By Gabriel Kessler and Gabriel Vommaro
Latin America’s political landscape is marked by rising discontent and ideological divides, amplified by the post-pandemic climate. A recent research project highlights three main conflict patterns—ideological polarization, leader-driven division, and widespread dissatisfaction—across five countries. These dynamics reveal potential risks to democracies, as polarization and disenfranchisement reshape political engagement and fuel uncertainty in the region’s future.
Latin America is currently experiencing escalating discontent and social and political conflict, which has been further exacerbated by the global Covid-19 pandemic, as discussed by Benza & Kessler, 2019. The leftist forces that ushered in the ‘Left Turn’ at the dawn of the 21st century have now become the ‘establishment’ facing a new wave of challenges. The emergence of right-wing opposition presaged a significant political shift that has not occurred yet. However, political discontent has grown in Latin America and is represented by massive protests, changes in electoral behavior, negative attitudes toward democracy, and the emergence of radical right-wing actors.
“[…] political discontent has grown in Latin America and is represented by massive protests, changes in electoral behavior, negative attitudes toward democracy, and the emergence of radical right-wing actors.”
How is conflict organized in different countries? What are the consequences and challenges of these conflicts for democracy in the region? To answer these and other questions, the Polarization, Democracy, and Rights in Latin America (POLDER) project, funded by the Ford Foundation, conducted comprehensive comparative research in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico) between 2021 and 2023, using mixed methods. Based on our research, we argue that, after the end of the commodity boom, social conflict in Latin America can be framed under three dynamics and non-sequenced scenarios as depicted in Figure 1: ideological polarization with affective components, polarization around an emerging leader, and generalized discontent.
Figure 1. Scenarios of discontent in contemporary Latin America
Source: Authors’ own diagram
Among the countries studied, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay are cases of ideological polarization. There is generalized discontent in Colombia and, with nuances, in Peru and Ecuador, while Mexico under Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and El Salvador under Nayib Bukele present polarization cases around a leader.
Three cases illustrate these scenarios. In Brazil, polarization began in mid-2000s with a “left turn” built around a solid socio-political coalition comprising an alliance between the Workers’ Party (PT in Portuguese), unions, and social movements. According to Singer, the PT governments articulated redistributive policies with progressive cultural, gender, and human rights policies. Samuels and Zucco show that when Bolsonaro emerged on the electoral scene, he managed to represent a dispersed and heterogeneous electorate that was brought together by their rejection of the PT and, as also proposed by Santos & Tanscheit and Rennó, their disagreement with a mainstream Right that did not fully represent cultural and economic unrest against Lula and his party.
In Colombia, in 2002, Botero, Losada & Wills-Otero demonstrated how Alvaro Uribe emerged as an authoritarian alternative to traditional party candidates (despite being a Liberal Party leader). With the frame of “democratic security,” he built a successful party brand based on hardline policies related to the domestic armed conflict. The 2016 referendum on the peace accords saw a high degree of electoral polarization. There was also a strategic articulation between those opposed to the Accords and religious conservatives. However, the nonpartisan nature of the vote hindered the consolidation of socio-political coalitions that might frame differing agendas for voters. In 2018, a leftist candidate reached the second round of the presidential elections. In 2022, this force brought its leader, Gustavo Petro, to power.
After more than seventy years of Partido Revolucionarío Institucional (PRI-Institutional Revolutionary Party) predominance, Mexico entered the 21st century, undergoing a process of democratic opening. A competitive system with three main electoral forces emerged composed of the PRI, which maintained its strength as a catch-all party with diffuse ideological components; the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN-National Action Party), a conservative party; and the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD-Revolutionary Democratic Party), a center-to-the-left party. Amid another disputed election, the 2006 presidential elections, the PRD became absorbed in a new movement, this time with a solid re-foundational tone: the Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (Morena-National Regeneration Movement) took in a good part of the PRD’s leaders and rank and file. The Morena party’s leader, Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), became president in 2018 with a discourse against the political establishment and its “privileges.” In 2024, Claudia Scheinbaum, of the same party, was elected with a high percentage of votes.
