While the far-right AfD failed to make major gains in the West, it cemented dominance in the East, becoming the country’s second-strongest party. Now, Friedrich Merz’s incoming government faces mounting domestic and geopolitical crises. Kristóf Szombati analyzes the outcome of the German elections.
By Kristóf Szombati
After the dust settled on election day and the sun rose over the Hauptstadt one thing became abundantly clear: the outcome could have been far worse. The terror attacks in Solingen, Mannheim, Magdeburg, Aschaffenburg and Munich made asylum and immigration the top electoral issue, forcing the two governing left-wing parties (the SPD and Greens) to play defense, and compelling conservative leader Friedrich Merz to launch a law-and-order offensive focused on the securitization of borders. While the maneuver prevented the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which had been calling for similar measures since 2015 – from taking ownership of the issue, it also led Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) to pass a non-binding parliamentary resolution together with the far-right.
Under these circumstances the key question of the election was not if the far-right would do well, but how well it would do.
In the end the CDU emerged as the clear winner, with the AfD failing to win a single direct mandate in West Germany and only receiving between 15-25% of votes there. Although the sighs of relief emerging from the left, right and center are warranted, no-one should fool themselves into thinking that the AfD has been contained. To the contrary, this particularly radical manifestation of the far-right is now the country’s second strongest party and it has entrenched its hegemony in the five Eastern regions (where it won the great majority of direct mandates).
The AfD is now also the main parliamentary opposition force and will be breathing down the neck of the next ruling coalition, ready to seize on its mistakes and shortcomings.
And we can be sure that there will be shortcomings. As things stand, a so-called “grand coalition” (what a misnomer!) formed by the conservatives as senior partners and the Social Democrats (SPD) as junior partners will take the reins of power. The coalition led by Friedrich Merz will face a series of difficult and treacherous challenges and an increasingly chaotic, competitive and violent world where Germany and its European partners are struggling to find a footing.
On the foreign policy front the most urgent task is to find a common strategy that allows European powers to influence the negotiations between the US and Russia on ending the war in Ukraine. This will not be easy, given the CDU’s and SPD’s divergent views on how to engage Russia (not to mention bringing together the radically opposed views of countries like Hungary and Slovakia on the one hand and Poland and the U.K. on the other). The incoming German government will also have to immediately begin working with other governments and the Commission on a common defense strategy with a view to creating a military force capable of deterring Russia. At the same time they will need to come up with a plan for re-engaging Putin in the event that a peace settlement can be reached. In addition, the new government will also have to play a much more active role than the previous one in cobbling together a coordinated response to Trump’s efforts to divide and subdue Europe economically and politically. All of this will necessitate a significant amount of effort to keep the German public on board, and the AfD will do everything in its power to sow division and discord.
Things do not look easier on the domestic front. The government will not only have to bring down high energy prices but also find a way to address the deep structural crisis of the industry-based economic model, which has been squeezed by robust competition from China and is now facing the devastating prospect of curtailed access to its main market if Trump forges ahead with the “beautiful” tariffs he has threatened to slap on the EU. In the past two years Germany has experienced negative economic growth and budget cuts, and the chances of reversing the tide are not great amid heightened global economic competition. The new government, moreover, will not only face the task of preventing the country’s deindustrialization; it must also find money to upgrade the country’s ailing public infrastructure, mitigate a worsening cost-of living crisis, and restore the country’s degraded military capabilities. Doing all of this together appears daunting to say the least. While even conservatives are coming around to realizing that their cherished Schuldenbremse (which prevents borrowing above 0.35% of GDP) will have to be reformed, it will not be possible to finance these extremely expensive undertakings solely through loans.
Painful budgetary choices will have to be made, and in all likelihood social expenditure will bear the brunt, leading to the further erosion of social cohesion and deepening frustration on the lower rungs of the social ladder.
The SPD, down 9% since the last election, faces an existential crisis. Although four years in opposition could allow the party to remake itself, it is likely that the Social Democrats will not be able to avoid entering into a coalition with the conservatives, given that “black-red” is the only two-way coalition possible and the country’s dreadful experience with the previous “traffic light” coalition has made three-way alliances extremely unpalatable.
