While the Putin regime’s war against Ukraine follows the tradition of Russian and Soviet imperialism, it’s methods have evolved. The “Iron Curtain” no longer exists, and in an increasingly globalized world where social media has transformed communication, authoritarian states no longer merely sever ties with the outside world. Instead, Putin’s Russia is actively engaging in transnational authoritarian repression.
This repression targets Russian citizens living abroad, academics focusing on Eastern Europe, and critics of the Russian regime in general. One of the key instruments in Russia’s transnational repression arsenal is the designation of organizations as “undesirable.” This designation poses significant challenges for the Central European University, which, given its origins, hosts numerous students and scholars from Eastern Europe. An even more severe measure was recently taken against the German Association for East European Studies (DGO), which was listed as an “extremist organization.” Members or anyone cooperating with the DGO face up to twelve years of imprisonment in Russian camps. Beyond posing significant obstacles to academic work, this designation also limits the freedom of movement of those affected, particularly concerning third countries that may be willing to extradite them. So far, serious countermeasures from democratic states or the European Union remain absent.
This written interview considers various implications of Transnational Authoritarian Repression and potential ways to counter it.
Professor Caroline von Gall is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies “Universalism and Particularism” at Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich and sits on the board of the DGO.
Transnational Authoritarian Repression:
Konstantin Kipp: In a recent article, you describe transnational repression as a relatively new phenomenon, one that hasn’t been prevalent throughout Russian history or in the histories of other authoritarian states. Could you provide our readers with an overview of the events and developments that have led Russia to engage in such actions? In your view, is the rise of transnational repression a reaction to the inability of authoritarian states in modern times to prevent criticism from entering their borders, or have these states simply discovered the potential of such repression in furthering their goals?
Caroline von Gall: In the age of globalization, the scale and nature of transnational repression have evolved significantly. Today, even authoritarian states can no longer afford complete isolation. Russia, for instance, as well as China, has significantly benefited from international trade. In Russia, energy exports contribute to the state’s coffers, while the ability to procure Western products helped sustain the regime’s legitimacy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the growing autocratization in Russia and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, resistance to joint economic projects increased in Western democracies. As a result, Russia had to actively influence government and public opinion in these countries to advance joint projects, such as the Nord Stream pipeline in Germany.
Globalization has also created interconnected spaces of communication, particularly through social media networks such as Facebook, X, and Telegram. These platforms have become a double-edged sword for governments like Russia’s: while they are crucial for disseminating propaganda in support of its policies, they also present a challenge when employed by regime critics to mobilize protests. In response, Russia – along with other autocracies such as China, as well as aspiring autocrats like U.S. President Donald Trump – seeks to control these networks.
For authoritarian regimes, globalization has brought both benefits and challenges that cannot be ignored. To maximize regime stability, autocrats have to cope with the challenges of globalization and act transnationally. They do so using classic instruments of authoritarianism such as propaganda and elite integration – including foreign elites, such as former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder. While Putin was initially described as a “spin doctor” who achieved his goals through skillful manipulation of public opinion, since 2012, he has increasingly relied on repression as a means of exercising power.
In recent years, Russia’s approach to globalization has generally shifted to a more aggressive stance, often described as “hybrid warfare.” According to the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, the goal is to “reduce and neutralize” threats to Russia’s security, which the government attributes to “unfriendly European states” and “their associations.” In pursuit of these objectives, Russia seeks to halt “unfriendly actions” and reject their “anti-Russian course.” The term “anti-Russian course” serves as a euphemism for any criticism of the country’s autocratization. Consequently, Russia’s objective today is to bolster pro-Russian voices and parties in Europe. To achieve these goals, Russia employs various tactics, including espionage, cyber-attacks, sabotage, and (attempted) targeted killings, alongside political campaigns and disinformation. As a result, individuals and entities opposing Russian disinformation become legitimate targets in this information war.
In the article, you mention a variety of techniques that Russia employs to target organizations and individuals, which effectively limit academic freedom as well as freedom of expression. Could you elaborate on these different techniques? One key mechanism appears to be the designation of an organization as “undesirable” or even “extremist.” Are there any rational criteria determining whether an organization falls into one category or the other, or does this solely depend on the discretion of Russian officials?
