By Vladimir Liparteliani
Vladimir Liparteliani is a political scientist specializing in the role of meanings and ideas in international relations with a particular focus on the geographical spaces of Europe and the former Soviet Union. He is currently completing his PhD at Durham University.
As Georgia approaches a pivotal parliamentary election on October 26, the ruling party – Georgian Dream – remains surprisingly resilient in its popularity. Despite large-scale anti-government protests earlier this year sparked by the controversial “foreign agents” bill, and opposition efforts to frame the ruling party as a Kremlin puppet steering the country away from its Western integration path, Georgian Dream is continuing to lead in pre-election polls one month before the elections.
This persistence in support occurs against the backdrop of strained relations between the Georgian government, which managed to obtain EU candidate status in December 2023, and the West largely due to the former’s increasing authoritarianism, illiberalism, and pro-Russian tilt. This raises the questions:
How has the support for Georgian Dream remained steadfast in a society where a significant majority has been oriented towards the integration into the EU and NATO for the past two decades? Why has the party’s drift towards anti-Western rhetoric and its open attacks on liberal freedoms, including women, the LGBTQI+ community, and pluralism, not significantly eroded its support?
Liberal ideas and Western-style democracy seem to struggle with gaining widespread support among the Georgian populace. The people remain predominantly inclined to support culturally conservative principles, as a significant group continues to reject core liberal values such as the rule of law, equality, democracy, human rights, pluralism, and secularism. As a result, Georgian Dream’s violations of these norms has not caused strong protest sentiments in the society.
The rejection of liberal values is at the core of Russian soft power objectives that have effectively demonized those values, contrasting them with traditional, conservative Orthodox values, projecting “the West as a morally degraded part of the world” and depicting it as a threat towards Georgian traditional culture and national identity since around 2012.
Such ideas are currently supported by some 37% of the Georgian population. What then is at the core of this soft power, and how has it mitigated significant protest against Georgian Dream’s illiberal policies?
Soft power, a concept pioneered by the political scientist Joseph Nye in his 1990 book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, refers to the ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion. Unlike hard power, which relies on military or economic force, soft power is derived from cultural influence, values, and diplomacy. The concept quickly gained practical popularity among many countries, primarily developed ones, as a significant part of their foreign policy.
After 2012, Russia also began actively referring to soft power and to its potential to promote Russia’s foreign policy interests. Importantly, this occurred in the context of Russia’s 2012 ‘conservative turn,’ an ideological pivot toward conservatism which has been a key element of Russia’s self-positioning ever since. Seeking to advance its foreign ambitions through soft power, the Kremlin started to leverage public diplomacy tools, such as NGOs, online media outlets, and political parties to spread its soft influence in Georgia. Through these instruments, the Russian government has explicitly aimed to promote conservative and religious values among Georgians, to juxtapose them to Western liberal norms and hence to dismiss the Western political system and its image.
Although Russian soft power has been steadily gaining traction, its real success came after 2020 as Georgian Dream’s agenda to undermine democracy and civil liberties also took a more explicit form. As Russian soft power and the rhetoric of Georgian Dream worked in concert, they reinforced each other’s efforts to erode democratic norms in the country.
One of the cornerstones of Russia’s soft power in Georgia has been the establishment of a network of NGOs that propagate Kremlin-backed narratives.
Organizations such as the Eurasian Institute, the Society of Erekle II, and the Eurasian Choice have played a critical role in advancing anti-Western and conservative viewpoints. These NGOs are funded by Russian state organs like the Gorchakov Fund and Russkiy Mir Foundation, and their activities range from hosting public events to disseminating information through media platforms like the RIA Novosti press centre in Tbilisi. For example, the protests against the adoption of the anti-discrimination law in 2014 – arguing that the law would promote homosexuality and was therefore unacceptable in Orthodox Georgia – are a distinctive example of the activities of these NGOs. Their messaging has resonated, particularly among older and more conservative segments of the population.
