By Levan Kakhishvili
Levan Kakhishvili is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the European Politics Research Group, ETH Zurich, where he researches the convergence between EU law in social policy and legislation in candidate countries. His doctoral dissertation, completed at the University of Bamberg, focused on programmatic party competition in hybrid regimes and its interactions with clientelist forms of competition.
On October 26, Georgia’s parliamentary elections will serve as a referendum on its future, out of which three main scenarios emerge. In the first, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party wins, consolidates authoritarian rule, and aligns with Russia. A second scenario sees the opposition winning, potentially restoring democracy and accelerating EU integration. However, the most likely scenario involves contested results, which could trigger public unrest, violent clashes, and even Russian intervention. This critical election will most likely determine whether Georgia embraces European-style democracy or solidifies authoritarianism, risking further isolation from Western allies.
Both the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party and the opposition see the upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia as a referendum on the nation’s future. With GD’s recent authoritarian and pro-Russian shift—which has alienated even former allies, including President Salome Zourabichvili, a politically astute French-born diplomat—these elections could be unprecedented for Georgia in determining its future political trajectory. GD has been in office for over a decade. Over this period, it has built a strong hold over the state and its institutions, and it has increasingly followed a sovereign foreign policy direction. If GD wins, it will secure a fourth consecutive term, thus able to consolidate its power and shape Georgia’s political and legal systems to its interests. Yet, in this critical moment, three other scenarios emerge: GD could win decisively, ending democratization and aligning with Russia; the opposition could prevail, leading to rapid European integration; or the results could be hotly contested, with no clear victor. The last scenario, the most likely but also the most dangerous, could risk Georgia’s security, demanding careful navigation by all parties to avoid destabilization.
Scenario 1. GD’s victory and the consolidation of Georgia’s authoritarianism
In 2023, democracy indices such as V-Dem, The Economist’s Democracy Index, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index rated Georgian democracy at its lowest since 2013. While these scores have not altered Georgia’s political classification, they signal a decline. Recent actions by GD reinforce this trend. GD enacted a “foreign agents” law, inspired by Moscow’s playbook, to regulate funding for civil society groups and media. They also banned same-sex marriage and “gay propaganda,” echoing Moscow’s conservative policies. Additionally, GD plans to outlaw almost all opposition parties that have a chance to surpass the 5% parliamentary threshold.
This first scenario indicates that GD, should it win outright, would consolidate its authoritarian rule, targeting both political and civil opposition.
With Western criticism of these laws and EU integration stalled, Georgia risks isolation, potentially increasing Moscow’s influence over Tbilisi. GD’s promises of EU membership “with dignity” by 2030 seem unlikely if this authoritarian path persists.
If GD consolidates power, it’s expected to further politicize the judiciary, stifle civil society, and transform the parliament into a rubber stamp for Bidzina Ivanishvili, who will either continue as Georgia’s informal ruler or reenter formal politics. As a result, the primary question would be to what lengths is GD willing to go to achieve the broad repression of civil society, political parties, and public political participation.
In this scenario, Georgia would align more closely with Russia and possibly China, following the 2023 strategic partnership with Beijing. Its only European partner would perhaps be Hungary under Viktor Orbán because of similar authoritarian tendencies. However, neither China nor Hungary would shield Georgia from Russian influence. Ultimately, this path would immediately lead to a regression of Georgian democracy, positioning Tbilisi as a Russian satellite. Democracy advocates internally may need to move their activities underground while external supporters, such as international donors, might want to consider making their support more accessible in such contexts. However, a different turn of events can easily lead to much more positive outlook on the future of Georgia’s democracy.
Scenario 2. GD’s defeat: A U-turn for Georgian democracy
The 2024 elections in Georgia offer the opposition a rare chance to defeat GD due to the introduction of a fully proportional system, which eliminates the ruling party’s previous advantage based on single-mandate districts. Opposition parties, in fear of losing votes, have formed three coalitions and signed the “Georgian Charter,” drafted by President Salome Zourabichvili, committing to reforms, European integration, and snap elections in a fair, competitive environment under a technocratic interim government.
In this second scenario, a coalition of parties wins a majority of votes and GD would not be able to form a government on its own. Due to a perceived lack of legitimacy, GD would be unable to mobilize the state’s coercive apparatus to contest the results and so would be forced to transfer power. Opposition parties will be expected to consult with the President to establish an interim government focused on EU integration reforms, including depoliticizing the judiciary and creating a fair electoral environment. GD’s recent repressive laws would be repealed, and perhaps some of the damage to democracy undone. The cabinet, including the Prime Minister, would consist of experienced professionals, not party-affiliated politicians, who would implement these reforms swiftly.
