by Ferenc Laczó
Bucking wider trends once again, Hungarian voters ousted a seemingly entrenched quasi-party state on Sunday. The resounding defeat of the first proudly illiberal regime within the enlarged West forces us to revise conventional wisdoms about the System of National Cooperation and its leader. The unhoped-for supermajority for Tisza also shows the country’s political culture and historical trajectory in a new light. Ferenc Laczó reflects on the meaning of the Hungarian elections.
It happened gradually, then all at once.
Illiberal hegemony has visibly been crumbling in Hungary since early 2022. The national elections on Sunday then brought a predicted and still unhoped-for supermajority for the Tisza party that may just enable an ambitious program of re-democratization.
In a world of all so many depressing developments and declining expectations towards the future,
this ouster of a seemingly entrenched quasi-party state – the first proudly illiberal regime within the enlarged West of the post-Cold War period – forces us to revise received wisdoms.
It urges us to think again about Hungary’s much-discussed leader of the past sixteen years, Viktor Orbán; his regime, popularly – and often ironically – dubbed the System of National Cooperation; and the country’s unusual trajectory that has repeatedly bucked wider trends.
*
Let me begin by suggesting the kind of sports analogy the former PM is so fond of: Viktor Orbán’s career now much resembles that of José Mourinho.
An unusually motivated person with raw talent succeeds at dominating the game for a while, so much so that people start to believe he can hardly make mistakes. He may upset many with his unusual antics and often crude strategy, but his track record soon solidifies his reputation as a cunning genius. However, consistent successes over several years means he keeps on retrenching a style that is fast becoming anachronistic. His aura of invincibility disappear, and he seems unable to develop new skills.
The admiration and fear he used to elicit in such abundance are suddenly replaced by harsh questions: Did he merely strike a raw nerve at an opportune moment and then run with his luck to enter the history books? Has he managed to exert any truly positive impact? Haven’t we overestimated him all along?
Be that as it may, neither Orbán, nor Mourinho seem ready to give up the fight though both now risk getting exposed as a relic from a bygone era.
*
We have heard much in recent years about how liberalism tends to chip away at its own foundations and how it has been entering into a profound crisis of reproduction.
My – probably very Hungarian – sense of optimism now tells me that illiberalism exhibits much of the same dynamic.
If Orbán’s long-standing rule is anything to go by, the building of a new oligarchic elite raises the odds of populist rhetoric being turned against illiberal regimes. The starker the colors in which a conservative utopia gets painted, the more apparent the gap grows between supposedly dominant values and actual social realities. The more such an illiberal regime promises to protect the nation, the more socioeconomic crises hurt its popularity.
For these reasons, Fidesz’s hegemony has visibly been crumbling over the past two years. Fierce escalation close to election day, potentially leading to the declaration of a state of emergency, had been widely feared. The most serious attempt to launch a false flag operation was then quickly exposed as a laughing stock and a bigger artificial shock failed to materialize. Orbán conceded unexpectedly early on Sunday.
I still doubt there is such a thing as an illiberal democracy, but it looks like the main emphasis in “competitive authoritarianism” can at times indeed be on the “competitive” part. Combine that with notable geopolitical stakes and what you get is a slightly unhinged tragicomedy that passes as an electoral campaign.
Fake accounts, AI-generated horror, courageous defecting officers, high-profile leaks, a faux sex scandal, a nervous breakdown and a teenage IT mastermind with awkward glasses have all been almost normalized in recent weeks.
If the Hungary of early 2026 should in retrospect pass as some kind of flawed democracy, it has had numerous captivating flaws indeed, which eventually boosted turnout to an unprecedented high.
*
That leads me to my third and last question: How come Hungarian society – a society many assumed had largely, even decisively become a captive audience for Orbán’s propaganda machinery – has now achieved something few thought imaginable?
A key part of the explanation may well lie with the peculiar political culture of Hungary, a political culture shaped by stark ambiguities. Hungarians tend to be disgruntled and are often witty though they may not be particularly courageous. However, they still prefer to view themselves as rebellious. They may appear patient, even meek until they have had too much.
It is usually a pre-existing mass movement that catapults charismatic leaders into historic roles. It seems to me Hungary has just seen the reverse.
Through possessing a sense of gravitas while appearing personally pained, Péter Magyar has catalyzed a mass movement that was in many ways waiting to happen. After all, the Fidesz elite’s immoral and utterly self-serving dealings had at some point become just too revolting. However, without this articulate, energetic and most strategic politician the sustained popular uprising known as Tisza may never have developed.
While East Germany and Czechoslovakia democratized via mass movements in late 1989, more people have been mobilized for positive change in Hungary in recent months than in that fateful year of supposed miracles, which in Hungary did less to end the country’s subordination to Moscow than many have understood.
*
Tisza’s resounding victory is a moment of generational change in Hungarian politics. It also heralds the arrival of a new tone, a friendlier, kinder and more inclusive one – which is obviously a low bar after sixteen years of Schmittian politics. Being part of a wider liberal democratic union – all the evident flaws of that union notwithstanding that Orbán has been unusually skilled at exposing – has ultimately helped undermine the long-standing popular legitimacy of his illiberal rule. That is not to deny that addressing effectively the manifold legacies of that rule promises to be a convoluted and often frustrating process.
This should be a moment for joyous celebrations in Hungary and beyond, but it is certainly not the time for any sort of liberal triumphalism.
It is high time to re-examine our mistaken assumptions about a controversial leader, his overestimated regime and a much-maligned political culture. It is even more urgent now to think seriously about how things could be built back better.
After all, the country remains mired in grave crisis, its key institutions hollowed out, many of its people badly neglected and visibly struggling.
The wager of democracy is that people have the power to change all that.
It amounts to a strange experiment that may turn out right even in my home country, as I learned, to my own surprise, this Sunday.
Ferenc Laczó is former Co-Managing Editor at the Review of Democracy and is assistant professor with tenure in History at Maastricht University. His main research interests lie in political and intellectual history, modern and contemporary European and global history, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, and questions of history and memory.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