In addition to NGOs, Russia’s soft power strategy has included support for certain political movements and parties within Georgia that share its anti-Western stance. One notable example is the Alliance of Patriots, a conservative party founded in opposition to the pro-Western policies of former President Mikheil Saakashvili. The Alliance of Patriots has received support from Russia, both ideologically and financially, and has become a significant player in Georgian politics, appealing to voters who are skeptical of Western integration. Far-right movements like the Georgian March and the Conservative Movement – the existence of which has been possible due to Russia’s financial support – constitute a similar example.
These groups are known for their ultra-conservative, anti-liberal, and, in some cases, quasi-fascist ideologies. They frequently espouse anti-Western rhetoric, using issues like LGBTQI+ rights and “traditional values” as rallying points to demonize the West. For instance, during the annual Pride Weeks in Tbilisi, these groups have led violent protests, burning EU and NATO flags and promoting homophobic narratives. Such actions are not merely isolated expressions of intolerance but have been part of a broader trend, used by the Russian state as its own instruments of soft power, through which it has aimed to win sympathy among mainly conservative-minded members of society, spread hatred towards liberal ideas, and demoralize the Western-oriented part of society.
Media is the third and final crucial pillar of Russian soft power in Georgia. The Russian state-owned news agency Sputnik Georgia, one of the most popular news outlets, has been instrumental in shaping public opinion by presenting a pro-Russian, anti-Western perspective. While Sputnik does not operate as a television network like RT – which was part of cable television in Georgia before being taken down in 2022 following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – it maintains an active presence through websites and radio broadcasts that promote Moscow’s viewpoints. Sputnik consistently frames issues in a way that aligns with Kremlin narratives, while never giving a platform to opposing voices, particularly those advocating for closer ties with the West. This selective presentation of information has helped to foster a sense of mistrust towards Georgia’s pro-Western political parties.
Amplifying only the opinions of experts who support Georgia’s neutrality or align with Russian interests, Sputnik marginalizes pro-Western voices and creates an echo chamber of anti-liberal sentiment.
As the October elections approach, the subtle yet pervasive influence of Russian soft power in Georgia becomes increasingly evident in for example the failure of pro-Western oppositional forces to mobilize significant amount of people for the protests against the governments’ plans to apologize to South Ossetians for the 2008 military conflict. Moscow’s soft influence is also clearly reflected in the unshaken commitment of the majority to conservative values and in their weak responsiveness to liberal norms and ideas, for instance the people’s widespread toleration and acceptance of the anti-LGBTQ+ legislation recently approved by the government. This demonstrates that Russian soft power has managed to impact Georgia’s political landscape by promoting conservative values, diminishing the importance of liberal sentiments, and bolstering political movements that strengthen far-right ideologies.
As a result, Russian conservative soft power has helped deter public dissent against Georgian Dream’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies. It has played a significant role in fostering tolerance toward the illiberal, increasingly authoritarian and undemocratic actions of the ruling party, such as the plans to ban the opposition, the crack down on civil society, or severe violence over political activists.
Georgian Dream’s foreign policy shift towards a more skeptical stance regarding the West seems not only to be accepted by a significant portion of the electorate but, in some quarters, embraced. This is in spite of the statements of EU’s leaders that the drift will hugely undermine Georgia’s prospects for integration into the EU and even will probably suspend the existing free-visa regime with the Schengen Area.
The critical question now is whether Georgia will continue its gradual drift away from Euro-Atlantic integration towards a more neutral or even pro-Russian stance. This will largely depend on the results of the upcoming elections where Georgian Dream, supported by Russian soft power, has a strong chance of victory. If current trends persist, it might mean that Russian soft power had a significant role in altering Georgia’s political trajectory, at least in the near term.
What is crucial though is that such a trajectory would extend beyond mere geopolitics; it would signify a redirect away from liberal democracy and its associated freedoms for Georgians.
Either way, the battle between the country’s liberal aspirations and conservative heritage is still far from over.
