Curated by Kristóf Szombati and Ece Özbey
Germany’s latest parliamentary elections mark more than just a change in government — they signal a potential turning point for the country’s economy, multicultural identity, and political landscape. As the European Union’s largest and most influential member grapples with mounting domestic and global pressures, the decisions made in the coming years will not only define Germany’s trajectory but also reverberate across Europe and beyond.
This mini-series brings together leading scholars working in and on Germany to offer their insights into the key questions arising from this pivotal moment of transition. Through a multi-angled, interdisciplinary discussion, it examines the political, economic, and social forces driving change and shaping the country’s and the broader region’s future.
In this fourth and final edition, our contributors reflect on the shifting boundaries between the democratic mainstream and the far right, questioning whether Germany’s long-standing firewall is holding — or quietly being redrawn.
You can also explore other contributions to this mini-series:
📌 Read our editor Kristóf Szombati’s analysis of the election outcome and the challenges the incoming government will have to face.
📌 Check out the expert insights on Germany’s socio-economic model in transition.
📌 Delve into perspectives on identity, integration, and the complex challenges of social cohesion in Germany.
📌 Unpack the views on the future of Germany’s green agenda.
For decades, post-war German politics has rested on a shared commitment to keeping extremist parties at the margins. The principle of the cordon sanitaire — a firewall between democratic and anti-democratic forces — was more than a procedural rule; it became a moral and institutional cornerstone of liberal democracy in Germany. But what happens when this line begins to blur? We asked our contributors:
How likely is the cordon sanitaire to collapse in the next parliament? And what unconventional forms of cooperation or tactical maneuvering might emerge across the political spectrum in the upcoming legislative cycle?
While interrogating the shifting political landscape from different angles, both contributors agree that the cordon sanitaire is no longer a fixed boundary. Its erosion may not come through formal power-sharing, but it is already visible through rhetorical convergence, strategic alignments, and the gradual normalization of far-right actors within democratic institutions.
Manuela Caiani draws on social movement theory to reflect on the long-term social, cultural, and organizational dynamics that have made the far right a powerful hybrid actor operating both in the streets and within institutions and have underpinned its growing influence. Her analysis situates political realignment within a deeper process of transformation — one that extends far beyond electoral politics — and suggests the distinction between mainstream and extremist politics is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
Leonce Röth, in turn, situates the German case in a broader historical and comparative context, drawing attention to how past collaborations between conservatives and the far-right have paved the way for democratic backsliding. Drawing on recent parliamentary events and expert survey data showing a marked shift in party positions, he considers whether tactical collaboration without formal coalition is replacing political isolation as the new norm.
What does this mean for the post-war settlement? The AfD’s electoral breakthrough is not simply a story of rising vote share but of deep sociopolitical entrenchment. As the taboo surrounding cooperation weakens, the firewall is not collapsing all at once, but being steadily rewired. In its place, a new political configuration is emerging — one built not on the old logic of containment but on selective alignment and strategic accommodation.
Prof. Dr. Manuela Caiani
The 2025 German elections saw a record-breaking 82.5% voter turnout — the highest since reunification — reflecting heightened public concern over the country’s political and economic future after the collapse of the government in November. The far-right AfD was the election’s biggest gainer, nearly doubling its share to 21%. Particularly strong in the East, the party’s rise raises questions about the resilience of the post-war political order that has traditionally excluded extremist parties from governance.
Although academic interest in the radical right has grown over the past decade, research still shows certain biases, often privileging party politics and electoral behavior while overlooking the broader non-partisan milieu, sociocultural context, and mobilizing structures that support far-right success. Simultaneously, social movements scholarship partly neglects right-wing radicalism, historically focusing on leftist activism, or limits itself to framing right-wing extremism through the lens of violence and terrorism. Yet to understand the AfD’s trajectory — and the potential collapse of the cordon sanitaire — we must engage with the far right as both a political and social movement.
From a social movement perspective, three key levels — macro, meso, and micro — help illuminate the AfD’s growing influence. At the macro level, political opportunity structures matter: far-right movements do not emerge in a vacuum. In Germany, long-term environmental, cultural, and institutional factors have shaped a unique “movement-partyism” context. As Weisskircher notes, Germany represents an “extreme case” where far-right actors operate simultaneously in the streets and in institutions. Since reunification, street-level activism — especially in the East — has flourished in the absence of a viable far-right party until recently. With the AfD’s electoral consolidation, these two tracks are now converging.
This convergence blurs the firewall. AfD politicians have collaborated with anti-immigration activists and protest groups, while far-right intellectuals within and around the party have drawn on Gramscian “metapolitics” to shape public discourse, seeking not only votes but institutional change. As the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) struggles to regain voters lost to the AfD, informal alignment on issues such as migration or energy policy may tempt tactical cooperation — even if a formal coalition remains unlikely. In this light, the firewall may not fall overnight, but it is already being tested through the invention and diffusion of discursive frames that mediate mobilization, rhetorical convergence, and legislative maneuvering.
