by Ferenc Laczó
Ferenc Laczó is former Co-managing Editor of the Review of Democracy, and an Assistant Professor with Tenure in History at Maastricht University. His writings have appeared in fourteen languages and his books have been discussed in more than fifty publications.
In our moment of great peril, it is insufficient for supporters of liberal democracy to play defense. It is imperative for them to grasp illiberalism’s key features and what those features may reveal about the path to a more democratic future, Ferenc Laczó argues in this new op-ed.
With the shocking beginnings of Donald Trump’s second term, many suspect we may be nearing a tipping point in the global history of democracy. Numerous democracies have indeed been eroding, and the process appears to be accelerating these days. However, despite continuous setbacks over the past two decades, only a few formerly democratic regimes have openly embraced autocratic rule until now.
What should be of wider concern than open democide is just how many democratically elected governments have sought to accomplish an illiberal transformation – and how far such attempts have succeeded in diverse places like India, Israel, Hungary or Turkey. It is illiberalism, I argue, rather than old-fashioned authoritarianism or the much-discussed phenomenon of populism that has had an outsized pernicious effect on liberal democracies. That makes it imperative to grasp illiberalism’s key features – and what those features may reveal about the path to a more democratic future.
Illiberal actors may not aim to abolish democracy but challenge its very foundations, such as human rights, the rule of law, independent institutions, or the idea of legitimate disagreement.
As Marlene Laruelle conceptualizes the phenomenon, illiberalism favors traditional hierarchies and cultural homogeneity, emphasizes duties and forms of ‘rootedness,’ and proposes majoritarian, nation-centric or sovereigntist solutions.
Illiberal actors in Western countries mix political, economic, and cultural claims into a powerful cocktail. Such Western actors, often unlike their non-Western counterparts, represent a backlash against multilateralism and globalization. They explicitly critique neoliberal agendas and their economic consequences. And they openly reject progressive cultural and moral causes that have gained influence since the 1960s while vehemently opposing migration in particular.
More moderate expressions of illiberalism contest liberal democracy via trying to appropriate some of its cherished values, such as liberty or the popular will.
As Helena Rosenblatt has remarked, this kind of argumentation is hardly new: conservatives were objecting not just to the crystallization of modern liberal principles some two centuries ago but have repeatedly maintained since that the liberal in liberalism was being used to deceive people.
Such political contestation is closely linked to the spread of liberal values – and has thus only grown more intense in reaction to liberal democracy’s ‘global moment’ in the wake of 1989.
More radical variants of illiberalism build on this conservative critique to combine several agendas and tactics. Radical illiberalism may be expressed through violations of ordinary political procedure and the takeover of the judicial system; explicit ethnocentrism and the redefinition of citizenship; the promotion of a comprehensive conception of the common good at the expense of individual autonomy; the politicization of media and attacks on academic freedom; the fueling of culture wars and identity-related conflicts; anti-universalist attacks on ‘political correctness’ and progressive values; through stoking fears and policies of securitization; through scapegoating and smear campaigns; via vulgar, attention-grabbing, shameless acts; or – conversely – via propagating a vision of politics as a clear-cut moral battle.
These agendas and tactics, which may be combined in various ways, directly feed attempts to centralize power.
They may sharply transform democracy without abolishing it. There is ample evidence that when illiberal political projects gain traction, they result in societies that are more closed and more polarized.
However, illiberalism does not equal authoritarianism. The backlash it represents is facilitated by democratic settings and principles. Moreover, as Zsolt Enyedi has noted, contrary to populists in the strict sense, illiberal actors tend to view national authorities and spiritual-intellectual leaders as constituting a legitimate new elite.
If the above sketches the physiognomy of this momentous phenomenon, what does it suggest about how its spread might be fought and reversed?
First of all, it is essential to adopt a sober perspective and recognize just how embattled liberal democracy has become across large parts of the globe and commit to rigorously tracking the manifold interplays between various illiberal agendas.
It is similarly important to realize that illiberal political projects may succeed to a remarkable extent even when cultural values trend liberal. That realization should motivate more ambitious agendas in politics, the economy, and culture that show an attractive map towards a fairer and more egalitarian future. It should also motivate the building of broader, more inclusive coalitions – coalitions that in numerous countries would also include those who support liberal democratic causes based on their religious convictions and values, for example.
In this moment of great peril, it is insufficient for those who support liberal democracy to play defense.
They need to fight back against illiberalism in a much more comprehensive manner – rather than fatalistically declaring that the tipping point beyond which lies a new sinister age of authoritarianism has already been reached. And that urgent fight requires a political strategy that can compete with the illiberal one in terms of versatility and tactical acuity while building on the constructive side of humans.