The designation of “foreign agent” or “undesirable organization” is a central instrument of Russia’s transnational repression, imposing strict administrative requirements. Non-compliance can result in severe penalties. The goal is to isolate individuals and institutions, including foreign ones, to complicate their work. Moreover, Russian cyber-attacks on academic institutions are intended to spread fear.
A significant escalation occurred in July 2024 when Russia designated the German Association for Eastern European Studies (DGO) as an “extremist organization” in connection with a cyber-attack. This classification carries even more far-reaching consequences than being labeled “undesirable.” Not only membership but any form of collaboration with the DGO – through conferences or publications – is automatically a criminal offense in Russia. Sentences for such offenses can be up to 12 years of imprisonment in Russian camps. This impacts nearly all researchers on Eastern Europe in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, as well as many experts in politics and the media. Travel to Russia is now impossible, posing serious consequences for those with family ties there. Additionally, in countries that cooperate with Russia, there is a risk of extradition.
Recent months have shown’ that Russia’s measures are effective. The listing restricts the work of the DGO, creates a need for advice and information and thus blocks resources. Russian academics are withdrawing articles for joint publications or presentations at conferences. Moreover, those affected have become more hesitant to post on social media, some events are no longer publicly advertised, and members have left the organization. These measures create a chilling effect, especially on young academics, graduates, and postgraduates.
Transnational repression is a serious threat to human rights, democratic institutions, and state sovereignty, as well as a disturbing manifestation of global authoritarianism. When autocracies intimidate academics through procedures that violate the rule of law, the German government cannot immediately stop these human rights violations. Legal action against decisions in Russia is of little help, and rehabilitation by the Russian government is unattainable. Even if most people recognize the political nature of these decisions, the lack of rehabilitation results in a lingering stigma.
With these measures, the authoritarian Russian state not only violates individual rights, but also German sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Through transnational repression against people, the repressive state uses authoritarian measures to influence the society of the targeted state.
The Russian law on extremism has long been abused as a tool of repression against religious and ethnic minorities. Individuals have been sentenced to harsh penalties under this law with the aim of silencing other members of these minorities and preventing them from publicly promoting their traditions and beliefs. For Putin, such minorities represent a significant threat of disintegration. Later, the law on extremism was applied more broadly. For instance, recently, it was used to prohibit the Russian LGBTQ movement and the Anti-Corruption Foundation of Alexei Navalny.
While we were generally aware of the abuse of the law, the listing of the DGO as a foreign academic institution was entirely unforeseeable.
It is inherent in political repression that it is arbitrary and that it is impossible to know in advance when one is committing a punishable offence. On the other hand, research shows that Russians can identify the conditions under which they are at risk of persecution. Roughly speaking, the yardstick for when repression is applied are the power interests and the survival of the authoritarian regime.
Repression Through Authoritarian International Law?
Similar to your observations, Prof. Tom Ginsburg has identified changes in the behavior of modern authoritarians. According to Prof. Ginsburg, supranational authoritarian cooperation results in Authoritarian International Law, which aims to “extend the survival and reach of authoritarian rule across space and time.” This law primarily serves to ensure regime survival, which also appears to be the goal of the transnational repression you highlight. Do you believe that the transnational repression of academic freedom and freedom of expression could evolve into a domain of Authoritarian International Law? Or do such tendencies already exist?
Yes, we can see that international law and authoritarianism are not contradictory in terms, but that autocrats exploit the international legal sphere for their own purposes. To this end, alternative organizations, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, have been created.
However, the more common case is that autocrats abuse existing international organizations for their own ends. For instance, in the Council of Europe, authoritarian states support one another, provide election observers for each other, and jointly lobby for traditional values as a limit to liberal human rights.
In the domain of transnational repression, Russia has in the past abused Interpol for political cases. Another more recent example is the Kremlin’s bilateral cooperation with several countries to secure help in extraditing Russians on the Prosecutor General’s Office request.
Autocrats clearly learn from each other, and Russian methods have been copied by numerous right-wing populists. One example is the restrictive NGO legislation that stigmatizes so-called “foreign agents” in Russia, Hungary, and Georgia.
So yes, with the growing autocratization worldwide, it is more likely that the instruments of international law will be (ab)used by authoritarians. We need to examine these developments more closely. In Western discourse, we often discuss noncompliance and violations of international law by authoritarian states. However, we must keep in mind that authoritarian states are not only breakers but also makers of international law.
