By Ece Özbey
As the crackdown on Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu intensifies, the stakes for the democratic opposition in Turkey grow higher. This analysis explores how legal repression, symbolic erasure, and authoritarian overreach may backfire — entrenching resistance, destabilizing governance, and echoing global patterns of democratic decline, without yet sealing Turkey’s fate as another Venezuela.
A few months ago, in March, I wrote about the “radish in the saddlebag,” President Erdoğan’s cryptic warning foreshadowing a crackdown on opposition municipalities. The arrest of Istanbul’s Mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, was the first bitter taste of that impending harvest (though far from the first blow against dissent in Turkey). Now, as spring turns to summer, it is increasingly clear that the intention is not merely to target a few inconvenient figures but to dismantle opposition structures altogether and curtail their operational capacities, starting with its most prominent, and arguably most resonant, public face. This mirrors broader patterns of authoritarian consolidation, where hollowing out democratic institutions and weakening any viable opposition becomes a deliberate state project.
The escalation of measures against İmamoğlu goes well beyond legal maneuvering. It is a concerted effort to erase him from the public consciousness — an act bordering on political damnatio memoriae, an ancient practice of effacing disgraced figures from the historical record. The critical distinction here, however, is that the regime’s narrative of İmamoğlu’s “disgrace” is emphatically rejected by the public, as opinion polls consistently show.
The ban on İmamoğlu’s image and voice on Istanbul’s public transport, the silencing of his X account within Turkey, and his prolonged, and unofficially extended, detention are not the actions of a government confident in its democratic mandate or popular legitimacy. Rather, they are indicative of a regime, once proudly presenting itself as the “good type,” giving voice to the oppressed majority, grappling with perceived insecurity and fearing a rival’s enduring appeal and accrued power. Yet this battle is not unfolding in the realm of ideas or images alone; it is being institutionalized through legal mechanisms that seek not only to marginalize İmamoğlu but to criminalize the opposition itself.
Lawfare and the Architecture of Repression
When the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office decreed that İmamoğlu’s likeness and words were too potent for the city’s commuters, it inadvertently revealed just how threatening his symbolic capital has become. It acknowledged that his very image, his recorded voice, carries a political weight that cannot be counterbalanced through legitimate democratic contestation or open public discourse.
This attempt to render İmamoğlu invisible, to make him a non-person in the city he was thrice elected to lead, is a chilling, if clumsy, display of authoritarian narrowing, where space for dissent is systematically constricted, a process meticulously documented by scholars of democratic erosion.
But can a face that has become a potent symbol, a focal point for broader grievances and aspirations, be truly erased? Can a voice that millions perceive as articulating their own concerns be muted?
The harder the authorities try to expunge İmamoğlu from the public sphere, the more his presence seems to be amplified through what might be termed “infrapolitics” — the subtle, everyday forms of resistance. The “Free İmamoğlu” banner defiantly unfurled by CHP lawmakers on the Bosporus Bridge, an act that has predictably drawn an investigation, is a testament to this. It is a visual echo of CHP leader Özgür Özel’s declaration: “This is just the beginning. The struggle continues.” And the hashtag #İmamoğluHerYerde (“İmamoğlu is everywhere”) is no longer just a slogan; it is an increasingly accurate description of a defiance sustained by perceived injustice and a refusal to concede to the state’s narrative control.
The regime’s tools of suppression are no longer hidden in the saddlebag — they are openly brandished to reveal a total “lawfare,” the instrumentalization of legal processes for political ends.
The myriad investigations, “bid rigging” charges, and diploma lawsuits all contribute to an atmosphere of relentless judicial harassment. Despite nearly three months passing, indictments mostly remain unfinished, while waves of mass arrests continue, often reportedly without hard evidence, showing that they, ostensibly for prevention, are in fact being used as punitive tools. Detainees are allegedly being pressured to turn informants under the so-called “effective remorse law,” which offers reduced sentences in exchange for cooperation, further exposing the instrumentalization of legal frameworks for political ends.
The court case initiated in April concerning the 38th Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) Congress, with its looming threat of “absolute nullity,” offers another stark example. Recent reports indicate that the case’s next hearing is set for the end of June, reflecting the continued legal limbo and political pressure on the party’s internal governance. Meanwhile, the indictment, just finalized last week, seeks to imprison İmamoğlu and 11 fellow party members on charges of “rigging the vote.”
This maneuver, aimed at potentially invalidating the leadership election that saw Özgür Özel replace Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in November 2023, along with the continued imprisonment of İmamoğlu, represents a direct assault on the democratic processes of the major opposition party. If successful, such an intervention would not only sow profound internal discord but also fundamentally undermine the CHP’s legitimacy and operational capacity, effectively dictating its leadership from the outside and turning it into a pliable instrument of state will.
Compounding this external pressure are lingering intra-party tensions, particularly concerning former leader Kılıçdaroğlu, who has yet to explicitly rule out a return to the party’s helm. Kılıçdaroğlu’s stance inevitably fuels speculation and could be perceived as undermining the incumbent leadership of Özel, particularly in the face of such aggressive state interference.
