by Tebo Esmond A. Ratsiripe-Sekgwa
For the first time since independence, Africa’s longest continuous multiparty democracy, Botswana, has changed government. For nearly six decades, one party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), dominated elections. However, the outcome of the 2024 general elections saw the BDP lose its grip on power, to the country’s first coalition government, Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). So, how did the decline of the BDP come about? Also, will this be the end of an era of one-party dominance?
After 58 years in power, despite previously being responsive and sensitive to the possibility of losing power, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) eventually succumbed to internal and external factors in the 2024 general elections. The electoral defeat of the BDP was not one that could have easily been predicted, given the complex nature and interplay of the issues that led to this outcome.
While many have rightfully highlighted the conflict between the then incumbent President Mokgweetsi Masisi and his predecessor Seretse Khama Ian Khama, there are other matters that are equally significant, but often overlooked. These disregarded issues include the controversial and divisive BDP primary elections, a fragmented BDP membership, unpopular policies, as well as a stronger, united opposition with appealing promises.
Historical Factors Affecting the Decline of the BDP
It should not be taken for granted that the BDP had been losing its share of votes since 1979 to opposition parties, mainly to the Botswana National Front (BNF). In 1994, the BNF significantly increased its support leading to the expectation that it would unseat the BDP in 1999. However, following the split of the BNF leading to the creation of the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) towards the 1999 elections, BDP continued to survive, given the now divided main opposition.
In response to the possibility of losing power, the BDP reintegrated the famous and popular Khama name into the party. The late Sir Seretse Khama was the country’s first president, and a highly popular figure among the BDP’s main base (made up mainly of elderly voters). By introducing his son, Lt. Gen (rtd.) Seretse Khama Ian Khama (commonly known as Ian Khama), as a member of BDP and successor to the then president Festus Mogae, the party assured itself of the continued retention of its strongholds in the central district, especially in the Serowe Constituencies. Given that Sir Seretse Khama was from Serowe, as well as the hereditary Chief of the Bangwato tribe in the central district, and a founding member of the BDP, the Serowe Constituencies were always guaranteed to support the BDP. This backing, however, was only assured as long as the Khama family remained members of the BDP. With Ian Khama taking over from Festus Mogae through the automatic succession plan of the BDP in 2008, the Serowe strongholds remained in favor of the BDP.
This support of the traditional strongholds of the BDP in the Serowe Constituencies, remained undisturbed until the dispute between the then former president Ian Khama, and his successor, Mokgweetsi Masisi.
The BDP had already been weakened by the breakaway and formation of the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) in 2010, which almost resulted in the loss of the 2014 elections to the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) coalition. With another faction breaking away from the BDP due to Ian Khama forming the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF) in 2019, the decline of the BDP had become almost inevitable.
Contemporary Factors Affecting the Decline of the BDP
While the BDP went on to take opposition strongholds in the 2019 elections under Masisi, it lost its strongholds in the Serowe Constituencies. The outcome reflected this new, but unsustainable division, with the BDP losing its traditional strongholds to the BPF, while gaining opposition strongholds such as the Gaborone Constituencies.
With the BPF and UDC joining forces, the BDP faced the 2024 general elections in a weakened position.
Infighting continued, as opposition within the party grew against President Masisi, with some members such as the current BDP party leader Mpho Balopi, supporting the return of Ian Khama to the party.
The lack of unity within the party went on to create disputes during the primary elections, with irregularities such as missing names from voters’ rolls highlighted.
This further split the BDP membership, as it left many BDP voters disgruntled, possibly leading to some voting for the opposition, in protest. However, internal party politics alone were not the only source of the decline of the BDP, but also unpopular policies by the Masisi administration.
One of its most unpopular policies was the constitutional review, which alienated the often overlooked, but significantly important tribal leadership (Chiefs).
The Masisi administration attempted to use the constitutional review to consolidate executive power and undermine traditional leadership.