As a junior coalition partner, the SPD will struggle to preserve its social democratic profile.
Under pressure from the CDU, it will probably have to acquiesce to a reform of its flagship social policy: the guaranteed minimal income scheme (the so-called Bürgergeld). The Social Democrats will also have to go along with Merz’s pledge to turn back “illegal” asylum-seekers from Germany’s borders, even though this may cause rifts with neighbors. The cornerstones of economic policy are also likely to be set by the CDU, whose leadership has promised to substantially reduce corporate taxes instead of offering subsidies to companies willing to invest in the upgrading of productive capacities (the option preferred by social democrats). Because of all this, the SPD risks being deserted by many voters and this could relegate the party to the political sidelines, as has happened to social democrats in France and elsewhere.
A resurgent Left party (die Linke) – which caused the biggest surprise of the election by gaining close to 9% of the votes – is best positioned to defend the foundations of the Sozialstaat. The presence of a “social opposition” should be a welcome prospect for those committed to the preservation of German democracy, given that the other left-leaning parties in opposition are not well-positioned to take on this role. The Greens – who had been the favorites of young voters at the previous election – have toned down their left-wing credentials in view of luring voters away from the CDU but also to create space for a coalition with the conservatives. As for the left-conservative alliance led by former Left party firebrand Sarah Wagenknecht (BSW), it failed to overcome the parliamentary threshold of 5%. Stranded outside the parliamentary arena and facing competition from right-wing rivals on immigration and the Left on welfare, the BSW will struggle to rebuild momentum.
This leaves die Linke as the only force that could potentially prevent the AfD from absorbing societal discontents.
Theirs will be an uphill battle, as the party has struggled to reach citizens living outside historic left-wing bastions and heavily urbanized multicultural districts.
Although the biggest losers of the election are the two smaller parties – the Liberals and the BSW – that failed to cross the 5% threshold, the Greens are also in a difficult position. The strategy pursued by candidate for chancellor Robert Habeck of moving toward the political center failed, with many young voters migrating to the Left and some centrist voters going over to the CDU. If the party decides to move left, it will have to contend and compete with a resurgent Left. Doubling down on the agenda of ecological transformation is another option, but decreasing social support for ecology and an increasingly policed climate movement will limit the appeal of this strategy. In fact the biggest losers of this election are not only the Greens but the climate agenda more generally. The prospect of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 is looking increasingly dim, with the CDU pushing for environmental deregulation and the deferral of the 2035 ban on combustion engines.
In sum,
the elections have yielded a balance of forces that will allow Germany to move beyond the paralysis that characterized the traffic light years.
Friedrich Merz will lead a more unified government, and he is better positioned than Olaf Scholz was to work together with European powers and the Commission on common projects, first and foremost on defense and trade. Furthermore, he has a mandate to take decisive action on the domestic front where his attention will be focused on striking a new settlement on asylum, immigration and citizenship, and decreasing taxes and environmental regulation in view of safeguarding Germany’s industrial base. All of this means that the government he leads will at least have a shot at tackling the most immediate challenges Germany and Europe face. So much for the good news.
The bad news is that the incoming government will deprioritize the ecological transition (an approach which will reverberate around the continent) and its policies could further undermine social cohesion.
While the SPD will probably be able to offer protections to pensioners (a crucial constituency), it may not be able to do the same for the most vulnerable segments of the population amongst whom people with an immigration background are overrepresented. Rampant social insecurity could sow the seeds of social unrest, and the latter could very well stoke racism and xenophobia on the one hand, and the radicalization of immigrant communities on the other. In other words, it is an open question whether the security and social policy measures waiting to be adopted will deepen or dampen social tensions and whether they will allow for the preservation of the multicultural social model. One can only hope that Merz – who has never held a top governmental job – is up to the task and that the democratic opposition will be up to challenging him if he loses his way. Otherwise, we can be sure that there will be a force waiting in the wings to take advantage of the situation.