Transnational authoritarian repression, as well as Authoritarian International Law, currently appear to be practices predominantly applied by Russia and China. However, authoritarianism is also on the rise in Western countries. Recently, the U.S. President Donald Trump issued executive orders seeking to sanction the International Criminal Court. While ICC staff and collaborators don’t face up to 12 years of imprisonment, the act clearly demonstrates the U.S.’s willingness to transnationally silence criticism against itself or its allies. How do such actions by western governments compare to the transnational repression you identified?
In the United States, we still have the rule of law and freedom of expression. Today, Russian-style repression does not occur. However, in recent decades, we have seen how quickly systems can change. In Russia, it initially targeted only Putin’s direct enemies, such as the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Then, it expanded to NGOs, minorities, protesters, and the LGBTQI+ community. Now, there is hardly any opposition left, and even lawyers are given heavy sentences just for defending people in accordance with the law.
While this is not the same in the United States, political violence is on the rise there. We can observe how migrants are being threatened and opponents verbally attacked, and often this is based precisely on a broadly interpreted freedom of expression. Next to this, Vice President JD Vance is also criticizing academia. Overall, respect for international law and human rights is declining even in democracies.
Countering Transnational Authoritarian Repression:
One of the main challenges in countering Russian transnational authoritarian repression is the lack of effective legal recourse against Russian law or the designation of organizations as “undesirable” or “extremist,” due to the lack of judicial independence in Russia. In a 2018 article, you warned that excluding Russia from the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Convention of Human Rights would disadvantage the victims of human rights’ abuses. In 2022, this exclusion became a reality, and as a result, acts of the Russian government no longer fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Could the Court have provided a means to counter transnational repression, at least in terms of symbolic rehabilitation for organizations and individuals stigmatized by Russian attacks? In hindsight, was it a mistake to exclude Russia from the CoE?
No, overall, it wasn’t a mistake to exclude Russia, but of course, it would now be helpful to have an institution capable of determining legal violations. Especially between 1990 and 2010, there was hope that international law could compensate for the fact that globalization meant problems could no longer be negotiated at the national level due to their transnational nature. Nevertheless, the exclusion was right. The contracting states are not only the recipients of condemnations but also the source of human rights. The ECtHR often makes decisions based on consensus among member states, allowing them to influence its jurisprudence. Moreover, Putin has weakened the court’s legitimacy by refusing to implement its rulings. Through this non-compliance, he has constantly shown that he is above the court, which has been detrimental to its work. On the contrary it has helped Putin that in Russia a strong conservative countermovement has formed in the face of “lectures” from Strasbourg. Putin successfully sells his fight against the West as an anti-colonial struggle.
After all, the Council of Europe should have sanctioned Russia much more severely after the annexation of Crimea. Here Putin saw that respect for international law did not mean much to European states either. That encouraged him.
In principle, freedom of science is also protected by Article 15 of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Russia is bound by this and has violated the norm, but there are no complaint procedures comparable to those of the ECHR. Nevertheless, Germany could articulate a violation here.
Given the lack of effective legal recourse, what – if any – legal options do democratic states, and the European Union have to ensure that academic work on Eastern Europe and criticism of the Russian regime can be conducted without fear of repression? What non-legal tools could be employed to achieve the same goal?
In recent years, various NGOs, such as Freedom House, as well as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, have taken up the issue of transnational repression. Overall, it has been emphasized that raising awareness in both government and society is necessary to ensure that these measures do not achieve their intended effect. It is crucial that victims are not left alone but instead receive solidarity and understanding from society. Freedom House recommends for the fight against transnational repression to be recognized as a new cross-cutting governmental task. There is a need for an interdepartmental contact point for victims, connecting security, human rights, rule of law, and foreign policy issues. Freedom House also advocates for identifying and documenting transnational repression as a distinct problem and raising awareness of it within government and law enforcement. In addition to increased security measures, consideration should be given to creating a special register to document and provide information on cases. An official, visible rejection of the unjust Russian verdict by German or European authorities could offer clarity and serve as a substitute for the legal protection required by the rule of law. It is also important to review with whom counterintelligence and law enforcement share information.
Finally, it is important to consider how science can succeed when it is threatened with violence. The German government has a duty to protect the freedom of science, which means it must use all available means to counter violations of academic freedom by third parties. It is crucial to recognize that the targeting of German academics not only affects these individuals but also German democratic discourse. It also constitutes a violation of German sovereignty and poses a threat to the country’s stability and security.
