Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014, has over the last four years evolved into a full-scale, brutal war. While Ukrainian soldiers defend their country, the rest of the state apparatus faces intensified challenges in organizing the everyday lives of the country’s citizens. The situation worsened at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026. Due to the intensification of bombardments of energy infrastructure, millions of citizens, especially in the largest cities and in the capital Kyiv, have for many days and weeks lived and worked without electricity, heating, and water. Even as parts of the country are ravaged by lawless attacks, the judiciary continues to function and ensure the operation of Ukraine’s legal system. A new challenge has emerged with the process of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU). The country’s legal system must adapt to the EU’s requirements.
Stanislav Kravchenko, Tetyana Antsupova, and Sergii Koziakov analyze the challenges facing the Ukrainian judiciary arising from the ongoing war, the process of accession to the EU, and allegations of corruption reported in European media outlets.
Stanislav Kravchenko is the President of the Supreme Court in Ukraine.
Professor Tetyana Antsupova is a Senior Research Fellow at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) and lead researcher of the Project “The Dynamics of the Judiciary in Ukraine in the Context of the Rule of Law and the EU Accession Aspirations.” Professor Antsupova is a former judge of the Supreme Court in Ukraine (Grand Chamber).
Dr. Sergii Koziakov is Research Leader at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Dr. Koziakov is a former Chairman of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine and has been an Associate Professor at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Institute of International Relations) since 1988.
Tetyana Antsupova and Sergii Koziakov: How were the first weeks and months of the Supreme Court’s work after the beginning of the war? How do judges continue to work amid constant bombardment, and how has the war affected their well-being?
Stanislav Kravchenko: One of the most significant achievements of the Ukrainian judiciary, and of the Supreme Court in particular, has been to preserve institutional stability and continued access to justice throughout the wartime period. Despite Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian courts handle around four million cases annually. While this figure is alarming, it also testifies to the remarkable resilience of the judicial system. Even amid blackouts, shelling, and displacement, citizens have retained the ability to defend their rights in court, including before the Supreme Court.
In 2025, the Supreme Court reviewed approximately 92,000 cases, a figure comparable to that of the year before. By contrast, 2022 saw a sharp and understandable decline of around 40 per cent across the judiciary, as millions of people were forced to flee their homes or leave the country. By 2023, however, court activity had largely returned to pre-war levels.
At the beginning of the invasion, neither the High Council of Justice nor the High Qualification Commission of Judges was operational. Nevertheless, urgent decisions had to be taken. Particularly concerning changes to the territorial jurisdiction of courts in occupied areas. In 2022, the jurisdiction of 130 courts was reassigned, and following de-occupation, the jurisdiction of 50 courts was restored. While 2023 was relatively stable, further jurisdictional changes became necessary in 2024 due to renewed occupation and the proximity of certain courts to the front line, especially in the Donetsk region.
The war has inevitably affected the mental well-being of judges and court staff. Night-time shelling often disrupts work the following day, while daytime attacks force hearings to be suspended as people seek shelter.
Tragically, in December 2024, an employee of the Donetsk Court of Appeal was killed by a ballistic missile strike on the courthouse in Kryvyi Rih. In September 2024, Leonid Loboyko, a judge of the Supreme Court, was killed by a Russian drone strike in the village of Kozacha Lopan in Kharkiv Oblast. Reportedly, he was delivering humanitarian aid to residents of the village at the time of the attack. Such events take a profound psychological toll. Nevertheless, judges and court staff continue to fulfil their duties under extreme conditions, demonstrating professionalism and dedication at all levels of the judiciary, especially in regions closest to the front line.
Open sources indicate that since the Supreme Court began operating in December 2017, approximately a quarter of its judges have resigned. How does this affect the Court’s decisions?
Currently, there are 146 sitting judges at the Supreme Court, two of whom are seconded to the High Council of Justice, leaving 144 actively serving. By law, the Court can have up to 200 judges, and historically, the highest number serving simultaneously was 196. This means there are currently 49 fewer judges than permitted.
