Poland is taking on the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union at a time when it is emerging as a crucial player in European politics. With a focus on defense, Ukraine, and balancing green policies with economic competitiveness, Poland’s leadership marks a pivotal moment for Europe’s future.
by Piotr Buras and Michał Matlak
Poland, once a cautious newcomer to the European Union, has returned to the center of European politics following the victory of democratic parties over an illiberal government in December 2023. Under the leadership of Donald Tusk, Poland – which now holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union – is positioning itself as both a key voice in shaping Europe’s future and a prominent player in EU-US cooperation, particularly in navigating the re-balancing of global power dynamics. With a focus on strengthening defense, providing long-term support to Ukraine, and navigating its way to remain competitive, Poland finds itself at the center of the EU’s dilemmas – balancing the need to secure Europe, define its role in global competition with China and the United States, and uphold the European social model and its green policies.
Last week saw various kinds of responses to US President Donald Trump’s set of inaugural speeches and actions. The day after the inauguration in Washington, D.C., European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gave a sort of counter-speech at the annual meeting of the global elite in Davos. Von der Leyen warned against a tariff war by pointing to the potential of the European bloc. Von der Leyen also defended the Paris Climate Agreement, which is one of the cornerstones for the Union to fight climate change, and from which Trump pulled out the US immediately.
The head of the Commission defended her idea of reform in the Union, which is supposed to eventually allow the EU to become competitive with the US and China by unlocking the potential of its single market and using almost 1.5 trillion of European savings to invest in its economy. She spoke little about security in Davos, which in turn was the focus of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s speech, which called for Europe to build up its military and take a seat at the table in possible peace negotiations.
But the most forceful counter-speech came perhaps from Donald Tusk.
Speaking in front of the European Parliament, Tusk passionately defended liberal democratic Europe against Trump’s anti-Europeanism, Russian aggression, and Chinese expansionism.
Tusk’s speech, presenting the priorities of the Polish rotating presidency of the Council, called for European unity, greater confidence, and a drastic increase in defense spending so that European countries approach 5% of GDP (currently, Poland is the only EU country close to reaching this target as it will spend 4.7% of its GDP on defense this year).
Tusk didn’t hold back, calling for a recalibration of the Green Deal with a stark warning: if soaring energy prices turn Europeans against climate protection, the world could lose one of the last champions of this crucial cause. He also defended his uncompromising stance on migration and border control, arguing that failure to manage these issues risks empowering the far right.
The tone resembled that of a motivational coach, acutely attuned to the fears of his audience and determined to restore their confidence. Rather than placating Donald Trump, as many might have expected, Tusk chose a path of assertiveness—just as he did during Trump’s first term when he served as European Council president.
His message was clear: Europe must stand firm, united, and self-assured to confront external pressures and internal doubts.
Building on the intellectual convictions of his youth, the Polish Prime Minister consciously took on the role of defender of the free world. His passion for liberal ideals—nurtured during his work with the Gdańsk-based Przegląd Polityczny (Review of Politics)—was palpable. Echoes of Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich von Hayek, and Raymond Aron, thinkers he once championed together with Wojciech Duda, resonated in his defense of traditional liberal freedoms.
The speech wasn’t just a nostalgic ode to liberalism. Tusk’s rallying cry to MEPs was steeped in the urgency of the moment: the rise of sovereigntists and anti-European forces looms large. With speeches from AfD, Confederation, and Fidesz MEPs serving as ominous warnings, he didn’t need to look far for reminders. Tusk understands that Europe’s pro-European consensus is fragile, always at risk of being toppled by figures like Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, or Alice Weidel. Even in Poland, the liberal democratic victory appears tenuous, teetering on the edge of reversal.
While Tusk’s motivational address did not delve deeply into specifics,
Poland’s vision for the EU has become clear based on its actions in Brussels: it would be a Union focused on security and enlargement, addressing the threats posed by Russia and the war in Ukraine while tackling the common challenges of economic and climate transformation.
From Pupil to Player: Poland’s 20 Years in the EU
If someone were suddenly transported from 2003 when debates about Poland’s EU accession were dominated by skepticism and various fears, they might be shocked by today’s realities. Contrary to the dire predictions of those days, Poland has emerged as the greatest success story among Central and Eastern European countries, including in agriculture—a sector that was once considered particularly vulnerable.