However, challenges would remain. The opposition must fully commit to the Charter for reforms to be sustainable, especially the formation of a technocratic government with non-political ministers, which requires them to relinquish power—a significant hurdle.
Moreover, the President’s influence, while respected, has limits. The recent failure to unite two opposition factions shows Zourabichvili’s influence is not absolute, though her call for unity led to prompt negotiations.
Overall, this scenario, while promising for democracy, is uncertain. If opposition unity endures, Georgia could move back toward democratization and European integration. This would lead to significant reforms in line with the EU’s membership conditions. Consequently, Georgia would benefit from technical and political expertise to implement reforms quickly and efficiently, financial support and the EU’s readiness to open accession negotiations. However, success depends on defeating GD, a peaceful transfer of power, and the new coalition prioritizing long -term national interests over short-term political gains.
Scenario 3. Contested electoral results: Post-election uncertainty and public unrest
If GD cannot secure a decisive election victory or refuses to concede because of its ability to mobilize a large number of voters, Georgia could face significant turmoil. Experts anticipate that GD will “steal” elections and that “post-election unrest” will follow. GD might also try to form a coalition with smaller parties like Girchi (Georgian for “Pinecone”) or the right-wing populists with whom GD has recently aligned discursively. Meanwhile, the main opposition parties would seek to build their coalition, leading to uncertainty about governance and a lack of willingness from either side to acknowledge defeat. This scenario could result in widespread protests, as neither coalition would likely earn public trust, shifting political battles from parliament to the streets.
Mass protests are likely, considering the spring demonstrations against the “foreign agents” law, where a significant portion of Tbilisi’s population joined the March for Europe.
If GD attempts to retain power, similar protests could arise, though it is unclear if they will remain peaceful. This scenario presents two major security risks: clashes between protestors and police, and potential Russian interference.
GD seems oblivious to its declining legitimacy, as it claims 60% public support and seeks a constitutional majority. On April 29, GD demonstrated its ability to mobilize large crowds, partly by coercing public employees to attend rallies. Although it is unclear how the attitudes of those who felt obliged to attend the rally may change after the elections, GD’s capacity to utilize their own formal and informal networks should not be underestimated. A recent poll from September, on the other hand, indicates opposition parties could collectively secure 61.8% of the vote, while GD stands at 32.3%. Although opinion polls in Georgia are often unreliable, if these numbers reflect the post-election mood, both GD and the opposition could mobilize a large number of voters. With GD controlling the state’s coercive apparatus, violent clashes may ensue, leading either to the overthrow of GD or GD’s suppression of protests and consolidation of power, potentially followed by retaliatory measures.
Amid post-election unrest, there’s also the risk of Russian intervention. While Moscow’s current capacity for military action in Georgia is unclear, it is reminiscent of the 2014 situation in Ukraine when Russia reacted to pro-EU protests. Russia has already framed a narrative accusing the U.S. of plotting to overthrow GD in a “Tbilisi Maidan,” involving opposition and civil society organizations. Meanwhile, the U.S. has sanctioned GD officials, and US senators have repeatedly made statements about the “need to do more” to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Consequently, Georgia can become “the frontline of the struggle between Russia and the west,” as the journalist Nathalie Tocci wrote in July in The Guardian. This frontline is currently abstract but has great potential to become physical.
Overall, this scenario is the most uncertain and can be the most dangerous for Georgia’s democracy as well as security. At the same time, it seems to be the most likely unless the events before the elections take an unexpected turn and increase voters’ certainty about the possible results of the ballot—in which case democracy advocates will need to focus in the short term on mediation and dialogue efforts to bring the parties to the table and find a negotiated solution.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the upcoming elections in Georgia represent a pivotal moment with three potential paths forward, each carrying profound implications. A GD victory could solidify authoritarianism, aligning Georgia closer with Russia and stifling democratic processes. Alternatively, an opposition win could restore the country’s democratic trajectory and re-establish its Euro-Atlantic ambitions, though this depends on unity and adherence to democratic principles among opposition factions. The most uncertain and perilous outcome, however, involves contested results leading to public unrest. This scenario risks violent clashes and possible Russian intervention, recalling past crises in the region. The “maidanization” of the streets of Tbilisi, to which GD and its associates often allude, may become a reality. At the end of the day, supporters of Georgia’s democracy either need to move their activities underground, be prepared for accelerated reforms and EU integration, or engage in mediation between GD and the opposition to avoid violence. Georgia stands at a crossroads, with its democratic future, international alignment, and internal stability all hanging in the balance.
