By Michal Matlak
Michał Matlak acts as advisor in the European Parliament. He is associated with the CEU Democracy Institute and the University of Lodz. He formerly acted as the managing editor of the Review of Democracy.
Labour’s victory in Thursday’s UK elections will finally bring the era of Brexit to an end in European politics. Britain’s exit has happened. Although most Brits today would vote in favour of their country’s membership in the Union, in their minds and in those of EU citizens reunification does not appear to be an urgent matter for the coming years – Jean-Claude Juncker talks of a “century or two” as a possible time horizon for Britain’s future EU membership.
This does not mean that the relationship between the EU and Britain should not change fundamentally.
A Difficult Divorce
Writing about the terms of divorce between the EU and the British, Joseph H.H. Weiler referred to the Treaty of Versailles and the humiliation of Germany after World War I. He believes that the European Union had used its radically greater power to weaken Britain significantly. Others have much more understanding for Brussels’ approach – according to many, the unity of the union and the single market had to be the EU’s priorities at a time of rising anti-EU sentiment in many member states. It appears today that the lesson of Brexit functions as a sort of vaccine in most EU societies – although Weiler is right to point out that the Union must at some future point become a community of destiny, not just one of shared interests.
Whether we can compare it to Versailles or not, it is clear that the Union took advantage of its greatest asset – size – to impose unfavorable exit terms on Britain. Weiler points in particular to the introduction, as a result of the divorce agreement, of an internal customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK as a major humiliation for the British side – a humiliation admittedly somewhat reduced last year with the signing of the Windsor Agreement which, among other things, increases the control of the Northern Irish devolved legislature over how EU regulations are applied there.
Post-Brexit Britain in Crisis
The unfavorable deal, however, is not the reason for Britain’s poor condition today. It was rather the exit from the EU, its single market and customs union as such that greatly weakened Britain’s economic power. The freedom of trade agreements and the possibility of deregulation have not caused a rebound of the British economy at all. The UK’s exports are expected to decline by about 15 percent compared to the situation we would have had if the UK had remained in the EU; economic growth is at a mere 0.5 percent; public services are in a worse state than in most Western European countries. And what Britain was supposed to “regain control” over, namely migration, has doubled (although EU countries are no longer its primary source).
None of this, however, will induce Britons to return to the EU. Although a majority of citizens would want to rejoin the Union (about 58 percent of them), few of them consider re-accession an important issue – only 13 percent consider it to be.
The divorce lasted so long and was so grueling that today few would want to launch another national debate about the EU.
Although it was Britain that lost the negotiating game, the EU is also weaker as a result of Brexit – we have lost an important member with significant economic, military, scientific and cultural strengths. But with the successive crises that have befallen Europe after Brexit – the rule of law crisis, the pandemic, the war in Ukraine – most capitals have lost the reflex to look to London when making decisions.
Could things change now that Labour will be back in the game with a moderately pro-European government?
The Labour Party Appears Very Cautious
The short answer is no. The longer one is that it is possible but will take effort on both sides.
On EU matters, Labour promises a rather minimal program: in its manifesto, it rules out seeking membership in the single market and customs union. Instead, the manifesto speaks of rather modest plans of achieving “trade facilitation,” while mentioning compliance with “EU veterinary standards,” which would facilitate meat exports, but would certainly not bring about an economic breakthrough across the Channel. There is no denying that parts of the Labour Party – mainly among the parochialized working-class constituencies – were opposed to the UK’s EU membership. While the majority of its members were in favour of membership, this has not been a vision accepted by the party as a whole.
From the point of view of the EU, and especially its eastern flank, the most important proposal in Labour’s programme is the formalization of security and foreign policy cooperation with the EU.
In his text in Foreign Affairs, David Lammy, the UK’s shadow foreign secretary, has announced the submission of a proposal to the Union to sign a security pact, although he has not revealed details. He also talks about deepening bilateral relations with European countries in the area of security – and mentions Poland, France, Germany and Ireland by name in this context.
Lammy writes of his broader concept of a new British foreign policy as “progressive realism” – that implies an acceptance of Britain’s no longer privileged place in a world in which it does not belong among the superpowers. Progressive realism is supposed to allow Britain’s interests to be courted, but also the values it considers progressive, such as human rights, fighting climate change, democracy. Lammy cites as his role model Labour foreign minister Ernest Bevin (who, according to Lammy, was behind the creation of NATO by having convinced President Truman to give the Allies strong security guarantees) – a positive signal in the context of the possible weakening of American commitment to the organization.
What Could the Union Do?
Just after the UK referendum eight years ago, the Union was in shock, only to then quickly pull itself together and prepare a strategy under the guidance of prominent diplomat Michel Barnier. Barnier proposed a tough strategy and kept 27 capitals united around it, even though that first seemed like a mission impossible.
The situation is different today. There is less need to prove to Brits – or to the different kinds of exiters from various members states, for that matter – what the point of having the Union is. There is, however, much more to think about when it comes to building an alliance in a world where the West, democracy and respect for international law are losing their appeal.
The EU could therefore offer the UK a broad partnership that could strengthen both sides in the face of serious threats: an imperial Russia, a strong and not necessarily Europe-friendly China, but also in relation to migration and climate challenges that affect us in a similar way due to our geographical proximity.
A broad agreement on defense appears to be key. The UK has not been part of recent defense industry development initiatives, which is understandable due to Brexit. However, when you consider the weakness of those industries, tapping into substantial British capabilities sounds like a very sensible idea indeed. Britain has played a significant and positive role regarding Ukraine. Its stance from the beginning of the war has been decisive and of great import. According to Anand Menon, director of the think-tank UK in a Changing Europe, this was dictated, among other things, by the UK’s desire to rebuild its international reputation after Brexit.
The same applies to military cooperation. In Europe, the British army is the only one truly comparable to the French in terms of battlefield experience and nuclear deterrence; deepening cooperation with such an army could greatly enhance European capabilities. The armies of the British and EU countries already cooperate within NATO, of course, but the Union is likely to take over much of the defense coordination in Europe, for example via the development of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of security and defence policy), especially if Donald Trump gets elected a second time in the US.
Regular participation of UK ministers in various configurations of the Council of the European Union – primarily on matters of foreign policy and defense, but also when it comes to coordination on economic issues – seems desirable too. It might also be worth considering an annual EU–UK summit with heads of states and key ministers, which could give momentum to the relationship. The idea of regular meetings was supposedly already raised by European Council head Charles Michel – though it was rejected by the British at the time.
The upcoming Polish Presidency to start on January 1, 2025 might just be the right moment to start a process of rapprochement. Minister Radosław Sikorski, not least because of his Oxford past, appears to be in an ideal position to propose a plan to bring the EU and the UK closer together. If such a plan were to succeed, we might soon be talking about the return of the Brits from their sovereignist quest.
In collaboration with Ferenc Laczó and Oliver Garner.
