by Bengisu Savran
Bengisu Savran is a master’s student at the Central European University and an intern at CEU Democracy Institute
Despite expectations of an opposition victory, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured the highest vote share and were reelected in 2023. The long-term project of national developmentalism and strong support from women, along with more specific factors like Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy and the February 6th earthquakes, significantly influenced the results.
“Erdoğan faces a real chance of losing as Turkey gets ready to vote”, wrote The Guardian regarding the 2023 Turkish elections.
Not only international media outlets but Turkish opinion polls too were expecting the opposition to win – despite the fact that AKP was the unrivalled victor at all elections since 2002. What is more, having succeeded at the elections of 2011, AKP set up a “cycle of dominance” that has encompassed several stages: mobilization, expanding the core support base by offering material benefits, delegitimizing the opposition forces and applying a strategic blend of ideological rigidity and flexibility. By doing so, AKP has strengthened its position as a rightist party which unites centre-right and Islamic voter bases and has achieved a dominant position that other right-wing parties were unable to do.
What made the 2023 elections especially important in this context was that, for the first time since 2002, Erdoğan and his Justice and Development party (the AKP) were not the obvious forerunners.
One of Turkey’s most trusted polling companies, Konda forecast that Erdoğan would receive only 43% of the vote in the first round of the Presidential elections. Meanwhile, the candidate of the united opposition, Kılıçdaroğlu was predicted to receive 49%. Contrary to these expectations, Erdoğan finished the first round in the lead with 49% and won in the second round with 52%. This raises the question how, even despite a severe economic crisis and the devastation of the South by an earthquake, did Erdoğan manage to stay in power? The article argues that national developmentalism, women’s support, the February 6th earthquake and the failure of opposition were primary factors for AKP to create votes in the 2023 Turkish elections.
National developmentalism to create votes
When it comes to the re-election of Erdoğan in 2023, two long-term reasons can be put forward: national developmentalism and women’s support. Catching up to the West has been a chief objective for the Turkish Republic since it’s foundation a century ago, and it has made impressive advances towards achieving this goal in the 22 years since the AKP took power. Dean Schafer argues that following the 2000-01 crisis, economic prosperity and strongman leadership rather than liberal democracy have become the determining factors in the eyes of the public, especially among the groups that have benefitted the most, i.e. the middle class and economic elites. Except for the contraction in 2009 in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the Turkish economy has recorded growth every year. Since 2002, the Turkish economy has grown more than threefold (Figure 1) and, according to the World Bank’s classification, it is now included in the upper-middle-income group among emerging market economies. Sectors like construction, mining, and energy have developed rapidly and became the fuels of Turkey’s economic growth.
Figure 1. GDP (PPP) per Capita
Source: TUIK, World Bank Database
While satisfaction with the country’s economic performance can in and of itself contribute to the popularity of incumbents, the Erdogan regime also made economic development a cornerstone of its propaganda. In a recent article, political scientist Aykut Öztürk offers evidence that such national developmentalist propaganda can indeed be effective. When AKP supporters were exposed to pictures of new roads, bridges and airports, their perception of the party became more positive, which may also have affected their voting preferences.
Turkey’s growing investments in the military can be viewed as another form of developmentalism under AKP rule. The production volume and export figures of the war industry of Turkey are increasing dynamically. Locally produced tanks, helicopters, and drones are shown on local TV channels presenting Turkey as one of the leading military powers in the world. Similarly, pro-regime media outlets repeatedly broadcast reports about TOGG, the Turkish electric automobile manufacturer and its cars. While the annual production numbers of TOGG remain rather low, several of its cars were strategically displayed at various polling stations on election day. To sum up, national developmentalist propaganda was skillfully deployed to emphasize economic, technological, and military achievements, thereby fostering positive emotions and maintaining the loyalty of AKP supporters towards the regime.
Many women voted for AKP
Given his sexist rhetoric, Erdoğan’s popularity among women voters may seem puzzling. Erdogan is opposed to gender equality, condemns abortion, labels LGBTQ+ individuals as deviants, and advises women to have at least three children. Yet half of the votes for the AKP came from women. So why is that? Despite the large increases in gross domestic product, Turkey remains an unequal country. According to the World Bank’s estimates, some 15% of Turkish society lives below the poverty line.
AKP enlarged the welfare state’s coverage to poor people, and many of the material benefits accrue to vulnerable women. According to political scientist Gamze Çavdar’s research, under the AKP governments, women’s share of social help increased substantially between 2003 and 2016 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Proportion of men and women for whom welfare transfers constitute more than 50% of their income.