The reduced number of judges does impact the Court’s work. Case submissions continue to rise steadily, with roughly 5% annual growth. In 2025, the Court received 94,000 new cases while reviewing 92,000. The backlog remains relatively small, but it is gradually increasing. Moreover, many judges are approaching the maximum age for tenure or may choose to resign, further reducing staffing.
During the first Plenary session of the Supreme Court in 2025, I emphasized that the issue of staffing the Supreme Court must be resolved as quickly as possible. Of course, we’re conscious of the workload of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ). We understand that competitions for the appellate courts are ongoing, and the selection for courts of first instance has begun. However, one thing the state simply cannot allow is the creation of staffing problems that would hinder the Supreme Court’s functioning, as legal certainty largely depends on the Court’s stability and efficiency.
The current pace of the competitions for the appellate courts is extremely unsatisfactory. Initially, we had expected these competitions to conclude in 2025, or at the latest, at the beginning of 2026. However, we can now say with confidence that this was overly optimistic. As a result, the HQCJ will not address the shortage of Supreme Court staffing very quickly. This is a serious problem that requires careful consideration.
Nonetheless, I sincerely hope that the HQCJ will accelerate the ongoing procedures and announce competitions for all vacant positions in the Supreme Court early this year.
The new Supreme Court was established through reforms in 2016. Has special legislation been introduced later to adapt the judicial process to wartime operations? If so, which laws are currently relevant? How do judges apply humanitarian law in wartime?
In February 2022, the law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” stipulated that changes to the territorial jurisdiction of courts need to be made by the High Council of Justice. However, the Council was not operational at the time. In response, Parliament quickly authorized the President of the Supreme Court to manage these issues, ensuring the functioning of the judicial system. Today, as President of the Supreme Court, I submit motions to change or restore the territorial jurisdiction of courts when necessary.
Additionally, significant amendments were made to procedural legislation, primarily concerning criminal law. Article 615 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine was revised to address the specific challenges of criminal proceedings during wartime. These adjustments were essential at the outset of the full-scale invasion, particularly since the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations was not operational, and some courts struggled to manage criminal proceedings efficiently. The procedural changes clarified how courts should handle cases under martial law conditions.
It is important to note that national legislation does not permit extraordinary simplification of court procedures, as stipulated by the law “On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency.”
Throughout the war, the judiciary has consistently maintained that, despite the extreme challenges, it must uphold the high standards of the Council of Europe, ensure the proper functioning of the European Convention on Human Rights, and implement approaches developed by the European Court of Human Rights.
Based on our observations, the Supreme Court actively engages in the European integration process at all stages. How does it communicate with the Government and the European Commission (Commission) during the adaptation to EU norms and rules?
The Court’s communication efforts related to European integration began in 2024, when Ukrainian legislation was scrutinized for the first time. A working group was established, followed by a national delegation tasked with negotiations with the Commission, coordinated by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.
Representatives of the Supreme Court were active members of this delegation and, in September 2024, participated in discussions with the European Commission on the outcomes of the legislative screening. We succeeded in establishing a shared understanding with Brussels regarding the areas in which Ukraine’s judiciary must adapt to meet EU standards. Significant efforts were made to provide the Commission with detailed information on how particular issues of interest to Brussels are addressed in legislation and in judicial practice, particularly within the Supreme Court.
Most importantly, we engaged in discussions on the rule of law and human rights protection, focusing on criminal proceedings, the functioning of democratic institutions, and safeguards for intellectual property and corporate law. Following this engagement, the European Commission issued a report that led to the development of a roadmap, particularly in the area covered by Section 23, “Rule of Law.” In this context, the Supreme Court has been proactive in recognising EU requirements and expectations.
The discussions with both national partners and Commission representatives were highly productive. We reached a consensus on priorities for judicial reform. This includes optimizing court structures, filling vacant positions across the judiciary, improving disciplinary procedures, and clarifying legislation related to judges’ disciplinary liability.
