By Ebru Işıklı and Elifcan Çelebi
After Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu’s imprisonment in March 2025, youth-led protests swept Turkey. Fueled by digital activism and pop culture, this new resistance converges with social policy innovations in opposition-run cities, marking a generational shift in how dissent and governance challenge authoritarianism.
On March 19, 2025, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu—the most prominent opposition figure in Turkey and President Erdoğan’s main political rival—was detained on politically motivated charges lacking concrete evidence, along with over 100 colleagues, including several district and, later, other municipal mayors from the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). Just four days later, he was sentenced to prison in what many regard as a political coup. This moment is pivotal for both domestic and foreign politics. Domestically, over the 24 years of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) rule, the opposition has struggled to maintain momentum and articulate a coherent strategy for confronting the government, whether through defending judicial independence, resisting media censorship, or agreeing on a roadmap for democratic reform. However, İmamoğlu’s arrest has acted as a catalyst.
Public outrage and mass protests have served as a unifying force for oppositional figures, helping rebuild a once-fractured alliance around democratic principles. This unity, forged under authoritarian repression, carries the potential to resonate far beyond Turkey’s borders. At its core is a new generation reshaping the very contours of resistance.
While the arrests remain the central catalyst, the annulment of İmamoğlu’s diploma—part of a string of arbitrary, unlawful measures targeting critics and vested rights—has introduced a potent new grievance into the movement. It has signaled not only that university degrees are no longer secure, but also that diplomas themselves have been devalued[i]. This blow to democracy, but also to social mobility, was first condemned by students at Istanbul University. Their outcry soon resonated with millions: some banging pots and pans from their windows, others gathering in municipal buildings, campuses, and public squares. The student-led protests have sparked a rare moment of unity—one driven by a collective demand for justice.
Unlike the Gezi Park protesters of 2013, often described as young, middle-class professionals, this new generation has come of age in a deeply polarized society under uninterrupted AKP rule. Knowing no government but the current one, they have grown up in a clientelist system that has steadily choked social mobility for most. They now also face significant economic insecurity amid a slow but relentless downturn, with many juggling grueling, low-paid, dead-end jobs alongside their studies just to make ends meet[ii].
Digital, Decentralized, Defiant: New Forms of Youth Protest
There are some notable features that distinguish these protests. First, in line with the previous remarks, it is “the precariat”—including NEETs[iii] (those neither in employment nor education and training) and students—who have taken to the streets.
Marked by vitality, confidence, and assertiveness in the face of brutal police violence, this digitally savvy, well-connected youth injects the movement with a palpable élan vital.
The deepening impoverishment of Turkish society has narrowed down the cultural gap between the urban working and middle classes[iv]. Comedians like Sude Belkıs, who are at the vanguard of an emergent, digitally mediated form of political satire that foregrounds social and economic issues of class and youth, have played a key role in bringing these groups together.
Second, while traditional political movements were often led by student groups and political organizations, new forms of activism are emerging from community spaces, pop culture fan groups, social media networks, and democratic assemblies. The protests in Turkey, mirroring a broader global trend, themselves reflect this shift. In December 2024, South Korean political protests saw an innovative use of K-pop fandom. Fans armed with light sticks became central figures in a digitally coordinated rally against the president’s impeachment. Similar patterns have surfaced elsewhere, from Hong Kong’s 2019 anti-ELAB protests, where young activists organized through community hubs and multi-category forums despite government efforts to shut down communication, to Serbian student movements using democratic assemblies to rally against corruption ahead of mass protests in Belgrade. These examples signify a broader transformation: Digital communities once devoted to entertainment are now mobilizing for political causes. In parallel, activists are moving away from centralized platforms where authoritarian governments and political elites often shape narratives toward decentralized alternatives, like Bluesky, which offer greater autonomy and privacy.
Third, the values of today’s youth diverge sharply from those of previous generations. The AKP’s national-religious identity narrative fails to resonate. Research shows that over half of 18- to 24-year-olds are less religious than their parents, with many identifying as non-religious.
For years, the AKP government has boxed the opposition into a lifestyle debate, casting politics as a clash between secular urban elites and its largely rural conservative heartland. The recent protests, however, appear to have upended this old framing by uniting young people with divergent views on religion, values, and culture against a government demanding absolute obedience to its increasingly traditionalist agenda.
