By Daniel Hegedüs
The April 2026 elections can mark the end of Hungary’s 16-year experiment with illiberalism and open a new chapter in its relations with Europe and the wider world. After more than a decade of multivectoral diplomacy—balancing uneasily between Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing—a new government might need to redefine the country’s place within the Euro-Atlantic community while confronting the legacies of dependency and mistrust left behind. The following analysis outlines the strategic framework for such a reorientation, mapping the challenges, trade-offs, and opportunities facing a future democratic Hungary.
The 2026 Hungarian elections and the rise of the opposition party Respect and Freedom (Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt, Tisza) offer the greatest opportunity for a democratic change of government—and thus for the possible end of Prime Minister Victor Orbán’s illiberal, semi-authoritarian regime—since 2010.
Hungary’s democratic decline and systemic corruption have long concerned its European partners, resulting in the European Union (EU)’s decision to freeze funds and introduce sanctions against the Orbán regime. These measures, however, gained real political support and appreciation by Member States primarily after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This shift was driven by Hungary’s multivectoral foreign policy—understood as what Vanderhill and colleagues describe as “a pragmatic, balanced approach to international relations, enabling states to engage simultaneously with multiple, often competing, major powers without exclusive alignment or subordination”—and by the regime’s deliberate and repeated efforts to block EU decisions aligned against the Kremlin’s strategic interests.
With a new, democratically elected government now a real possibility, the question is no longer hypothetical: What kind of foreign and EU policy should a future democratic Hungary pursue?
This piece is the first in a ten-part series exploring Hungary’s potential foreign policy reset, focusing on the strategic framework and challenges that could hinder a full break from the Orbán-era orientation and the dismantling of its institutional legacies. Subsequent pieces will address Hungary’s key relationships—with the EU, the United States, Russia, and China—alongside topics such as regional cooperation in Central Europe, the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and a renewed development policy. The series will also offer recommendations for European and transatlantic partners on how to engage with and support Hungary’s reintegration into the Western alliance system.
The Foreign Policy Line of Tisza
The ideological profile of the opposition party Tisza remains somewhat blurred, shaped by Péter Magyar’s charismatic and populist leadership, the nation-centered and often conservative worldview reflected in its main narrative, and the pragmatic need to present Tisza as a post-ideological catch-all movement capable of uniting and mobilizing very different social groups and voter segments against the incumbent Orbán regime.
Despite this lack of ideological clarity, Tisza’s campaign stands out for its effective use of substantive policy issues, in sharp contrast to Fidesz’s emotionally charged, enemy-driven rhetoric and to previous opposition formations’ limited capacity to turn topics like corruption or public services into winning themes. Foreign policy has been no exception.
The foundations of the opposition’s vision for Hungary’s future foreign policy were laid out in Magyar’s speech, “Hungary’s Place in Europe and the World,” delivered on July 26 in Székesfehérvár, the medieval coronation city of the Kingdom of Hungary. Symbolically timed to coincide with Orbán’s annual address in Băile Tușnad, Romania, the speech reassured both voters and international partners that a future democratic government would abandon the Orbán regime’s multivectoral foreign policy and remain firmly committed to Euro-Atlantic integration through EU and NATO membership.
Yet Magyar did not address the structural challenges that could hinder Hungary’s reintegration into the Western alliance as a constructive and trustworthy partner. While this omission is understandable given campaign logic, providing answers to these very real dilemmas will be essential for delivering a truly novel foreign policy. Without such clarification, expectations among both allies and voters risk going unmet.
Obstacles and Path Dependencies
The obstacles ahead can be grouped into two main categories.
First, Hungarian foreign policy has become as deeply captured as the country’s constitutional system itself. Simply ending veto diplomacy and adopting a constructive attitude toward the West will not suffice. The Orbán regime’s “Eastern Opening,” introduced by Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó in 2014, entrenched Russian and Chinese influence across strategic sectors. These embedded ties enable both authoritarian powers to retain leverage even under a democratic, pro-Western government.
A new administration will face hard choices: What should be done with the Russian-financed Paks II nuclear project? With the Chinese–Hungarian security agreement that allows PRC police deployment in Hungary? With Huawei’s role in 5G infrastructure or the Chinese AI-enabled CCTV systems used by the Ministry of Interior? Moscow could condition fuel supplies for the existing Paks reactors on preserving the Paks II deal, effectively blackmailing Budapest into continued nuclear dependence. Beijing could similarly leverage its holdings of Hungarian sovereign bonds, loan agreements, or investments to exert political pressure.
Both powers are likely to use economic incentives or coercion to preserve their foothold. If a new government views Russian and Chinese influence as a threat to national sovereignty—and dismantling these ties as a priority—it must adopt a comprehensive strategy to neutralize them.
