By Adina Marincea
Romania’s 2024 presidential race reveals again the troubling global rise of far-right populism. On December 8, Călin Georgescu, a pro-Kremlin independent candidate will compete with Elena Lasconi (USR- Save Romania Union). Yet, Georgescu’s rise did not come out of nowhere. As Adina Marincea demonstrates in this article, Călin Georgescu’s alarming advance reflects years of mobilizations by neo-legionary groups, Orthodox clergy, and Kremlin-aligned factions.
Adina Marincea is a Researcher at the Elie Wiesel National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania, where she analyzes far-right manifestations and discourse.
Until the 2020 elections, Romania had been considered an outlier in the Central and Eastern European region: it was viewed as a good democratic, pro-European ‘student’ with no far-right parties in Parliament.
The rise of the right-wing populist AUR (Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor, The Alliance for the Union of Romanians) in that year changed this perception, and now Romania is facing the possibility of electing as president a charismatic leader who is pro-Kremlin while also a supporter of Trump, neo-fascistic, a conspiracy theorist, as well as an Orthodox mysticist who is against science.
Călin Georgescu’s unexpected success in the first round of the presidential elections in Romania came as a shock to many, since election polls predicted a mere 4-5% vote intention in his favor. Yet, long before these elections, Georgescu made his political way through the system that he now rhetorically opposes. What might explain Călin Georgescu’s sudden electoral success, and who supports him? This is the focus of the overview that follows.
Though many current analyses discuss Georgescu’s online strategy, especially through TikTok, which surely played a significant part in his success, I argue that they tend to overlook his long-term political career building strategy.
Georgescu held many positions within the Romanian state ever since the 90s and had connections with different political leaders, while being supported by various representatives of that state – from ministers to Academy leaders, former Secret Services members, together with neo-legionary groups and priests.
Social networks, especially TikTok, have been successfully weaponized by Georgescu not just in 2024, but also in the run-up to the 2020 parliament elections. At that time, Georgescu was a member of AUR, which promoted him as a possible future Prime Minister.
Because of high mistrust in mainstream media, especially television channels (which have lost their political independence since they are directly funded by political parties), a big chunk of the electorate has shifted to social media to gain political information.
However, the role of online strategies should not overshadow the offline strategies Georgescu employed over many years. Georgescu managed to get the votes of young people, 18-24 years old (a public active on TikTok), irrespective of gender, and voters under the age of 44. His voters are predominantly from small and medium cities and rural areas, having either primary, secondary, or no formal education.
The potential president has received the support of different representatives of the political and state apparatuses. He has managed to build a network with deep connections in small cities and rural areas with the help of grassroots neo-legionary groups and priests.
In a typical populist manner, Călin Georgescu presents himself as a man outside and against the system, despite being clearly embedded in and supported by it. The investigative press has revealed his multiple connections with the main political parties, former presidents, ministers and different state institutions, including the Romanian Academy. Journalists from Snoop revealed that the Romanian press of the 1990s described Georgescu as a “lobbyist for PSD” (the post-communist Social-Democrat Party). His connections reach all the way to former president Ion Iliescu, Prime Minister Petre Roman and some Democratic Party (PD) ministers as well as state-funded NGOs. He became general secretary at the Ministry of Environment following a “rigged” contest and served as a personal advisor to the Minister. In 2004 he became a personal advisor to Mircea Geoană, who then served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was briefly employed in his ministry. Twenty years later, they became opponents, with Mircea Geoană also among the presidential candidates this year, after he had stepped down as NATO Deputy Secretary General.
Another journalistic investigation showed that Georgescu was connected to a network named after a KGB spy, Mihai Caraman. This network had roots in the (national-communist) Foreign Intelligence Directorate, which was at the same time penetrated by the Kremlin. The Caraman network, argues Spotmedia, has infiltrated government institutions and agencies, influencing groups of retired Army and former Securitate officers, running businesses and impacting political decision-making throughout the last two decades. For instance, Vasile Zărnescu, former Romanian Intelligence Service colonel, a longtime Holocaust denier who systematically incites to hatred and distributes well-known antisemitic narratives, has publicly voiced his support for Călin Georgescu, calling him “The Providential Candidate.” In 2022 the court decided to forgive Zărnescu for his clear public denial of the Holocaust which has continued up to this day. After the parliament elections on December 1, Zărnescu will very probably become Senator for the SOS România party of Diana Iovanovici-Șoșoacă, who is also subject of several criminal complaints for rehabilitation of war criminals and antisemitic incitement to hatred.