A dedicated part of Section 23 of the Roadmap addresses the effectiveness of justice. Establishing mechanisms to enhance the consistency of judicial practice, especially for cases not subject to cassation review, is a key objective, alongside the planned improvements to cassation filters. The Commission acknowledges the challenges the Supreme Court faces in managing the high volume of cases, which complicates the effective performance of its cassation function, underscoring the need for a clear decision on these filters.
The communication component of the roadmap is particularly innovative. It introduces an annual survey to measure citizens’ trust in the judicial system, aiming to counter misleading narratives suggesting widespread public distrust. The survey results will provide a more accurate picture of public confidence in the courts.
As of now, the roadmap has been approved by the Government. We are awaiting the EU’s approval. Despite this, it is already being implemented, and a dialogue with the EC is underway regarding the roadmap. Once fully executed, these initiatives will strengthen Ukraine’s judicial system and ensure its alignment with EU standards.
For many years, Ukrainian judges have followed the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) also being reviewed? How active is the exchange between Supreme Court judges and their EU counterparts?
We recognize that the most effective way to advance European integration and align with the CJEU’s case law is through judicial practice. Currently, we have cases in which the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court and the courts of cassation are applying CJEU jurisprudence.
Although Ukraine is not yet an EU member, we use tools to examine, analyze, and implement CJEU practices today, through the lens of the rule of law and the directives Ukraine has already ratified. For example, in a recent case, the Grand Chamber addressed intellectual property issues, specifically the termination of a trademark right due to non-use, relying on relevant CJEU case law to resolve the matter.
Since mid-2023, the Supreme Court, as a member of the EU Supreme Courts network, has been providing translations of the CJEU’s case law reviews. For a year and a half now, we have been preparing and publishing these reviews internally at the Supreme Court. We know how crucial proactivity is in this context – that is, we do not need to wait for the completion of the accession process to begin studying CJEU practice. Starting only once Ukraine joins the EU would be too late. That is why we are making every effort to advance this today.
I don’t think that this is an overly complex process. Many issues overlap with the case law of the ECtHR, which we have been systematically studying and applying for a long time. However, studying the CJEU’s work reveals a much larger number of legal questions that find resolution in its case law. Therefore, we strive to stay up to date and monitor how the case law evolves.
Moreover, judges participate in relevant training sessions. We invite experts on these topics, draw on the experiences of European colleagues, conduct visits to the Luxembourg Court, and engage with CJEU judges during academic and practical events.
In 2025, I visited Luxembourg, where I had the opportunity to meet with the presidents of the EU’s supreme courts. I also participated in the corresponding meeting of the presidents of Eastern European supreme courts, which took place in Albania in June 2025.
Such meetings are important, and we try to grasp every opportunity for communication to understand the legal approaches applied across Europe.
Regrettably, the media in the UK and other countries often report significant corruption in Ukraine, particularly involving judges. How widespread is corruption among judges, and what measures exist to prevent and combat it, especially within the judicial system? Can bodies such as the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine fight corruption independently?
Corruption within the judiciary is rare. We have robust mechanisms to respond to such misconduct, and every effort to investigate and hold offenders accountable acts as a strong deterrent. All individuals involved in corrupt acts face the inevitable consequence of criminal prosecution.
Today, Ukraine’s anti-corruption framework is well-developed. Every year, judges and civil servants submit detailed property declarations covering assets such as real estate, bank accounts, digital currencies, and cash. These declarations are publicly accessible, ensuring transparency. Although access was temporarily interrupted at the start of the full-scale war, it has now been entirely restored. This underscores Ukraine’s commitment to fighting corruption and maintaining effective preventive mechanisms.
Within the Supreme Court, the Criminal Court of Cassation has established a specialized anti-corruption chamber. Its members are selected every three years from the three judicial chambers of the Criminal Court of Cassation.
While there is still room to enhance the practical application of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, we do not currently observe significant systemic issues in this area.
An initial version of this interview was first drafted in Ukrainian. It was translated into English by Prof. Tetyana Antsupova. Konstantin Kipp edited the English version.