Pro-Western rhetoric alone will not alter the entrenched structures of dependency that constitute the first and most immediate challenge.
The second challenge stems from the erosion of elite consensus on strategic foreign policy issues, which has fractured the political landscape across Central and Eastern Europe. Competing geopolitical narratives increasingly have defined partisan divides: a pro-Western mainstream versus illiberal populists sympathetic to authoritarian powers. This pattern now extends beyond Hungary to Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
The foreign policy of the next Czech government under Andrej Babiš may appear increasingly multivectoral compared with that of the previous government led by Petr Fiala. Similar tensions and divisions in foreign and security policy are also becoming visible in Poland—once the country with the strongest elite consensus on such matters in Central Europe—between the pro-Western political center and the populist radical right.
Magyar’s ambition to strengthen regional cooperation will therefore collide with reality. The main governing parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia—traditional partners within the Visegrád Four—are now ideological allies of Orbán’s Fidesz, while Robert Fico’s Slovakia and a possible future Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS)-led Poland may view Hungary’s democratic renewal as a threat to their own rule.
It would be naïve to expect these governments to act as constructive partners in redefining Central European cooperation within the EU. Orbán’s Hungary has already sheltered figures such as Daniel Obajtek, the PiS politician and former CEO of the state-owned oil giant Orlen, former deputy Minister of Justice Marcin Romanowski, and, more recently, former Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro, all under investigation in Poland. A future PiS government might well reciprocate by harboring Fidesz officials, defying established norms of EU judicial cooperation. Under such conditions, finding common ground for regional collaboration will be difficult.
A new Tisza-led government may embody democratic renewal in Hungary and across Europe—but it will also have to confront the reality that the liberal-democratic versus illiberal-populist divide will remain a defining challenge, not only at home but also in regional diplomacy.
Toward “Idealistic Realism”
To address these challenges and meet the expectations of both Hungarian voters and international partners, the foreign policy of a democratic Hungary will need to integrate idealism with realism. This “idealistic realism” would combine normative commitments with strategic pragmatism, recognizing that the contest between liberal-democratic and authoritarian models now shapes not only global politics but also intra-European dynamics.
It is a legitimate objective for a future Tisza government to seek constructive and friendly relations with all neighboring countries and Central European partners, regardless of their current political orientation. Achieving this, however, will not be straightforward, given the diverging interests and illiberal tendencies of many regional actors.
At the same time, it will be in Hungary’s fundamental interest to invest in close, value-based cooperation with stakeholders committed to defending liberal democracy—both within their own countries and at the European level—from a centrist political position.
If Hungary successfully implements reforms for democratic renewal, Magyar and Tisza will likely become symbols of democratic resilience across Europe. With a constitutional supermajority, they could advance reforms beyond those achieved in post-2023 Poland, where democratic consolidation appears to have stalled. A Hungarian breakthrough would demonstrate that a return from electoral autocracy to democracy is possible, reinvigorating liberal forces across the region.
While this narrative may create obstacles to smooth cooperation with neighboring and regional partners—it is possible that, after 2027, Hungary will be the only Visegrád country without an illiberal government—embracing it could nonetheless provide important legitimacy and diplomatic leverage. Such credibility could, in turn, help unfreeze the suspended EU funds and strengthen Hungary’s position in negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Securing access to these funds is one of Tisza’s key promises and could make or break the new government’s output legitimacy at the very start of the parliamentary cycle. For this reason, it will be a strategic priority in the event of an opposition victory.
In essence, no future democratic Hungarian government can avoid balancing competing realist and idealist imperatives.
Even dismantling Orbán’s multivectoral policy will require careful sequencing to reduce dependency on Russia and China without provoking destabilizing crises. Finding this equilibrium will be the task of the prime minister and the government, but the concept of idealistic realism can serve as a strategic compass for Hungary’s foreign policy of democratic renewal.
Charting a Democratic Course
Tisza cannot be expected to address these complex foreign policy questions in detail during the campaign, when its priority remains electoral victory—ideally with a constitutional two-thirds majority. Yet identifying the challenges ahead and preparing coherent strategies to confront them will be essential once in government.
Hungary’s democratic future will hinge not only on domestic reform but also on a credible redefinition of its role within Europe and the transatlantic alliance. The success of that reorientation will depend on whether Budapest can translate the ideals of democratic renewal into a pragmatic yet principled foreign policy—one that promotes national interest, restores trust, and anchors Hungary once again at the heart of the Western community, all at the same time.
Daniel Hegedüs is Regional Director for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a Research Affiliate at the CEU Democracy Institute.
A Hungarian version of this article was first published in HVG.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