Călin Georgescu, the allegedly “anti-system,” “independent” candidate is actually supported by a new party, the Party of Young People (POT), as well as representatives of different state institutions and of the Romanian Orthodox Church (BOR).
Between 2016 and 2020 he toured around the country holding conferences about his “Country Project” in public universities, state cultural centers and other institutions. In this context, Victor Voicu, the vice-president of the Romanian Academy, publicly supported him. Leaders of other Academy institutes contributed to the rehabilitation of the interwar Legionary Movement, together with the current neo-legionary groups that support Georgescu. Georgescu was also supported by priests, both online and offline, especially at the local level. He was even allowed to “preach” in churches, both Orthodox and Pentecostal.
Călin Georgescu also managed to garner support from the most relevant and radical neo-legionary grassroots groups such as The Orthodox Brotherhood, Gogu Puiu, the Haidouks of Dobrogea Association, and the Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu Foundation. These groups have local networks that were mobilized during his campaign. This was possible due to a steady consolidation of neo-legionary thinking throughout the years.
Romania has seen a continuous rehabilitation of the Legionary Movement and war criminals, including through decisions to keep their statues and street names dedicated to them, as well as antisemitic and Holocaust denialist speech, often with the support of public institutions such as the Romanian Academy or public administration, intellectuals, journalists, prosecutors, parliamentarians, and others.
Such manifestations have increased in proportion and virulence since AUR’s electoral success in 2020. Despite having legislation in place that clearly criminalizes them, as well as a National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Antisemitism, Xenophobia, Radicalization and Hate Speech, the law is not being applied and such neofascist manifestations are left unsanctioned. This helps to normalize and legitimize them.
In 2024, Romania marked twenty years since its acknowledgement of the Romanian authorities’ responsibility for the Holocaust in Romania. Despite this, denialism is on the rise.
In his speech in the past ten years, Georgescu has shown admiration for authoritarian leaders from the East to the West. He has sanctified Trump’s alleged “sacrifice” in his fight against “Neo-Marxist Satanists” as being in the name of Jesus Christ, and was influenced by QAnon conspiracy theories and “The Great Reset” – Georgescu being one of the top promoters of this conspiracy theory in Romania.
In his ongoing campaign for President, Georgescu showed more affinity towards Putin, stating that “Romania’s chance is the Russian wisdom.” Additionally, he is supported by the so-called “Group for Romania”, a pro-Kremlin, far-right, antisemitic group that issued a press release in his support and who, earlier in the year, was calling for Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to save Romania from the “Judeo-Euro-Atlantic political regime”. One of the main representatives of this group, Miron Manega (Dumitru Manea), editor of a neo-fascist newspaper, ran for Senator on the lists of SOS Romania far-right party and might make it into Parliament.
Besides pro-Russian sympathies, recent investigations also revealed some connections between Georgescu and the Kremlin.
Context.ro showed that he was artificially boosted on TikTok, Facebook and Telegram by a network of profiles connected to Russian accounts with a few hundred thousand followers and clear pro-Russian preferences. Georgescu declared no funding for his campaign and no headquarters either. However, journalists found out that he was using villas owned by people connected to pro-Russian factions in Chișinău who are related to pro-Kremlin Moldavian politicians Renato Usatîi and Ilan Șor. The Kremlin’s propaganda has penetrated many layers of Romanian society and is very common among the far right.
To conclude, there is much more behind Călin Georgescu’s unexpected electoral success that is currently testing Romania’s Euro-Atlantic and democratic commitment than his online strategy. His road to success did not begin with his 2024 or even 2020 campaign, but much earlier. And despite him playing the populist anti-establishment card, he is the man of the system he criticizes, with connections to different important branches of the state, politics, and the Church. Further support has been provided by neo-legionary groups and pro-Kremlin factions. The second round of presidential elections will be held on December 8.
