By Zsofia Bocskay
Misinformation thrives in competitive autocracies, where governments manipulate information to control narratives and foster uncertainty around political events. Yet, its dynamics in these contexts remain underexplored. Our recent study on Turkey reveals that partisanship and selective exposure drive misinformation beliefs – but surprisingly, not via social media, rather through television.
In recent years, the spread of social media has amplified the threat misinformation poses to liberal democratic governance. Still, in democracies, information is relatively accessible, as citizens enjoy greater freedom to choose among diverse outlets. Social media often serves as an alternative to traditional media like television but is also a major source of misinformation. In competitive authoritarian regimes like Turkey, acquiring reliable information becomes far costlier due to government strategies such as media capture, censorship, and the deployment of online trolls.
Unlike democracies, authoritarian regimes thrive by keeping citizens in a haze of contradictory and unreliable information – an approach that likely contributes to their electoral success.
Misinformation – false or inaccurate claims, whether deliberate or less intentional – often originates from the top in such contexts.
The 2023 Turkish general elections brought an unprecedented wave of misleading claims from the political elite. The electoral context was marked by turmoil: a severe economic crisis and the aftermath of devastating earthquakes in southeastern provinces, home to 10% of the population. A broad opposition alliance, consisting of six parties spanning religious-conservative, nationalist, and social democratic ideologies, formed to challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has maintained power for over two decades.
In this challenging context, misinformation likely became one of the government’s strategies to secure electoral victory. For instance, a video shown at AKP rallies falsely implicated the opposition in collusion with an internationally designated terrorist organization – a fabrication, as reported, created by splicing two unrelated clips (Euronews). Several other misleading claims were circulated in pro-government media, including the assertion that 1.7 million people attended their final rally, a figure that independent estimates suggested was significantly lower.
Yet, the opposition’s tactics mirrored those of the government in some ways. To maintain unity and counter the AKP, the opposition shifted its rhetoric during the runoff campaign, abandoning a message of love and solidarity in favor of anti-immigration rhetoric. They accused the government of settling 10 million refugees in Turkey, despite official reports indicating significantly lower numbers. The opposition likely sought to draw attention to a polarizing issue that highlighted the government’s shortcomings. However, using misinformation may also have been a strategy to gain visibility in an otherwise heavily biased media environment.
While misleading claims exist even in consolidated democracies, citizens in autocracies face greater exposure due to constrained information environments – a tool vital for governments’ electoral dominance. In Turkey, over two decades of media capture have left pro-government conglomerates dominating the landscape. Critical outlets, often censored, align with opposition narratives, creating a polarized environment with strong press-party parallelism. Suppression of dissent online makes information acquisition costly, leaving many citizens to rely on easily accessible sources.
Why do people believe misinformation in democracies? The usual culprit is partisanship, which activates cognitive biases like motivated reasoning.
Partisans interpret information in ways that reinforce their beliefs, accepting rumors about opponents while rejecting similar claims about their preferred candidates.
Partisanship also shapes information-seeking behavior, as individuals avoid outlets with opposing views, exposing themselves selectively to like-minded sources.
In democratic contexts, social media is the primary driver of misinformation, thriving in an environment of high internet penetration and little editorial supervision. Platforms amplify echo chambers, where partisans consume information consistent with their views. Yet, traditional media, particularly television, often escapes scrutiny, despite being a significant source of political news globally.
In autocracies with lower internet penetration and digital literacy, legacy media becomes a powerful tool for controlling public narratives and disseminating misinformation.
In our study on the 2023 Turkish general elections, we explored how partisanship, ideology, and media consumption shape belief in misleading claims. Using a nationwide survey, we asked participants to evaluate the credibility of six misleading claims from the campaign, promoted by either pro-government or opposition sources.
Anti-opposition claims included accusations of supporting the LGBTQI community, colluding with imperialist powers, and allying with terrorists. Anti-government claims focused on the Central Bank wasting billions, Russian involvement in fabricating opposition-targeted videos, and the government’s alleged collaboration with FETO – a domestic terrorist group designated by the Turkish state, and held responsible for the 2016 failed coup attempt (BBC). Citizens found these claims believable to varying degrees. For instance, while many were skeptical about the opposition’s alleged ties to terrorists and imperialists, the partially true but inaccurate claim of supporting LGBTQI causes appeared more credible.
These patterns of misinformation belief are closely tied to information sources citizens rely on. Television remains the dominant source of political information in Turkey, particularly among government supporters, 61% of whom watch it daily. Opposition supporters rely on television less frequently (49%), but it remains the most popular source overall.
While government supporters consume pro-government channels 80% of the time, even opposition and independent voters frequently encounter these outlets, making them the most widely accessed across the population.
In contrast, 63% of citizens never read newspapers for political news.
Our findings highlight the role of partisanship and ideology in shaping susceptibility to misinformation. Citizens with right-leaning ideologies are less likely to believe anti-government claims but find anti-opposition narratives more credible. Similarly, government supporters are more likely to accept anti-opposition claims, while opposition voters are inclined to believe anti-government misinformation. Media consumption patterns also play a key role. Pro-government media consumers tend to reject negative claims about the government while readily accepting anti-opposition narratives. Conversely, pro-opposition media users are more likely to believe negative claims about the government.
Interestingly, while social media’s role in misinformation susceptibility is limited, it is more complex. Social media use increases belief in anti-opposition claims but also serves as a corrective for certain voters.
Frequent social media users, likely due to greater digital literacy or familiarity with algorithms, are more skeptical of misleading claims about both the government and the opposition, making them less susceptible to misinformation than occasional users.
Misinformation has become essential to political campaigns. While much research focuses on democracies, where social media is the primary culprit due to its ease of access and tailored content, non-democracies present a different challenge. Authoritarian governments often dominate traditional media leveraging public resources to spread misinformation. With lower internet penetration and digital literacy compared to many democracies, controlling narratives through television becomes significantly easier. By targeting social media platforms and amplifying existing inequalities, these regimes further constrain the already limited information ecosystems their citizens navigate.
An even more critical takeaway emerges: as independent media outlets face financial pressures and political attacks, they may align with partisan voices critical of the government to survive.
Similarly, opposition parties, struggling under unfair conditions, can resort to disseminating misinformation to rally supporters.
This cycle deepens polarization, undermines political discourse, and risks reducing critical, balanced content essential for a healthy democracy. Understanding media consumption in non-democracies offers vital insights into how misinformation reinforces authoritarian power and perpetuates systemic inequalities.
This article draws on our recent study, coauthored with Simge Andı, Ali Çarkoğlu, and Lemi Baruh, Authoritarians Do It Better? Belief in Misinformation in Turkey.
Zsofia Bocskay is a postdoctoral researcher at the CEU Democracy Institute and an affiliate of Koç University. Her research examines political communication in non-democracies, focusing on the interplay between party strategies, media systems, and voter behavior.
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