By Lara Goyburu
Argentina’s midterm elections tested not only the government’s ability to sustain its reform agenda but also citizens’ growing preference for results over ideology—a transformation increasingly visible across middle-income democracies.
Argentina’s October 26 legislative elections served less as a classic plebiscite than as a midterm test of President Javier Milei’s ability to sustain a rapid reform agenda. Elected in 2023 as a self-styled libertarian outsider promising to “end the political caste,” Milei entered office with an ambitious program of market-driven reforms and deep spending cuts that reshaped Argentina’s political landscape. The governing bloc of La Libertad Avanza (LLA), supported in part by PRO—the centre-right party once led by former president Mauricio Macri—emerged as the most voted force and consolidated the largest minority in the Chamber of Deputies, approaching a one-third threshold in both chambers. While it did not secure an outright majority, it gained enough leverage to defend its agenda and negotiate issue by issue. Voter turnout was low by Argentine standards, signaling fatigue and heightened sensitivity to context more than structural apathy.
Institutionally, the results left a Congress whose architecture forces negotiation.
Argentina’s Congress is bicameral, composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and its staggered renewal system means that partial elections often determine a government’s real ability to legislate. The Chamber of Deputies (257 seats) renews half of its members every two years, while the Senate (72) renews by thirds. In this election, 127 deputies and twenty-four senators were chosen. The one-third mark matters because it can block decisions requiring supermajorities and, at the same time, compels the government to forge alliances for ordinary legislation. In practice, holding roughly a third of seats allows a president to maintain legislative veto but not to govern alone. Every reform thus becomes an exercise in political engineering: sequencing, packaging, compensating, communicating, and executing.
Sociologically, these elections confirmed a shift I have been observing for two years: faced with the certainty of the past, Argentine voters now choose the uncertainty of the future. This is not blind enthusiasm but a willingness to tolerate risk when the promise of results appears credible. The long-standing Peronism versus anti-Peronism divide—once the dominant axis of competition—has become too narrow to describe a landscape that now combines liberal economic preferences with demands for institutional order and tangible social expectations, such as access to prices, jobs, public services, and security. Peronism, the broad movement founded by Juan Perón in the 1940s, has dominated Argentine politics for decades and shaped both left- and right-wing identities; its relative decline helps explain this new voter fluidity. Nearly half of the electorate was politically socialized in digital environments and lived through crises that no longer resonate with the narratives of the 1990s or the early post-2001 years. The decisive contest is now among voters under forty and in urban middle sectors. Our monthly tracking shows, with regional nuances, a governing coalition that is stronger among young men with medium or high levels of education, and a Peronist opposition that is more resilient among women and lower-education groups. These are not fixed identities but mobile aggregates that respond to performance and perceived costs.
Sociologically, these elections confirmed a shift I have been observing for two years: faced with the certainty of the past, Argentine voters now choose the uncertainty of the future.
For President Milei, the new equilibrium in Congress brings both strength and constraint. With a larger minority and a near one-third threshold, his administration can avoid hostile legislation and manage the timing of its own initiatives—deciding what enters the agenda, when, and at what pace. Yet negotiation becomes the rule, not the exception. Without full majorities, each reform requires ad hoc coalitions. Natural allies are insufficient; provincial blocs and centrist actors gain relevance, reshaping every vote. Argentina’s strong federal structure gives provincial governors disproportionate influence in Congress; they control budgets, patronage, and local legislative blocs, making them essential power-brokers. Sequencing and presentation are as crucial as substance. The sensible path is to advance through achievable steps, moderate costs, ensure implementation can be tracked, and sustain an honest narrative of trade-offs. Without careful monitoring and timely corrections, even a favorable parliamentary balance can turn into a political ceiling.
Regionally, Argentina remains far from homogeneous. Buenos Aires Province—the country’s most populous district and home to 37 percent of the electorate—continues to be the Peronists’ main stronghold, though it no longer acts as a uniform bastion. The central provinces—Córdoba, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos—and several Patagonian districts leaned toward LLA-PRO, while the northwest and northeast preserved Peronist cores with uneven performance. The “national result” therefore reflects overlapping maps rather than a single swing. Low turnout deserves a double reading: it signals exhaustion after years of stagnation, inflation, and an overloaded public debate, but it also reflects a form of contextual withdrawal rather than disinterest. Pre-election surveys by major pollsters such as Management & Fit revealed high awareness and engagement; people knew the stakes, yet the cost of showing up grew in an atmosphere of political noise and uncertainty.
Economically and politically, the agenda has also evolved. In 2024, inflation organized everything; by 2025, while still central, issues of integrity—corruption, transparency, clear rules—and of governance quality—execution, oversight, metrics—have gained prominence. This mix of “price and principle” now sustains expectations of the government and raises the bar for all actors. If “order” and “tidiness” fail to translate into transparent and measurable policies—public procurement, audits, whistleblower protection, open data standards—the backlash will be swift. For a government that came to power promising radical honesty and efficiency, unmet expectations on transparency may prove more costly than slow economic recovery. The October 26 result gave the Executive permission to continue, not a license to pursue an all-or-nothing approach.
That calls for a sober roadmap: move forward through feasible chapters instead of sweeping reforms; consolidate and, where possible, broaden the governing coalition rather than reshuffling it constantly; negotiate firmly but without humiliation, since many indispensable votes come from provinces the government does not control; and reinforce implementation with visible management—less grandstanding, more milestones, progress tracking, and measurable outcomes. For the opposition, the challenge is symmetrical: build a credible alternative that moves beyond mere rejection and competes on execution. When opposition leaders offered concrete solutions and fresh faces, they grew; when they retreated into identity politics and slogans, they did not. The coming competition is not for the cleverest catchphrase but for the ability to turn promises into observable results.
The October 26 result gave the Executive permission to continue, not a license to pursue an all-or-nothing approach.
Ahead lie three risks mirrored by three opportunities. The first risk is overreading the result: mistaking a strong minority for hegemony invites maximalist decisions and, eventually, legislative paralysis—a familiar fate for recent governments. The second is social fatigue: without tangible relief in prices, incomes, and services, tolerance for uncertainty will fade quickly, shrinking political capital. The third is federal misalignment: pushing national reforms without explicit provincial pacts heightens budgetary frictions and can jam the Senate, where governors hold significant influence. Yet there are also opportunities. Smart sequencing—combining framework laws with implementation pilots that deliver visible results within 90 to 180 days—can sustain momentum and allow corrections. Integrity agreements—a transversal agenda of transparency and oversight in procurement, audits, and program traceability—could align incentives among government, opposition, and provincial leaders. A coherent data policy—standardizing, opening, and auditing management information—could move the public debate from slogans to citizen oversight, with comparable metrics that strengthen governance and accountability.
What happens in Argentina resonates with trends in other middle-income democracies: reconfigured cleavages, fluid coalitions, and impatient electorates. In this sense, Argentina’s experience under Milei encapsulates a wider democratic tension: how to deliver visible change without undermining institutions. The local novelty is not disruptive rhetoric itself but the attempt to turn it into public goods within political time. If the 26-O elections leave one lesson, it is this: societies reward those who seem capable of changing without breaking the rules. For Milei, the challenge is to turn electoral energy into a durable architecture of agreements; for the opposition, to transform memory into a credible project. Between the certainty of the past and the uncertainty of the future, the test is no longer who is right but who delivers measurable results—the only language Argentine voters still seem willing to hear.
Lara Goyburu is Executive Director of Management & Fit (Argentina) and Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