Poland’s achievements are staggering. Between 2004 and 2022, its GDP doubled, and studies by the Polish Economic Institute suggest that its growth was 40% higher than it would have been without EU membership. GDP per capita has risen from 45% of Germany’s level in 2004 to over 67% today.
While there were occasional missteps—like the EU competition rules that negatively impacted Poland’s shipbuilding industry—the effects of European economic integration have been overwhelmingly positive for the country.
Beyond some 235 billions of Euros received in EU funds, two factors proved even more transformative: access to the common market, which integrated Poland into European value chains, and a dramatic improvement in state institutions. Membership helped Poland transition from a post-communist state to a robust version of democratic capitalism.
But while a significant part of the East thrived, the same cannot be said for the rest of the Union. Over the last two decades, ‘old Europe’ stagnated, and southern Europe struggled with crisis after crisis. Of the EU’s three blocs — North, South, and East—the East has clearly gained the most.
However, the tide may be turning. Poland’s labor costs are rising, and its coal dependency is becoming a liability. Expensive extraction and high carbon intensity not only reduce Poland’s appeal as a location for new investment but also highlight its vulnerability in an EU shifting towards a greener, more competitive economy. The Union is focusing more on boosting its global competitiveness to try to catch up with the US and China than on nurturing its poorer members. Large European companies, of which Poland has hardly any, are the new priority.
Poland’s EU membership has been an undeniable success, but the next 20 years may demand bold reforms and strategic shifts to maintain the country’s recent trajectory. The open question is whether Poland can adapt to these new realities and continue to thrive in a changing Europe.
Poland’s Power Play: Ukraine and Europe’s Defense
Security is the watchword of Poland’s EU presidency. The term spans economic, energy, food, health, and—most crucially—military dimensions. This focus is hardly surprising given Poland’s proximity to a belligerent Russia. For decades, NATO has been the cornerstone of Poland’s defense, but cracks in this strategy are emerging. The US, whose defense budget dwarfs all other NATO members combined, appears to be decreasingly committed to Europe’s security. While NATO clearly remains indispensable, Poland is championing a stronger role for the European Union in this area.
Donald Tusk made this point clear in Strasbourg, paraphrasing John F. Kennedy: “Ask not what America can do for European security, ask what we can do for it.”
He reiterated calls for Shield East and the European Iron Dome—ambitious initiatives to bolster EU defense.
Shield East envisions fortifications along the Union’s eastern border and joint missile and air defense systems for Poland and the Baltic states. Poland has already launched its National Security Plan: Shield East, allocating PLN 10 billion (about 2,4 billion Euros) to reinforce its borders with Russia and Belarus, including a satellite system financed by the European Investment Bank. As a more ambitious plan, Poland and Greece have proposed a European Iron Dome, a shared system to counter missiles, drones, and aerial attacks.
These two projects are only part of what a future Defense Union could look like. The question of defense industry seems to be key here, even if its development comes with tensions. Countries like France advocate for EU funds to stay mostly within Europe, while Poland insists on a more flexible approach to source weapons globally and to prioritize readiness for the immediate threat from Russia. A potential Polish-French rapprochement, exemplified by Poland’s possible inclusion in Airbus, could ease these frictions and strengthen defense ties as the two countries renew the Friendship Treaty.
These initiatives also intertwine with Ukraine’s future.
Discussions on European defense often center on the war in Ukraine and the security guarantees needed for a genuine peace agreement.
Poland favors NATO forces for this mission, though US involvement appears unlikely. European troops could bear the responsibility instead, with President Zelenskyy proposing a mission of 200,000 troops to support Ukraine’s 800,000-strong military. Such a move would mark a paradigm shift in European defense policy, reliant on US leadership ever since World War II.
The question of Ukraine’s fate extends beyond the battlefield. Its EU accession is both a political and civilizational aspiration, but it is not one without complications. While Poland has historically championed Ukraine’s EU membership but some cracks have appeared in this support more recently. The strength of Ukrainian agriculture, coupled with trade facilitation measures during the war, has sparked backlash in Poland and other East European countries—a contentious issue that will undoubtedly surface during accession negotiations. Yet, for Ukraine, the EU represents much more than an economic zone; it amounts to a rejection of Russian influence and a step toward a Western-oriented future.
