By Benedetta Lobina
With the ongoing judicial reforms, the Italian Government’s conflict with the judiciary has reached a new phase. In her op-ed, Benedetta Lobina examines the proposed changes and assesses their impact on the rule of law in Italy.
Benedetta Lobina is a PhD Candidate at University College Dublin and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Trinity College Dublin. Her research focuses on the impact of domestic rule of law deficiencies on European Union integration.
The Italian judiciary is currently undergoing reform. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is seeking to overhaul key aspects related to the organization of judicial career paths and the role and composition of the Superior Council of the Judiciary – thus affecting judicial self-governance as a whole. After the initial bill passed the lower house of the Parliament, the Camera dei Deputati, in January, the National Magistrates’ Association (Associazione Nazionale Magistrati) organized a strike, expressing concerns over potential threats to constitutional principles and the broader weakening of judicial independence.
Understanding the Constitutional Reform
The judicial reform at issue (known as “p.d.l. n. C. 1917”), currently under examination by the Senate, was passed after a brief review – merely a week, which is unusual for constitutional reforms of this kind – and without amendments by the Chamber of Deputies earlier this year.
The bill introduces three significant changes to the current system. Most notably, it provides for the separation of judicial careers between judges and prosecutors. Currently, the two roles are grouped together in the Constitution under the umbrella term “magistrates”, allowing them to follow the same professional development path and switch between roles later in their careers. Supporters of the reform argue that this flexibility can undermine impartiality and public trust in the justice system when the two roles are too closely connected, and former prosecutors can become judges.
The second part of the reform addresses governance bodies. The current Superior Council of the Judiciary (SCJ) would be split into three distinct bodies: one SCJ for judges; one SCJ for prosecutors; and a High Disciplinary Court. The first two bodies are naturally justified by the aforementioned division of career paths, while the decision to isolate disciplinary duties from normal administrative competency is motivated by perceived deficiencies in the current system.
Finally, the bill introduces a new procedure for the composition of the two SCJs, where lay members (one-third) and judicial members (two-thirds) are randomly selected through a draw, based on lists drafted by Parliament, judges and prosecutors. A similar sortition process would also apply to the High Disciplinary Court, except for the members appointed by the Head of State. The government’s aim here is to improve impartiality and avoid electoral competition.
Legitimate Concern or Undercover Power Grab?
It is well-known, that the Italian judicial system suffers from severe inefficiencies, particularly due to the long adjudication times and the failure to prosecute high-level corruption cases, which have eroded public trust in the institution. Arguably, this reform does little to address these underlying issues. Instead, it shifts the focus onto the magistrates themselves, aligning with the government’s problematic – hostile – rhetoric towards the profession. For instance, after a Rome court ruled against Italy’s immigration deal with Albania, Meloni called the decision “prejudiced” and accused the judiciary of creating “opposition” instead of “help[ing] to give answers,” fostering a climate of intimidation that often leads to judges involved in such cases facing personal vilification and even death threats.
In this environment, the reform has been met with diffidence by the judiciary, culminating in strikes, particularly due to the potential for political exploitation that the proposed constitutional amendments would create. In the draft approved by the Chamber of Deputies, practical questions regarding the separation of careers remain unanswered. Without common rules between judges and prosecutors, further reform through ordinary legislation will be required to determine the new professional development paths, appointment processes, and more, leaving the door open for politicization. Moreover, magistrates have warned that the split would result in prosecutors no longer falling within the constitutional guarantee of external independence.
The division of the Superior Council of the Judiciary has been criticized for following a “divide and conquer” logic. Judicial self-governance is liable to be weakened, as the system no longer functions as a unified body, with the sortition-based appointment-by-lot method undercutting the influence of judicial associations. Moreover, the European Commission already raised concerns on this in its 2024 Rule of Law Report, arguing that it is unclear if the randomized process complies with European standards, which require that members of national councils for the judiciary be elected by their peers (or at least a majority of them). Lastly, the creation of an ad hoc disciplinary body, whose functions were previously entrusted to the SCJ and which furthermore prevents the possibility to appeal decisions to the Court of Cassation, creates concerns about judicial independence and a potential chilling effect.
Apart from the actual legislative process, it is interesting to note that the government’s response to the protests of the judiciary has been one of dismissal and delegitimization. Justice Minister Nordio shed doubt over the legality of strikes, arguing that in other European countries magistrates are prohibited from engaging in “political” protest against government measures. According to Nordio, the judiciary’s concerns are nothing less than “petulant litanies” and “colossal nonsense.” Overall, this highlights an ongoing struggle between the government and the judiciary, with the former determined to exclude the latter from any form of negotiation, while exploiting public distrust in the magistrates to score political points.
The Road Ahead
Although the initial approval of the bill sparked protests and concerns, the process to amend the Italian Constitution is long and burdensome. It requires two readings by the Parliament, and either a two-thirds majority in each chamber or a referendum (the latter being likely in most cases). Ample time remains to modify the bill’s contents, and ultimately, the initiative may fail altogether. Should the reform be successful, it needs to be carefully evaluated in the context of EU law, especially as it pertains to judicial independence under Article 19 TEU, the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as with respect to the principle of non-regression under Article 49 TEU. Albeit the European Commission having already flagged issues with the proposals presented by the government, political compromises between Meloni and President von der Leyen cast doubt on whether said concerns will lead to actual oversight and enforcement, if needed.
As the Prime Minister continues to position herself as a reliable partner, and indeed an important interlocutor between the EU and Trump, the likelihood that her domestic policies will come under scrutiny is low – a worrying prospect for the rule of law in Italy. On the other hand, the National Magistrates’ Association could take a leaf out of its Portuguese and Romanian counterparts books’ and submit a preliminary ruling request to the CJEU, which would undoubtedly shed light on how to correctly balance the need for increased efficiency in the justice system, and respect for fundamental values.
As it stands, the bill on the separation of careers is most notable for what is left unsaid – namely, the logistics of separating the judicial careers – and what surrounds it – the judicial strikes. Although reforms are warranted given the existing problems in the justice system, the decision to prioritize measures that focus on magistrates’ careers and alter their self-governance bodies seems overly political and does little to dispel fears of future rule of law backsliding.
