By John Chin, Mirren Hibbert, and Staten Rector
In February, Togo became the first of 10 African states to hold (indirect) executive elections in 2025. February 5 also marked the 20th anniversary of the coup that brought Faure Gnassingbé to power. This article assesses the legacy of the 2005 coup and the failure of Togo’s democratization.
The never-ending Eyadéma regime
Since independence from France in 1960, Togo has only known personalist dictatorship. Long divided politically between southern ethnic groups (led by the Ewe) and northern ethnic groups (led by the Kabré), the country has been ruled first by the southern-dominated regime of Sylvio Olympio, and then under the northern-dominated regime of ex-sergeant Étienne Eyadéma after the latter led a military coup in 1963.
The Eyadéma clan has ruled Togo for over five decades.
In 1967, Eyadéma ousted the nominal civilian executive in a self-coup, took over the presidency, and banned political parties. In 1969, he founded the Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) as Togo’s only legally permitted political party. Togo transitioned to “electoral autocracy” in 1979 according to the RoW typology, but elections were mere democratic window dressing.
Although Eyadéma survived several assassination attempts during his tenure, the most serious challenge to his rule came from a pro-democracy movement in the early 1990s. In mid-1991, under increasing domestic and international pressure, Eyadéma agreed to legalize opposition parties and convene a national conference, which voted to limit the president’s powers and to appoint Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, a human rights lawyer and president of the bar association, as interim prime minister. But, thanks to the army’s loyalty and repression, Eyadéma managed to neuter the democratic opposition. He went on to win re-election as president in flawed elections in 1993, 1998, and 2003.
The legacy of Togo’s 2005 coup
When Eyadéma died on February 5, 2005, his son Faure Gnassingbé seized power in a veto coup that prevented Fambare Ouattara Natchaba, the speaker of parliament and next in the constitutional line of succession, from ascending to the acting presidency. After 2005, Gnassingbé undermined further electoral contestation, a robust civil society, and freedom of expression, as per V-Dem data. He won re-election in 2010, 2015, and 2020. In 2012, he replaced the RPT with a new ruling party, the Union for the Republic (UNIR).
After 2005, Gnassingbé oversaw renewed economic development after decades of effectively no growth. However, at no point have the legislature or judiciary or term limits constrained the executive, and Eyadéma’s rule remains marked by high levels of “neopatrimonialism”:
Dimensions of democracy (and development) in Togo since 1960
Data Source: Author replication of Boese et al. (2022) and V-Dem 2024, v. 14.
Ethnically-stacked armed forces are still a pillar of support for the Eyadéma clan’s rule under Gnassingbé. After an initial wave of post-coup repression in 2005, human rights protections improved for a decade, but began backsliding again after 2015, according to data from Chris Fariss. Togo ranks 126 out of 180 countries in public corruption, per Transparency International.
Sharp power in Togo
France was the Eyadéma regime’s principal patron and guarantor during the Cold War. It wielded by far the most influence capacity in Togo of any foreign power, as per FBIC data. French influence capacity has diminished since, whereas China’s influence increased in the 2000s (driven by rising trade levels) and that of the United States and Russia have both increased in recent years (driven in part by rising arms supplies):
Formal bilateral influence capacity in Togo, 1960–2023
Source: FBIC dataset v. 3.6, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures
If the West is unwilling to back a forever regime in Lomé or is unable to cement its linkage and leverage to promote democratization in Togo, Gnassingbé is likely to turn increasingly to Russia and China for support.
It has been reported that Togo is considering joining the Alliance of Sahel States – the Russian-backed group of new coup regimes.
Since 2022, Russia-Togo security cooperation has deepened, with Russia becoming Togo’s largest arms supplier and Togo the leading recipient of Russian arms among West African coastal states. In early 2024, Russian military advisors arrived in Togo to help build a military camp near the border with Burkina Faso to defend against jihadist attacks from Burkina Faso. Last November, Moscow won approval to open an embassy in Loméin 2025 after a Russian defense ministry delegation visited Togo and a Togolese delegation attended the first Russia-Africa Partnership Forum.
For its part, China is already a top provider of development assistance in Togo, trailing only the European Union, France, and Germany. Since Togo joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, China has financed the expansion of the port and the airport in Lomé. In September 2024, China and Togo upgraded bilateral ties and established a “comprehensive strategic partnership”–China’s highest level of diplomatic relations.
Long live Gnassingbé?
After mass protests in 2017-18, Gnassingbé agreed to a constitution in 2019 that re-introduced term limits.Thanks to a subsequent crackdown on opposition, restrictions on media freedom, and a ban on political rallies since 2022, UNIR easily won 108 of 113 seats in the National Assembly last April.The UNIR-dominated National Assembly then wasted no time voting 87-0 to adopt a new constitution removing citizens’ right to vote for president, effectively transitioning Togo from a presidential to parliamentary system.
This third constitutional amendment since the 2005 coup allows Gnassingbé to evade term limits. Before and after the vote, the regime banned several planned opposition protests and arrested opposition activists. Gnassingbé signed the new constitution last May. Under the new system, the president of the republic (head of state) retains symbolic powers but real executive power will inhere in a new executive position, the president of the council of ministers (PCM, head of government), to be elected by parliament.
On February 15, UNIR won 34 of 41 contested seats for a new Senate. Opposition parties, such as the National Alliance for Change (ANC), largely boycotted the election, seeing it as part of a “constitutional coup” by the ruling party. In March, Gnassingbé appointed the last 20 Senators. This month, long-time Gnassingbé ally Barry Moussa Barqué was elected head of the Senate, cementing Gnassingbé’s control over the legislature.
The 2025 Senate elections represent the conclusive end of the 2005 coup, extending personalist rule again and making Gnassingbé West Africa’s newest leader for life.
Although UNIR members of parliament will only formally select a new PCM after the new constitution goes into effect on May 6 (after a one-year transition period), Gnassingbé’s continued dominance of Togo’s political regime is already a fait accompli.
John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of the Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état (2022), which was named one of the “Best Historical Materials” published in 2022–23 by the American Library Association.
Mirren Hibbert is a student at Carnegie Mellon University majoring in international relations and political science with a minor in American politics and law.
Staten Rector is a student at Carnegie Mellon University majoring in economics and politics as well as ethics, history, and public policy.
