By Sushav Niraula
Sushav Niraula is a researcher at the Policy Entrepreneurs Inc., a think tank based in Nepal.
In this op-ed, Sushav Niraula explores the contradictory nature of Nepali bureaucracy, which can both resist and be subservient to elected representatives. This duality has resulted from increased bureaucratic power after the end of the monarchy. The op-ed discusses factors that have led to excess bureaucratic power and argues that governance reforms need to find a balance between power and accountability to make Nepali public service efficient.
There are two contradictory macro narratives one faces when engaging in the study of Nepali bureaucracy. The first consists of a bureaucracy as a permanent establishment with powers to challenge political representatives. This narrative fits with politicians’ ‘rants’ about an overly powerful administrative state. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s recent speech where he blamed a typist—a relatively junior bureaucrat—for supposedly controversial changes in the Federal Education Bill, illustrates well just how entrenched the belief in a bureaucratic ‘deep state’ is. The second narrative depicts Nepali bureaucracy as subservient to politicians and colluding with them for personal gain. News reports frequently cover cases of bureaucrats colluding with elected representatives for favourable transfers and kickbacks.
The contradiction between these narratives can seem puzzling at first. After all, how can bureaucracy be all-powerful and subservient at the same time?
It is only when we look at power as having the flexibility to adopt multiple options that we can grasp the, only seemingly, contradictory nature of Nepali bureaucracy.
At present, alongside subservience, a bureaucrat has multiple options – for example, resist, defend the status quo, collusion – when engaging with politicians and elected representatives. This has been the result of the strengthening of bureaucratic space due to ensuring legal safeguards, the formation of civil servants’ trade unions, and political instability post-monarchy.
Strengthening Bureaucratic Space
The post-Panchayat period (1990 onwards), which marked the end of the autocratic monarch era, saw bureaucrats protected from the executives’ whims by the Civil Service Act of 1993. The Act was prepared during a period when political parties, newly in power, were seeking support from the bureaucracy to run the government. The 1993 legislation – prepared from a ‘pro-bureaucrat’ perspective—moderated the discretionary power of the executive vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. It included specifications on service-related aspects like entry, promotion, retirement age, and also made ad hoc termination of bureaucrats difficult.
It is not that the bureaucracy had not been powerful during the monarchy. In real terms, high-ranking administrators were more powerful than ministers back then. But their power was derived from the monarch, who had the determining power over the entry, promotion, transfer, and termination of bureaucrats. Anytime a bureaucrats’ relationship with the monarch worsened, they would become irrelevant. The monarchs and the deep state within would use the corruption-stick to tame and scare independent minded and opposing bureaucrats. The 1978 ‘Carpet Scandal’ where the monarchy forced trumped-up corruption charges against credible administrators is a case in point. In these cases, the only strategic option for bureaucrats was subserviency.
With the monarchy gone, power fractionalized across political parties, and bureaucratic rights safeguarded through the 1993 legislation, the bureaucracy’s position strengthened.
Politicization and the subsequent establishment of trade unions for civil servants have further strengthened that position. The end of post-1990 popular movements against monarchy – both the 1990 and 2006-7 – saw the politicization of bureaucracy by political parties that were opposed to the monarchy.
The first movement awakened political consciousness among bureaucrats and led to the formation of political parties affiliated to trade unions for civil servants. Bureaucracy’s support of the second movement (2006-7) then left the politicians and elected representatives with a feeling of “owing” them for their favour. In his private conversation with the then-prime minister, former Home Secretary Umesh Mainali recounts the prime minister saying, “they (the bureaucrats) have helped us in the movement, (so) we will have to fulfil their demands.” As a result, the Civil Service Act was amended to recognize and legitimize trade union-related rights.
This led to the mushrooming of political party-affiliated trade unions that receive state funding and influence bureaucratic transfers in exchange for kickbacks.
Thirdly, constant changes in the government and poor quality of political leadership have strengthened the position of the bureaucracy. Since 2008, the year Nepal committed to switching from being a Hindu monarchy to a federal democratic republic, Nepal has had 13 prime ministers. The same prime minister has, at times, headed the government with different coalitions backing it. This has meant constant changes in ministers and commissions’ heads. With elected and nominated representatives – who are supposed to provide policy directions – constantly changing, bureaucracy has had greater room to manoeuvre.
Similarly, the quality of elected representatives has provided the bureaucracy with space to exert themselves. After an interaction with a particularly astute provincial secretary earlier this year, I remember thinking about the dynamics between the secretary- the senior most civil servant at a ministry – and their minister, the elected representative leading the ministry, who was previously a local gangster. With the former having decades of experience in the ways of the state, the minister would be no match for the secretary. Additionally, inferring from previous ministers’ tenures, the secretary can assume that the minister is likely to be in the office for only a short time and hence will have less incentive to follow his directives. In addition to these, factors like opportunities for personal growth through higher education and engagement with donors have also strengthened the position of bureaucrats.
Multiple Options
The widening space has opened an array of options for bureaucrats when engaging with elected and nominated representatives.
They can opt to resist, adopt the status quo, or be subservient and co-operate when engaging with political representatives.
These added options come with their own set of positives and negatives. The best part of these developments has been the opening of space for bureaucrats to resist political representatives when the latter’s decisions do not match the constitutional spirit and existing legal mandates. Cases like the former Chief Secretary, Som Lal Subedhi resisting the Prime Minister and Finance Minister’s request to give a tax break to a telecom company, and the former Finance Secretary, Rameshwore Khanal resigning over the then Finance Minister’s push to give amnesty to defaulting Value Added Tax (VAT) businesses are examples of positive resistance cases.
However, alongside the opening of space for resisting, the newer developments have resulted in sub-optional outcomes, including supporting and resisting for partisan reasons, adopting status quo measures due to job security and a dearth of functional metrics that measure work performance, and co-opting due to partisan and private interests. Instances such as the former Home Secretary, Tek Narayan Pandey, colluding with the then Home Minister for kickbacks, CPN-UML chair and Prime Minister K.P. Oli appointed Constitutional Commissions chiefs taking decisions that favour the CPN-UML, secretaries leveraging their partisan networks and colluding with the newly appointed ministers to get lucrative postings, and uninspiring performance due to job security and the absence of metrics measuring performance are examples of the negatives that have arisen due to the increased power of the bureaucratic apparatus.
Implications and Interventions
The Panchayat period is a testament to the fact that placing the bureaucracy at the mercy of the executive is less than ideal, for it encourages subservience and sycophancy. The bureaucracy requires certain service-related safeguards to check executive excesses and hold the executive accountable.
But excessive bureaucratic power also invites sub-optimal outcomes that impede the goal of an accountable and efficient bureaucracy.
Amidst political instability, the Nepali bureaucracy has gone from strength to strength and has emerged as a veritable force. They have leveraged this strengthened space for kickbacks and to gain service-related concessions – easy pathways to entry and promotion, lucrative transfers, longer service periods, etc. – which negatively affects the quality of public service delivery.
Governance reforms need to target some of these concessions that result in sub-optimal outcomes. Obvious areas to start includes abolishing political party-affiliated civil servants’ trade unions, curtailing bureaucratic influence on transfers, and making promotions tied to work performance.
This is likely to generate resistance from the bureaucracy, and much will depend on the quality and will of the elected representatives. The irony is that political instability and the uninspiring performance of elected representatives has given space to bureaucrats in the first place.
The article is based on research conducted by Policy Entrepreneurs Inc. (PEI) and SOAS University of London. An earlier version of the article was published at The Kathmandu Post on May 9, 2014.