At the meso level, the far-right is not a monolith but a dynamic ecosystem of actors — parties, anti-gender activists, conspiracy theorists, cultural movements, and more — not only exploiting static favorable “opportunities” but also creating its own organizations to propagate knowledge and norms. Pirro speaks of a “production structure” that nurtures mobilization across electoral and non-electoral arenas while other scholars use the term “Right-against-Rights” to describe this increasingly plural constellation. Electoral gains are just the tip of the iceberg, built on sustained social and organizational infrastructures. The AfD’s apparent attempts to distance itself from the extremist “Flügel” faction — while maintaining ties to its base — illustrate how boundary-drawing is more strategic than substantive. At the same time, the German authorities’ decision to continue monitoring the AfD for signs of right-wing extremism supports Sartori’s view that political organizations often harbor radical elements as constitutive parts of the whole. As Weisskircher observes, extreme-right elements are not marginal but embedded within broader formations; recognizing this is crucial for understanding the nature of these actors. While debate continues over whether the AfD should be classified as far right, rather than populist radical right, the distinction between these subtypes is merely a matter of empirical inquiry in light of the symbiotic relationship between populism and the extreme right.
At the micro level, individual values and identities also play a role. Psychological and socio-demographic studies show that AfD voters are not simply disaffected or irrational; they are often ideologically motivated and politically engaged. The rise of radical-right subcultures — especially among younger men — illustrates how cultural narratives and grievances feed into political mobilization. Recent AfD strategies to court young, male, and even immigrant-background voters, even while promoting anti-immigrant rhetoric, reflect pragmatic flexibility aimed at expanding its base.
To conclude, analyzing political realignment solely through institutional or electoral lenses risks missing the deeper undercurrents of mobilization. The AfD’s rise is not just a partisan story — it’s a sociopolitical transformation. As far-right ideas become normalized, individual involvement with far-right groups increases, and movement-party linkages intensify, the distinction between mainstream and extremist politics becomes harder to maintain. Whether we are witnessing the radicalization of the mainstream or the normalization of extremism remains open. But one thing is clear: the firewall in Germany is under strain.
Manuela Caiani is a Professor of Political Science at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, Italy, where she is part of the COSMOS (Centre on Social Movement Studies) research team. Contact: manuela.caiani@sns.it.
Dr. Leonce Röth
The abolition of firewalls has facilitated the rise of fascist regimes, particularly in the early 20th century when conservative parties’ willingness to collaborate with far-right forces contributed to the dismantling of democratic institutions. Scholars and pundits alike have pointed to the historical precedents and accumulated evidence suggesting that the accommodation of the far right, at best, does not pay off for conservatives, and at worst, creates a slippery slope from democratic backsliding to outright authoritarianism. The emphasis of such warnings has become more frequent as the far right rises. Awareness of these consequences is particularly strong in countries like Germany, which have an authoritarian past and a tradition of critical memory politics.
Despite this, far-right parties have successfully transitioned from pariah status to mainstream politics, accumulating over 100 years of government participation collectively in Europe alone since the 1990s. The most notable example occurred in 2001 when the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) entered a coalition with the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), prompting many to demand European Union sanctions. While the electoral success of far-right parties has led to the breakdown of firewalls in many countries and also often brought democratic backsliding, outright transitions to authoritarianism have yet to be documented. Typically, the breakdown of firewalls begins with informal collaboration at lower levels before escalating to formal cooperation at the highest executive levels. While some institutional hurdles, like electoral thresholds or (semi-)presidential systems in countries such as France, can impede the breakdown, they only raise the bar for far-right success as was recently witnessed in the United States.
Germany, however, has not had such institutional barriers, with the success of the far-right tied more to cultural factors. The horrors of far-right politics have not been institutionalized in electoral thresholds but rather embedded in collective memory and its perpetuation through education. Recent developments, however, have brought the possibility of a coalition between the conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the far-right AfD into the public eye. CDU chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz secured a majority in the Bundestag for a bill proposal tightening immigration controls with AfD support, sparking public outcry. This outcry largely followed partisan lines, with left-leaning parties strongly opposing cooperation with the far right. For them, it signaled a potential opening for full cooperation. Meanwhile, conservatives justified the move by accusing left-leaning parties, particularly the Greens, of holding German society hostage with liberal immigration policies in combination with the “knockout argument” of the firewall. In other words, supporters of the collaboration argued that the “will of the people” on immigration aligned more with the far-right than with the Greens, thus justifying controlled cooperation.
A recent expert poll, conducted before and after Merz’s proposal, showed that left-leaning parties like the Greens, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Left Party (Die Linke) remained committed to the firewall. However, the CDU, CSU, and Free Democratic Party (FDP) were seen as leaning towards supporting or abandoning the firewall. After the vote on the anti-immigration proposal, these three parties were seen as open to cooperation with the far right by most experts. This shift aligned with the positions of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) and the Free Voters (Freie Wähler) before the vote. In the following elections, the parties that supported the firewall collectively received only about 36% of the vote, indicating that partial cooperation with the far right might now enjoy majority support among German parties.
In conclusion, the gradual breakdown of the firewall between conservative and far-right parties, especially in Germany, would signal a shift in the political landscape. While left-wing parties continue to oppose such cooperation, the mainstream right appears increasingly open to engaging with the far right — making the gradual abolition of the firewall a likely reality in contemporary politics.
Dr. Leonce Röth is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Chair for Political Systems and European Integration, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. Contact: leonce.roeth@gsi.uni-muenchen.de.
