By Evgeny Romanovskiy
Moscow offers cheaper access to energy, finance, and payment rails, but not the investment and rules that make a real order.
There’s a certain comfort in caricature. Some say Russia has been decisively isolated since 2022; others claim it’s quietly building a counter-order with the Global South. But neither view really captures what’s happening on the ground. The reality is more practical—and, in many ways, more revealing.
Russia’s approach to global governance is all about flexibility. It’s not offering a grand vision or a new set of rules. Instead, Moscow promises fewer lectures, faster decisions, alternative payment rails, and a security package that can stabilize friendly governments in a pinch. This “multipolar menu” is attractive to leaders who want room to maneuver without the strings attached to Western finance or diplomacy.
But here’s the catch: flexibility only gets you so far. Without real investment, technology, or strong institutions, Russia’s influence has clear limits. The numbers tell the story. Take Africa, for example. Russia’s trade with the continent reached about $24–25 billion in 2023—an increase but still dwarfed by China’s $282 billion. Russian foreign direct investment in Africa is barely a blip.
Where Moscow does punch above its weight is in security exports. It’s the top arms supplier to Africa, and its rebranded “Africa Corps” has stepped in where the Wagner network left off, especially in the Sahel. These moves buy leverage, but they rarely translate into lasting legitimacy or broad-based development. Security can flip a government’s calculus in a crisis, but it doesn’t build roads, create jobs, or foster long-term loyalty.
Food and energy are two other areas where Russia’s approach is more about short-term gains than systemic change. When Moscow pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2023, it tightened global markets, especially for poorer importers. Yes, Russia followed up with grain deliveries to a handful of African countries, but these gestures can’t replace the stability that comes from predictable, system-wide supply. The political payoff is real, but the developmental impact is limited.
Energy is a similar story. After 2022, India’s oil imports from Russia soared, sometimes making up a third of its total. The reason? Persistent discounts. But this isn’t about alignment; it’s about hedging bets in a multipolar world. These deals have also sped up a shift in how trade is settled. By late 2023, about a third of Russia’s external trade was settled in Chinese yuan, and the yuan’s share in Russia’s currency markets kept breaking records. Attempts to settle trade in rupees stalled, leaving large sums parked in Indian banks and pushing more transactions into yuan or dirham channels. Sanctions have turned Western financial “rails” into toll roads, so Moscow is improvising with a patchwork of alternatives. This is good enough to keep business moving, but not enough to set new global standards.
On the diplomatic front, Russia has been quick to amplify frustrations with the Western-led order. Many Global South countries abstained from UN votes on Ukraine not to endorse Russia’s actions, but to signal their reservations about Western crisis management and the hierarchy of norms. Moscow has seized on this, loudly supporting Security Council reform and permanent seats for India, Brazil, and African nations. It’s a low-cost way to win rhetorical points with reform-minded capitals.
So, what does all this add up to? For Western and partner governments, it’s tempting to dismiss Russia as just a spoiler. But that’s both analytically lazy and strategically risky. The appeal of Russia’s offer is practical: price, speed, and options. If the West wants to compete, it needs to be just as practical—streamlining development finance, lowering compliance costs for third-country traders, keeping food and fertilizer corridors open, and backing credible UN reform. Preaching about rules isn’t enough; what matters is delivering usable infrastructure and real choices.
The bottom line is clear: Moscow isn’t building a rival world order. It’s offering a cheaper, more flexible bargain within the existing one. The real test isn’t in communiqués or speeches, but in where capital and attention actually flow. Compete where Russia’s bargain is most attractive – on flexibility, speed, and access – and its limits will become obvious.
Evgeny Romanovskiy is a PhD candidate in Political & Social Geography at Charles University (Prague). His research examines everyday Europeanization and perceptions of the European Union in the North Caucasus and across diasporic networks.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