What about the Green Deal?
The European Union has long been preparing for several transformations that are practically forced on it by changing external circumstances. The fight against global warming has motivated European politicians to create an ambitious green transformation agenda, while competition with China and the US has triggered an economic paradigm shift.
The European Green Deal is under fire today. It seems likely that it will be modified, so that the average citizen is affected as little as possible – a sentiment that is increasingly felt in Brussels, although there is no consensus on the issue.
The European environmental hawks are opposed to Europe abandoning its climate-related ambitions, suggesting that if Europe did so, no one in the world would remain dedicated to fighting dramatic global warming.
The EU’s new priority, decarbonization is even more controversial in Poland. Under the previous Law and Justice government, Poland formally accepted the climate neutrality target but opposed it in practice. Its implementation indeed entails particularly high costs for a country whose energy system is still largely based on coal – more so than that of any other EU country. The more the EU increased its emission reduction targets (55% by 2030) and adapted its instruments to meet those new targets, the more the tensions grew between the direction of EU policy, on the one hand, and the Polish economic model and its ongoing transformation, on the other. Although Poland has made significant progress in recent years both in terms of investment in renewables and emission reduction, the inadequate pace of those changes – in relation to both the scale of the challenges and the need to adapt to EU policies – amounts to what has perhaps been the greatest negligence by the Polish state during its first two decades of EU membership.
The challenges concern not only in the energy sector but, more importantly, the decarbonization of industry. For the past two decades, the development of industry, which accounts for about 20% of Poland’s GDP (one of the highest rates in the EU), was largely based on a triad of low labor costs, well-educated staff, and relatively cheap energy. But these growth engines are breaking down. Due to the rising cost of carbon emissions, energy prices in the industrial section – have become the highest in the EU. Representatives of the Polish government warn against decarbonizing too fast (their slogan is ‘decarbonization without deindustrialization’). The change of government in Warsaw has not fundamentally affected Polish criticism of the plan to introduce an emissions trading scheme for the construction and transport sector (the so-called ETS2) in 2027 – a plan that Tusk referenced critically in his speech. However, it is crucial that Poland develops a clear decarbonization plan as the country’s future competitiveness will depend on it.
One of the key debates awaiting the Union in the coming years will concern the funds earmarked for improving its competitiveness.
The creation of additional instruments based on shared debt (known as the Sovereignty Fund) has been called for by Ursula von der Leyen and more recently also by Mario Draghi, the author of a key report prepared for the Commission. This important debate will take place in parallel to the work on the new EU budget for 2028-34 – and will begin as early as 2025 under the direction of Polish Commissioner for Budget and Administration Piotr Serafin. The debate is significant from Poland’s point of view and will affects its position regarding the new funds. Warsaw’s priority will indeed be to defend the structure of the EU budget, which currently envisages high outlays for cohesion policy – of which Poland is the main beneficiary.
The transfer of the EU presidency from Viktor Orbán to Donald Tusk on 1 January has a symbolic dimension.
These two politicians perhaps best represent the key dilemmas facing the Union – such as the future of Russia policy, liberal democracy, and EU solidarity and unity – and two radically different approaches to them. In the temporary absence of Germany and in the face of France’s political paralysis, Tusk’s Poland is the most important exponent of the pro-European trend today and offers a realistic alternative to the centrifugal tendencies represented by Orbán.
“The future of Europe depends on Central Europe,” wrote Austrian diplomats Erhard Busek and Emil Brix in their 2018 book Mitteleuropa Revisited. It would not be the first time that the course of European history gets decided in Central Europe. But our moment may well be the first time that Central Europeans have the chance to significantly influence that future course.
Piotr Buras is the head of ECFR’s Warsaw office, while Michał Matlak is the coordinator of the CEU Democracy Institute Enlargement Hub, a visiting fellow at the EUI, and a policy advisor at the European Parliament.
The text is based on the report “A New Leader for Europe? : Shifting Paradigms in Poland’s EU Policy,” published by the European University Institute, Florence.
