Moldova’s latest parliamentary elections, hailed as a pro-European victory, reveal deeper tensions beneath the surface. Despite promises of EU integration and reform, geopolitical fears, economic hardship, and questions about democratic transparency continue to shape the country’s fragile future.
By Anastasia Felcher
Roughly a week ago, on September 28, Moldovan citizens at home and across the globe went to voting polls to decide which political parties would represent their interests in the next four-year parliamentary cycle. The turnout exceeded the threshold for validity, making the vote to be declared valid and the election results being officially accepted at home and internationally. After the votes were counted, the results got warm international praise, especially from representatives of the European political establishment, for Moldovans choosing the path of European integration and transparency. In reality, however, joining the European family of states might be a more thorny path than the electoral promises highlighted.
Both the collisions within the EU and inability of Moldovan elected politicians to comply with requirements of reforms could be to blame here. Yet, whatever reasons might introduce roughness into the prospective integration process, the possible disappointment of citizens who would be asked to vote again in four years, might strike back. As for the recent choice of parliamentary representatives, the overall setup of the pre-election campaign, previous and campaign-wide banning decisions regarding media channels and running candidates as well as decisions regarding distribution of voting polling stations, raise questions about transparency and the overall course of Moldovan democracy.
The first and major factor to consider is the adamant geopolitical orientation of the entire election campaign, often to the detriment of internal politics, interests and needs. Relying on geopolitics as a voting strategy is not new to Moldova.
The country has been struggling to formulate a solid political vision of its own future for decades, while failing to lose “the title” of the poorest nation in Europe and falling into a demographic collapse.
On this background, unable to offer a working and sustainable development path, rival parties have been routinely resorting to geopolitics to win votes. What helps this geopolitical rift is that Moldova remains to be on a crossroad of international interests and influences, a post-Soviet legacy that the country still struggles to overcome. Traditionally, parties leaning to the left have been relying on nostalgia for the Soviet past, while this was still a political resource, later advocating for closer ties with Russia and its sphere of influence. Following the same logic, center and right leaning parties advocated for western geopolitical orientation, which in the latest decades crystallized in joining the EU.
If earlier the prospective of the European future has been more of a rhetoric that divided the political spectrum, the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion to Ukraine actually set the process of European integration for Moldova in motion. The country was granted an EU candidate status several months after the invasion, together with Ukraine, with accession negotiations officially starting two years later. In the same 2024, Moldova held a referendum and constitutional amendments to enshrine an EU‑oriented path and, after it was narrowly approved, the government declared aiming to complete accession negotiations by 2027. Also in 2024, the country re‑elected Maia Sandu, the founder of the ruling political force prior to the parliamentary election, the center-right pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), as president. This race was, however, very tight, with the gap in votes between Sandu and the pro-Russian Socialist Party candidate getting dangerously close. PAS and Sandu reverted to explain this result by heavily emphasizing Russia interfering in the election by cyber attacks and voter bribery, yet the public has never seen the investigation results on this matter.
In September 2025, the parliamentary election campaign was centered around the ongoing war in the neighbouring Ukraine, with each major political competitor mobilizing voters’ fears of further escalation on Moldovan territory, in case of making a “wrong choice”. What helped make scary claims sound plausible, at least in the tense election environment, is the Russia-backed de-facto state that separates the left bank of the Dniester River and Moldova’s border with Ukraine. The self-proclaimed PMR, or Pridnestrovie, also known as Transnistria, exists since 1992 as the result of a frozen conflict that tore the country apart for two years.
Since the 2022 full-scale invasion, fears of Russia “opening an additional front” in Transnistria to secure the land corridor for its troops to Odessa region, have been paralyzing Moldovan public discourse.
PAS relied on the rhetoric that tried to convince the voters that, if the party lost parliamentary majority, this would bring major domestic security breaches, inability to rely on international support in the number of fields, losing freedom of movement privileges within the EU, and inability to proceed further with EU integration or resist Russian influence. In 2025, their electoral platform differed significantly from the one of 2021, which heavily relied on domestic affairs, promises to battle corruption and overwhelming reforms. Four years back, this platform brought PAS to power, winning them a strong parliamentary majority. Yet, four years in power, the judicial reform process proved to be slow and controversial, while citizens suffered unprecedented economic hardship, skyrocketing inflation and increase in the cost of living, real estate, goods and services. Other criticism included energy and agricultural policy failures, perceived democratic backsliding, and overreliance on external support. Despite these critical points accumulating over the four years in power, PAS did not address them extensively in the 2025 election campaign but heavily emphasized geopolitical arguments instead.
Major opponents of PAS in 2025, Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), led by former president Igor Dodon, reinforced their chances by bringing together representatives of several left‑wing, communist, and socialist parties. The bloc’s platform advocated for renewing ties with Russia, scaling back aspects of Western integration, and revisiting existing energy and trade agreements. BEP, in their turn, also scared the voters with the prospective escalation of military conflict from across the border to Moldovan soil. They insisted that in case of a “wrong choice”, Sandu’s party and its accomplices would have to give up the sovereign Moldovan territory to the escalating interests of Brussels.
The remaining parties and independent candidates that made it to the parliament, did not offer any release from these fears. Those were the Alternative Bloc (BA), led by Ion Ceban, mayor of Chișinău, which claimed a “moderate” or “balanced” orientation, but raised suspicion in its possible pro-Russian position; a populist Our Party (PN), led by Renato Usatîi, who built its platform on heavily criticizing the establishment; and the Democracy at Home Party (PDA), a right-wing party advocating for a unification with Romania. Representatives of these currents are often present in Moldovan political spectrum, not defining the major orientation of the country’s domestic and foreign agenda, but securing a minor share of votes.
As the result of the election, PAS secured an absolute majority out of 101 parliamentary seats, getting 50.20 % of the vote (55 seats), BEP came second with 24.20 % (26 seats), BA — 7.96 % (8 seats), PN — 6.20 % (6 seats), PDA —5.62 % (6 seats). This allows PAS to form a government with no need for a coalition, which still raises questions of what kind of government will Moldova experience in the forthcoming four years. While the hopes for the European future remain high despite the recent obstacles put by Hungary on the path of Ukraine’s EU integration (which Moldova is tied to), the immediate action towards reducing inequality and corruption at home is what would bring a true relief to the country’s residents. Another conclusion from the election is that for the next parliamentary cycle, the country would be ruled by politicians with strong political career history, i.e. experienced in serving various political roles in government(s) and various committees. Whether this experience will strengthen Moldova’s democracy or, conversely, reinforce the status quo remains to be seen.
Dr. Anastasia Felcher is a historian and cultural heritage specialist and works as a Slavic Archivist at the Blinken OSA Archivum at the Central European University (CEU).
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
Cover image: Flickr / United Nations Development Program in Europe and CIS (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)