Finally, as sociologist Cihan Tugal notes, protesting students have successfully pushed the social democratic opposition, particularly the CHP, toward a more assertive, combative stance. CHP leader Özgür Özel has publicly endorsed the students’ call to boycott pro-government businesses and launched a website tracking targeted brands. The nationwide boycott prompted many shopkeepers to halt operations in solidarity with the opposition. The government responded with force, escalating security measures, detaining protesters, and imposing severe restrictions on gatherings and social media after the protests went national. Yet authoritarian repression failed to quell the movement. On the contrary, resistance continues to grow. Testimony to this is the participation of students from private universities and even high schools, groups that had rarely, if ever, been involved in protests before.
Protests alongside the Opposition’s Promises of Social Policy Reform
In a climate of economic decline and political repression, what alternatives remain for young people? The question, in fact, extends beyond youth—it speaks to the whole country. Since the 2019 local elections, rising support for the opposition has shown that Turkish voters are seeking out change within the narrowing confines of the country’s electoral autocracy. This was most evident in the landmark local election victories of 2019 and 2024, when the opposition captured most metropolitan cities, most notably Istanbul and Ankara.
Faced with a deepening economic crisis, many CHP-led municipalities have introduced protective social policies. Among the most emblematic is the “City Restaurant” (Kent Lokantası) initiative, launched by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality under Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. These restaurants offer a four-dish meal for 40 Turkish Lira—roughly one Euro at today’s exchange rate—and now number 18 across the city.
Another significant policy initiative under İmamoğlu has been the provision of student dormitories. Under AKP leadership before 2019, the municipality offered no student housing. Today, it operates 14 large dormitories that provide affordable accommodation well below market rates. These measures directly address the economic precarity young people face, from rising living costs and soaring housing prices to scarce job opportunities.
In addition to welfare programs, the municipality has invested heavily in cultural and educational infrastructure. Since 2019, it has opened numerous public libraries and 24/7 study halls across the city, offering free internet, snacks, and quiet study environments. Unused or neglected urban spaces have been transformed into open culture centers hosting workshops, exhibitions, and events aimed at youth engagement. These venues have served not only as educational hubs but also as inclusive spaces for art, dialogue, and community-building.
Beyond these initiatives specifically targeting youth, the municipality has also introduced free public transport for mothers with babies, free daycare centers, and the “suspended bill” initiative during the pandemic to support struggling households. Taken together, these programs represent a universal shift in welfare provision. Designed to operate outside clientelist networks, they have aimed to reach broader constituencies, especially younger voters, while moving beyond simple cash handouts.
Together with an effective communication strategy adopted by the main opposition party, these social policy initiatives have successfully redressed the social democratic opposition’s battered credibility, expanded its electoral base, and most importantly, amplified İmamoğlu’s personal appeal.
From Protest to Policy: Emerging Pathways of Change?
The protests following İmamoğlu’s imprisonment have brought into focus a new generation of politically active youth, shaped by economic hardship, digital connectivity, and life under an increasingly authoritarian regime. Fragmented yet diverse, these young people share a mounting rejection of the status quo and a demand for a more just, inclusive future. Their activism reflects not only frustration but also the emergence of fresh political repertoires and alliances. Whether mobilizing through pop culture, digital satire, or decentralized networks, they are redefining what resistance looks like today. While it is too early to tell whether this energy will translate into lasting political change, it carries a clear promise of renewal.
At the same time, the growing appeal of opposition-led municipalities shows that change is not only imagined in the streets but also built through concrete policy. Social programs introduced under İmamoğlu—affordable meals, student dormitories, and inclusive public spaces—offer a rare example of welfare provision beyond clientelism in Turkey. These initiatives directly address everyday struggles, from the cost of living to inequality and access to basic services, and they resonate well beyond youth. Recent polls suggest they have bolstered opposition support across social and generational lines. Taken together, the rise of youth-led resistance and the expansion of universalist social policy point to a shifting landscape in oppositional politics. Their long-term impact remains to be seen, but the space for change has undoubtedly widened.
Dr. Ebru Işıklı is a researcher at University College Dublin’s School of Sociology in Dublin, Ireland. Her interests spans labor movements and inequalities in labor market.
Dr. Elifcan Çelebi is an Assistant Professor at University College Dublin’s School of Politics and International Relations in Dublin, Ireland. Her research primarily focuses on the politics of social policy, especially in comparative perspectives and autocratic settings.
[i] The scandal revealed last week about the network selling fake diplomas also underscores this devaluation.
[ii] In Turkey, poverty rates among young adults (ages 15–24) reach 30 percent—well above the EU-27 average of about 19 percent.
[iii] The NEETs rate in Turkey is 31 percent compared to the OECD avarage of 13.8 percent.
[iv] Nearly 49 percent of private sector workers in Turkey earn either the minimum wage or no more than 10 percent above it.