How do different scenarios influence the structuring of discontent at the societal level? In our argument, in line with Ken Roberts’ discussion of the post-neoliberal political scenario in Latin America, the agents of representation provide the frames by which society organizes discontent. For example, in the case of Brazil, Kessler, Miskolci, and Vommaro show that PT voters have progressive positions on cultural and economic issues, while Bolsonaro voters are more conservative on both dimensions. In scenarios of generalized discontent towards political elites, parties organize the electoral scene but are weak agents of representation and, therefore, do not organize the conflict at the societal level. Such is the case for Colombia, where Kessler et al. show that electoral preference and ideological positions are weakly correlated. When a polarized scenario centers on a leader, polarization operates at the electoral level but does not organize preferences and demands within society’s principal agendas. As in Colombia, electoral preference and ideological positions are weakly correlated in Mexico.
The three scenarios also have implications for different dimensions of conflict structuring. The first evident impact is on the politicization of agendas at the societal level.
There is a correlation between a high level of polarization and a greater interest in politics. Opinions are clearly in line with votes.
These trends are related to the frames set by socio-political coalitions. In Brazil, there are more arguments and language about rights and less based on individual perspectives. In both Mexico and Brazil, there is more interest in politics and more consumption of political information. On the other hand, Colombia is the least politicized case, with a greater weight of religious frames and less consumption of political information.
There is a correlation between a high level of polarization and a greater interest in politics. Opinions are clearly in line with votes.
Second, there are implications for the ideological alignment of discontent. High levels of alignment imply that the frames organizing positions on agendas follow the left-right cleavage (with its national particularities), generally associated with the main competing socio-political coalitions. In Brazil, where there is ideological polarization, an ideological boundary between voters of the two competing options was identified. In Colombia, where generalized discontent prevails, the idea of an “uneven playing field” generates apathy and anger. The lack of opportunities and the negative view of elites generates the perception of an uneven playing field: everything is set up by the elites only for their own benefit. In Mexico, the critical factor is moral and calls into question the protagonists of Mexico’s recent history, particularly on corruption and privileges.
High levels of alignment imply that the frames organizing positions on agendas follow the left-right cleavage (with its national particularities), generally associated with the main competing socio-political coalitions.
Third, the degree and content of affective polarization also vary in the three scenarios. Brazil exhibits the highest levels of moral disqualification of adversaries with ideological polarization. Thus, affective polarization feeds back into ideological alignments instead of supplanting them. A clear contrast is Colombia, where the negative view of the other only emerges among small, hardcore groups of voters. In Mexico, meanwhile, ideological alignment is also diffuse. Still, AMLO’s influence could either lead to an ideological reordering of society or become a less durable experience of populist interpellation.
Polarization is known to have unequal effects on democratic vitality. It organizes discontent and creates high levels of politicization, but it also generates a great deal of animosity at the societal level.
Finally, the dynamic character of our conceptualization of scenarios has implications for polarized ones. Polarization is known to have unequal effects on democratic vitality. It organizes discontent and creates high levels of politicization, but it also generates a great deal of animosity at the societal level. Polarization scenarios around an emerging leader can allow for the growth of authoritarian orientations. This has not been the case in Mexico. The presidency of Claudia Scheinbaum seems to augur a deepening of democracy. However, other cases of emerging leaders promising to transform longstanding discontent into hope for change may be worrying signs of illiberal democracies, like Bukele in El Salvador, or a turn to the far right with an uncertain future, like Milei in Argentina. Finally, cases of generalized discontent seem most common in Latin America. There, the dissatisfaction with democracy, the low level of participation in elections, and the difficulty for society to transform its dissatisfaction into transformative action led us to foresee a scenario of high political volatility with no clear horizon for change.
Gabriel Kessler is a principal investigator at the Argentinian National Research Council, CONICET, and a full professor at UNLP (Universidad Nacional de La Plata) and Eidaes-Unsam (Escuela Interdisciplinaria de Alto Estudios Sociales, Universidad Nacional de San Martin).
Gabriel Vommaro is a Fellow at the Center for Inter-American Policy and Research (CIPR), Stone Center for Latin American Studies, Tulane University, Professor of Political Sociology at Eidaes-Unsam, and Researcher at the Argentinian National Research Council, CONICET.
