By Filip Milacic
Across the world, strongmen follow the same playbook to dismantle democracy. But their favorite tool could also become their greatest weakness if democracy’s defenders learn to flip the script.
“We have replaced a shipwrecked liberal democracy with a 21st-century Christian democracy, which guarantees people’s freedom and security,” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said in a speech a few years ago. And he is not the only one using this kind of language. Indeed, across the world, many authoritarian incumbents portray their attacks on democratic norms and principles as efforts to improve, or even save, democracy. What is more, unlike classic coups or outright breakdowns, these assaults proceed through incremental and legalistic strategies. This distinguishes the current trend of democratic backsliding from previous ones, creating two novel challenges for pro-democracy forces: uncertainty about who the enemies of democracy are and ambiguity about the attacks on democracy.
Today’s autocrats blur the line between defending and dismantling democracy, making it harder to see from the outset when democracy is under attack and who is attacking it.
In the past, it was much easier to recognize when democracy was under attack. The earlier generations of authoritarian-minded leaders were transparent about their intentions, and tanks in the streets were a clear sign of it. Nowadays, when almost all political actors proclaim themselves to be champions of democracy, distinguishing genuine democrats from imposters is harder and likely detrimental to democracy itself. Pushing back against an authoritarian incumbent is much more promising in the early stages of democratic backsliding. However, uncertainty about whether democracy is under threat makes it difficult for opposition forces to agree on a joint strategy early in the process, when the likelihood of success is greater.
Yet even if pro-democracy actors can identify the enemies of democracy early on, they need to convince the broader public—quickly enough—that democracy is under threat. They may be fully aware of the incumbent’s undemocratic agenda but still struggle to mobilize democratically-minded citizens, both in the streets and at the ballot box. This is because attacks on democracy are ambiguous in the new authoritarian playbook. Besides, as already noted, portraying their assaults as efforts to enhance or renew democracy, new autocrats often justify them as protecting the nation’s identity, sovereignty, and interests, or as being in line with their majoritarian mandate. The subversion of democracy also tends to occur through subtle interventions—such as changes to bylaws regulating the appointment of judges—that ordinary citizens may find difficult to recognize as undemocratic.
Uncertainty about whether democracy is under threat makes it difficult for opposition forces to cooperate and mobilize democratically-minded citizens early on.
When the threat to democracy remains abstract and the damage less visible, pro-democracy actors usually struggle to persuade citizens of the necessity to resist. Yet once the danger becomes tangible and the damage undeniable, mobilization becomes easier, but halting or reversing democratic backsliding becomes far harder.
Two crucial questions thus arise: How can pro-democracy actors reduce uncertainty when assessing whether someone is a false democrat, enabling them to act without delay? And how can they reduce ambiguity with respect to autocrats’ actions, which would make it easier for citizens to grasp their true nature early on?
I argue that the experience of judicial “reforms” in Hungary, Poland, and Israel offers some guidance. Despite following similar strategies, the incumbents achieved different outcomes: In Hungary, the independent judiciary was quickly captured, whereas in Poland, the popular mobilization led by civil society slowed down the “reform” and weakened its most controversial elements, and in Israel, it stopped it altogether.
Drawing on interviews with civil society representatives and political actors from these three countries—individuals directly involved in the respective political battles—I argue that the diffusion of information about the authoritarian playbook was crucial for overcoming the challenges of uncertainty and ambiguity. According to my interlocutors, diffusion first occurred through learning from the international and domestic media outlets and social media, and later through personal contacts and activist networks.
Firstly, the diffusion of information about “negative cases” (Hungary for Poland, and both Hungary and Poland for Israel) was important for raising awareness about the true nature of the incumbents’ actions. Pro-democracy civil society groups in Poland and Israel were immediately alarmed.
Secondly, the diffusion of information proved critical in plausibly naming the threats to democracy, thus helping to convince Polish and Israeli citizens that democracy was under attack and mobilize them in its defense.
The Hungarian experience, as a forerunner among liberal democracies to “reform” its judiciary, served as an early warning for pro-democracy actors in Poland. Pointing to Hungary’s example, which the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) openly promised to emulate, further helped them convince their fellow Poles to mobilize quickly. In the words of Jakub Kocjan, head of the civil society organization Akcja Demokracja (meaning Action Democracy), it was “super important” in making citizens aware of the threat.
In a similar fashion, the Hungarian and Polish experiences helped Israeli pro-democracy actors immediately understand the real intentions and likely consequences of their government’s judicial “reform,” and sound the alarm about the imminent danger to citizens. Israel’s experience also demonstrates that this tactic can succeed even in countries without an authoritarian past, where democratic breakdown remains largely a hypothetical risk. Additionally, it shows that such diffusion can occur even among countries that are neither geographically nor culturally close.
Taken together, the cases of Hungary, Poland, and Israel show that information travels faster than repression.
This is not to say that the diffusion was solely responsible for overcoming the challenges of uncertainty and ambiguity that enabled a quick popular mobilization in Poland and Israel. Other factors were also at play, such as an organized civil society, reporting by independent media, incumbents’ previous undemocratic behavior, and criticism of the “reforms” by pro-democracy external actors (such as the European Union and the United States). However, diffusion should also be recognized as an important contributing factor. Indeed, concrete examples are far more effective than abstract warnings for mobilizing citizens and exposing an incumbent’s true intentions, particularly when used strategically in protest slogans, public statements, short videos, and online campaigns that highlight the earlier similar “reforms.” For example, the protest chants “Yariv Levin, poh zeh lo Polin” (“Yariv Levin, this is not Poland”) and “Bibi v’Sara, poh zeh lo Hungariah” (“Bibi and Sara, this is not Hungary,” referring to Benjamin Netanyahu) became some of the most popular.
Hence, beyond strengthening ties with counterparts in countries already affected by democratic subversion to learn about their experiences, pro-democracy actors must also be creative when alarming citizens. Israel’s experience, in particular, confirms the value of using technology, digital activism, and clear messaging when trying to make the attacks on democracy visible to the public.
These findings hold valuable lessons for democracies worldwide. When an authoritarian incumbent imitates a policy from the established authoritarian playbook, pro-democracy actors can turn this imitation into their advantage.
This Op-Ed draws on the essay How to Flip the Script on the Authoritarian Playbook.
Filip Milacic is a senior researcher at the “Democracy of the Future” office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), visiting faculty at the Central European University (CEU), and research affiliate at the CEU’s Democracy Institute. He is the author of the forthcoming book “Abandoning Democracy for the Nation” (Cambridge University Press).
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