Given that Ian Khama was a hereditary Chief and an opponent of President Masisi, the administration attempted to use the constitutional review to weaken the Chieftainship institution. The Chieftainship of the Bangwato tribe of the central district was the source of former president Ian Khama’s power, as such, President Masisi sought to diminish it. However, this was a serious miscalculation on the part of the administration and the BDP, given that this alienated many of the Chiefs, especially those from tribes recognized in the current constitution.
While this might seem insignificant in a democratic system, it is important in the Botswana society, given that these Chiefs are mainly those of the largest Tswana tribes. Furthermore, in what seems like a desperate last-ditch effort to gain something while in power, the Masisi administration introduced the Presidential Pensions and Retirement Benefits bill, which sought to give permanent pensions to the wife and children of former presidents. The bill proved to be highly unpopular. This backlash from the general public eventually led to its withdrawal. Therefore, towards the end of its term, the Masisi administration was showing signs of desperation.
With the BDP internally split, most traditional allies were alienated. With the latest breakaway faction, BPF, teaming up with the UDC, the desperation was well founded. The UDC coalition also offered appealing promises, especially the minimum wage of P4000 (approx. USD300), and the increase of the old age pension from P830 (approx. USD61) to P1800 (approx. USD132). The UDC manifesto also included reducing old age pension eligibility from 65 to 60 years, increasing student and National Community Service allowances to P2500 (approx. USD183), building 100,000 affordable houses, and creating 450,000 to 500,000 jobs.
With so many promises deducting from national revenue, with insufficient income sources to cover the gap, the new administration has continuously projected deficit budgets. This has been worsened further by the decline in diamond revenue, which dominates export earnings and government income.
The economy has also been unstable, contracting by three percent in 2024 and 2025, according to the World Bank, with a slight recovery of 0.6 percent projected for 2026. There is still, however, the issue of where the country will source the funds for its budget deficits in the long run, as the public debt continues to rise exponentially.
In short, the loss of the 2024 general elections by the BDP can be attributed to a combination of historical and contemporary factors, mainly a weaker party due to the breakaway of the BMD and BPF factions, and a stronger opposition coalition that integrated these fragments of the BDP. The infighting by the BDP also further weakened it, as it led to controversial and divisive primary elections. Unpopular policies with critical stakeholders of the BDP was also a determining factor, given that it directly affected the party’s source of strength, in its silent alliance with Chiefs of the largest Tswana tribes.
However, this is not to take away credit from the opposition, which had come close to attaining power in previous elections, notably in 1994, 1999, and 2014. Much like the current BDP, infighting and lack of unity had resulted in the then opposition falling short. This time around, it was the BDP that suffered from these deficiencies, that were previously associated and more prone to opposition parties.
The Future of Botswana’s Democracy
For the first time in Botswana’s democratic history, a coalition government has taken the reigns of power. The country has not just changed governments for the first time since independence, but it is also testing the stability and sustainability of coalition rule. Whether or not the coalition government will survive another election, will largely be determined by their ability to remain united, fulfillment of their promises while maintaining economic stability, and the outcome of yet another attempt to review the constitution.
Although much of the aforementioned is within the control of the ruling coalition, the main opposition parties still have an opportunity to strengthen themselves going into the 2029 general elections. The BCP’s prospects can be boosted if its current campaign to expand its presence in the south of the country proves fruitful. With regards to the BDP, there are already attempts to lure the BPF and Khama back to the party, in addition to publicly apologizing to all those presumed to have been done hard by the previous BDP administration. Should this strategy gain momentum, the BDP could possibly rise from its ashes, especially considering it is still the second largest party in the country, by popular vote.
Tebo Esmond A. Ratsiripe-Sekgwa is a former Botswana career diplomat, who dealt with political and economic matters. He was also a candidate in the Botswana Democratic Party’s 2024 primary elections. He holds an MA in Political Science with a specialization in Comparative Political Science from Central European University (Hungary), and a BA in Political Science and International Studies with a specialization in Comparative Government and International Studies from McDaniel College (USA). His MA thesis studied the political and economic history of Botswana.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