The above data clearly show the growing share of benefits to women. However, have they really affected women’s voting preferences? According to interviews conducted by Denizcan Kutlu in Ankara, social help has been an important factor in women’s voting behaviors. One of the interviewees, Gülten, answers positively to whether she feels closer, even indebted to AKP. She states that “[AKP] made you indebted and people pay their debts by voting for that party. The help is politicized so that they tell you not to look for any other alternative and think well about them” (p. 258-9).
The role of the opposition
Whereas national developmentalism and women voting for AKP can be grasped as long-term elements behind Erdoğan’s popularity, two short-term factors were specific to the 2023 elections. The first concerns the opposition’s role. On the one hand, six opposition parties overcame conflicts and deep distrust to join forces and form the Nation Alliance to contest Erdoğan and the AKP. On the other, in what was a controversial decision the Nation Alliance then selected Kemal Kılıçdaoğlu as its presidential candidate.
The controversy stemmed from the fact that Kılıçdaroğlu was highly unpopular among certain segments of the population. In the elections, Kılıçdaroğlu managed to gain support from the Alevi religious minority, Kurds and some Turkish nationalists; however, he failed to gain enough votes from conservative Sunni voters. While he drew on anti-incumbent sentiments, this was not enough to appeal to a majority. It is widely agreed that one of the key reasons Kılıçdaroğlu had difficulties reaching Erdoğan’s voters is that he lacks charisma. Besides, Erdoğan’s media has been slandering Kılıçdaroğlu and displaying him in a negative light to the public for over a decade. As he comes from an Alevi background, some Sunni groups approached him with particular suspicions and coldness.
The popularity surveys conducted before the elections also demonstrated the unpopularity of Kılıçdaroğlu among the voters. According to an ORC poll from 2-5 January 2023, among four possible opposition candidates (Meral Akşener, Mansur Yavaş, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Kemal Kılıçdaoğlu), Kılıçdaroğlu was predicted to perform weakest versus Erdogan.
Even though some AKP voters were also dissatisfied with the government, they were so suspicious of Kılıçdaroğlu that they still rather voted for Erdoğan. It can be viewed as a failure of the opposition side that the candidate least popular among the public was chosen to run for the office of president.
February 6th earthquake
Besides Kılıçdaroğlu’s controversial selection, the 6th February earthquake led to debates over the impact of natural disasters on the reelection of the incumbent. Many scholars have shown that natural disasters negatively affect the electoral performance of incumbents. Voters hold politicians accountable for their inability to help victims, unless incumbents excel at mitigating the disasters’ consequences.
In Turkey, 11 cities were affected by last year’s earthquake which led to the death of more than 50,000 people. Erdoğan’s reelection was surprising in the light of the state’s limited capacity to remedy the wounds of the earthquake and authorities’ previous granting of permissions for poorly constructed buildings. Nonetheless, in 8 out of the 11 cities affected by the earthquake, AKP subsequently gained the most votes.
AKP media’s earthquake coverage of “the disaster of the century” emphasized the severity of the disaster while trying to avoid attributing blame for it. According to interviews done following the earthquake, one of the victims stated that Erdoğan is a good man and underlined the help he had provided earthquake. Another victim praised the tent encampment where he was he and his wife were staying and said that there is nothing more the government could do.
When the victims were asked about the possible reason behind the earthquake and the damage it caused, most of them labelled it as a God-given disaster rather than associating the damage with the government’s low capacity and preparation.
In other words, with the state-owned media’s coverage of Erdoğan as the one who remedied the wounds of a God-given earthquake, voters did not perceive Erdoğan as responsible for the losses but instead saw him as a healer. State help provided in the wake of the earthquake might also have favored the incumbent side by helping to develop new clientelistic ties.
Earthquake relief may have strengthened the positive sentiments towards the governing party. The official AKP website offers a detailed list of the actions undertaken by AKP to remedy the situation of the victims. Some of the more remarkable ones are as follows: every household affected by the earthquake was provided 10.000- 15.000 TL (500-750 Euro) in aid. For citizens who took shelter outside the container cities, rent assistance of 3.000 TL- 5.000 TL (150-250 euro) per month was provided. 100.000 TL (5000 euro) cash aid was provided to those who lost their relatives in the earthquake so they could meet their urgent needs.
In the light of Turkish opinion polls and international media coverage, the results of the 2023 general elections and Erdoğan’s re-election as president amidst economic hardships and a major natural disaster could be considered surprising.
These unexpected results thus raise important questions concerning how natural disasters, gender policies, opposition candidates and economic development influence voting behavior and support for the government. Based on the above-discussed example, economic and military development and the effective use of clientelism, combined with weak opposition leaders, can decisively benefit incumbents.
However, considering the last local elections on 31st of March 2024, ended with the main opposition party’s victory (the CHP), the opposition did a better job and managed to control the major cities in Turkey. It opens up a new discussion of the reasons for the opposition success of the local elections despite the tragic defeat in the general one.
