of examples from the past century of authoritarianism as a result of demands to ‘protect democracy’ or tackle wealthy political elite dominance. The lack of clear definition of ‘state capture’ risks creating political discord, particularly in weak democracies where institutions are politicized. In enabling different actors to pursue the loosely defined ‘state capture’, we risk encouraging much worse. Overall, this book offers a refreshing and compelling argument for reform amidst a global democratic recession. Bagg fills a gap between political science, economics and history, identifying how tackling ‘state capture’ might help to deliver more healthy democracies and better wellbeing. Where there are weaknesses, this is often because the reader may want more detail than is possible from this short book. The realist approach is helpful but might go further, particularly in identifying how reformers might help build a ‘countervailing power’ and how to prevent such a power from capturing the state itself. It might also explore how different groups of elites participate in democratic politics for their benefit. This is a thoroughly engaging, albeit challenging text with plenty of merits.