This internal friction, while a natural element of party politics, thus becomes a significant vulnerability when the regime actively seeks to exploit any perceived weakness to further its agenda of political consolidation.
A Venezuelan Path?: Authoritarian Echoes and Domestic Fears
Turkey’s trajectory is not unfolding in isolation, a fact that has given rise to a vigorous domestic debate comparing it to other contexts of shrinking democratic space. Most notably, the fear of a “Venezuelan path” looms large in Turkish public discourse precisely because the methods, such as the systematic dismantling of opposition parties and the co-optation of the judiciary seen under Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro, echo a familiar authoritarian playbook.
While Venezuela was for decades anchored by one of Latin America’s most stable two-party democracies, the Chavismo project has resulted in a profound erosion of competitive politics and state capture. Yet the primary distinction between the two countries lies in the fate of their long-standing political parties. While Turkey’s opposition also has a tumultuous history, its institutional anchor, the CHP, retains a significant organizational capacity and broad electoral base, as evidenced by recent municipal election victories. This institutional depth and resilience provide a different foundation compared to the current state of the Venezuelan party system, which, despite moments of significant mobilization and the emergence of figures like María Corina Machado, has faced more profound fragmentation, severe state repression including exile and disqualification of leaders, and a more comprehensive hollowing out of democratic institutions over a shorter period.
Furthermore, while initially highly disappointed by the muted response of foreign actors to the arrests, the Turkish opposition has historically demonstrated a strong ability to cultivate and leverage international ties. This was once again exemplified at the recent Socialist International convention in Istanbul, where “Free İmamoglu” signs were prominently displayed and several representatives, including Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, publicly called for İmamoğlu’s immediate release. Such connections provide a degree of external legitimacy and scrutiny that has often been less accessible or effective for the Venezuelan opposition. Notably, President Erdoğan’s subsequent public outburst about the betrayal of “those they regarded as friends” inadvertently underscored how threatening these international alliances are to the regime’s narrative control and legitimacy.
Finally, the ongoing judicial crackdown imposes a significant and increasingly unsustainable economic burden on the government itself. Unlike Venezuela, which historically leveraged vast natural resource wealth to cushion its authoritarian tendencies, Turkey’s economy is structurally more diverse but also profoundly fragile and reliant on external confidence and stable investment flows. The unpredictability wrought by this “lawfare” is a costly drag on an economy already grappling with high inflation, a volatile currency, and a persistent current account deficit. These pressures have already fueled internal rifts within President Erdoğan’s cabinet, particularly between proponents of more orthodox reforms and fiscal discipline, like Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, and hardliners prioritizing political control.
Repression, then, is not just a political gamble; it is a profound economic liability that strains the state’s capacity and exposes the contradiction between the government’s quest for unchecked power and its professed commitment to stability and growth.
It is important to acknowledge Erdoğan’s ongoing efforts to reshape the political playing field, most notably through the reemergence of an unofficial “peace process” with the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and renewed debates on constitutional reform, which could pave the way for him to seek another presidential term. These developments further strain an already embattled opposition, creating new fault lines and strategic challenges in the near future. Still, Turkey and Venezuela are not (yet) identical. While both regimes exhibit clear authoritarian tendencies and utilize similar instruments of control, the two countries’ divergent historical paths, institutional resilience, international linkages, and the distinct economic impact of repression significantly shape the nature and potential outcomes of their respective political struggles.
Opposition Resilience and the Paradox of Repression
These comparative insights further highlight the stakes and the immense challenge for the CHP. The party must navigate this unprecedented oppressive climate while preserving hope and mobilizing its supporters. But, on the regime’s side, this campaign of attrition against İmamoğlu and the CHP may be triggering the paradox of repression: Instead of cowing the opposition, it can galvanize it, ironically transforming the political contest into a full resistance and undercutting the legitimacy of a power elite.
Erdoğan’s strategy not only ignores this potential paradox but suffers from a common authoritarian miscalculation: It mistakes the individual for the movement, the symbol for the substance of dissent.
While İmamoğlu is undeniably a charismatic and formidable figure, the desire for a more pluralistic, just, and democratic Turkey — and for a reversal of democratic backsliding — extends far beyond any single leader. By attempting to erase his face, the authorities risk etching the principles of democratic accountability and resistance he represents even more deeply into the collective consciousness of those who yearn for change, potentially fostering a more resilient and widespread opposition.
The question that hangs heavy in the Turkish air is not whether the government can continue to wield the state’s coercive power against its critics — it clearly can, and does. The real question is whether such tactics can ever truly extinguish the democratic aspirations of a nation, particularly when those aspirations have been repeatedly affirmed at the ballot box and are rooted in deeply held societal values and a longer, if imperfect, democratic muscle memory than in many other hybrid regimes. In attempting to expunge İmamoğlu, Erdoğan’s regime may instead be contributing to his iconic status and transforming him into a martyr for a larger cause. If history is any guide, efforts to erase dissent rarely achieve their intended end. The harder they scrub, the more vivid the image becomes.
Ece Özbey is the co-managing editor at the Review of Democracy. She is a doctoral researcher and lecturer at the University of Cologne, where she is pursuing her PhD in Comparative Politics through the International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy (IMPRS-SPCE) program.
