An op-ed by Zselyke Csaky
Supporting democracy and standing up to authoritarian aggression have been at center stage globally, especially since the start of Russia’s bloody war against Ukraine. The EU and its member states stepped up democracy support in the aftermath of the attack, however, they have been less active – and less ambitious – in the second year of the conflict.
As Europe continued to face multiple crises, including volatile situations in the Middle East, the Caucuses, and the Sahel, democracy policy lost some of its prominence in 2023, according to a new report published by the European Democracy Hub.
Supporting Ukraine remained a European priority, as evidenced by the unlocking of a 50B euro aid package in February. While the approval came on the back of a drawn-out process, its success indicated continued and firm backing among the member states. Still, the urgency that the war had given to defending democratic values faded somewhat, with fewer mentions of democracy in the speeches and strategic commitments of high-level EU officials compared to previous years.
The balancing of support for democracy with geopolitical considerations and long-term strategic goals was visible in internal matters as well.
The EU blocked access to practically all cohesion and recovery funds to Poland and Hungary in 2022 – a significant step given that it amounted to about one-fifth of each country’s GDP – but it gave up much of its leverage over the rule-of-law in late 2023. In Poland’s case, the new government is intent on rebuilding democracy. When it comes to Hungary, however, the unfreezing of 10B euros may have led to Orban dropping his veto on Ukraine but clearly did nothing to halt further deterioration domestically.
The EU at the same time moved forward with some initiatives on defending democracy, including proposing a new anticorruption regime, implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) to tackle disinformation, and releasing funding calls on media pluralism. The Defense of Democracy package, the Commission’s flagship project on improving transparency and tackling electoral interference, was published after significant delays. However, concerns remained over its effectiveness and potential chilling effect on civil society organizations.
At the level of national foreign policy strategies, few countries made democracy support a key consideration and spending on democracy remained difficult to measure.
In an interesting new development, however, there was an increased focus on gender both at the level of development aid and in security missions, as well as in national strategies.
While there is an overlap between the democracy agenda and feminist foreign policy, the two are not in perfect alignment; improvement on women and girls’ rights may not always lead to improvements on other rights.
When it comes to neighborhood policies, the launch of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and the granting of candidate status to Georgia constituted significant milestones. They also opened the way to more EU influence over democratic norms in the three countries. There was little progress in the Western Balkans at the same time, and EU countries’ engagement failed to protect democracy and human rights in several crises, from the flareup of violence between Serbia and Kosovo to Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno Karabakh and the war in Gaza.
Despite the launch of some new programs, the EU’s security and peacebuilding missions increasingly focused on containment of conflict, even though democracy support is defined as a central pillar of the EU’s conflict-resolution strategy.
In general, European countries struggled to come up with an adequate and coherent pro-democracy response to coups, and the EU’s weakening security presence in the Sahel was coupled with a less ambitious strategy in the region.
The alignment between geopolitical considerations and support for democracy in foreign policy has never been perfect – there have always been trade-offs between the two, with the EU and member states often deciding to tone down the latter to advance the former. Russia’s aggression and China’s assertiveness have thrown democracy’s vulnerability into sharp relief, strengthening European actors’ resolve to protect it.
That resolve lost some focus during 2023, with important initiatives moving forward but often taking a backseat to geopolitics and crisis management.
Part of the reason lies in the fact that the initial existential urgency surrounding the war dissipated, allowing European states to focus on their strategic positioning. Yet, as the EU gears up for elections and another possible surge of the far right in June, democracy will continue to stay high on the agenda for the rest of 2024.
Zselyke Csaky is a fellow at the European Democracy Hub and former research director at Freedom House. She was a co-author of the report.
