By Maria Skóra
Hungary’s parliamentary election brought a spectacular victory for the opposition. Viktor Orbán has lost power after 16 years of continued rule. His challenger, Péter Magyar, managed to build a movement that took advantage of a system meticulously rigged to prevent the incumbent from ever losing power. It is a victory against a captured state that systematically used the Hungarian public assets for private profit and unfair partisan advantage. Yet, the electoral victory will not automatically restore democratic standards and a rule-based order. In her op-ed, Maria Skora argues that the recent experience of Poland, which has been struggling to overcome the consequences of its own autocratic episode, might help Hungary to navigate the risks of re-democratization.
From Democratic Back-to-Front-sliding
For eight years, during two consecutive terms, the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party remodeled the state to seize political power. After taking office in 2015, the PiS government gained control over the Constitutional Tribunal, followed by the Supreme Court and the National Council of the Judiciary. Public resources were used for political campaigns, and high-ranking positions in state-owned enterprises served as rewards for party soldiers. Public broadcasters were captured while political pressure was exercised on commercial ones, who dared to criticize the government. A national-conservative grip was tangible in culture, education, and research. Funds were allocated to a new civil society that is ideologically aligned with the worldview promoted by PiS-led authorities.
In 2023, despite winning the elections, the PiS party failed to form a majority government and lost power. The new centrist cabinet was established under the leadership of the Civic Coalition (KO) with Donald Tusk as its head. With the change of government came a window of opportunity for restoring constitutional order. However, the long-promised “cleaning up after PiS” proved difficult, if not impossible, without deploying radical means. After the candidate supported by the governing coalition lost the presidential vote in 2025, it became clear that reforming the system through standard legislative procedures would not be possible. A persisting constitutional crisis and institutional chaos continue to hinder the restoration of liberal democratic standards.
The practices listed above don’t need to be explained to the Hungarian public. They are from the same “autocratic playbook” that had been practiced in Budapest long before it was applied in Warsaw. Parallels between the two countries were observed, especially in the realms of dismantling accountability mechanisms such as judicial independence, media freedom, executive aggrandizement, and, in parallel, in the ‘illiberal’ ideological turn. So far, the Tusk government’s efforts to remedy these authoritarian practices have brought mixed results.
While recognizing the differences between the two countries, both in terms of their systemic set-up and political circumstances, there are a few lessons from Poland to consider for the “day after” the election in Hungary, at the institutional, political, and societal levels.
The Art of Institutional Restoration
Repairing institutions without obstructing the state’s functioning, while also ensuring their continuity and legitimacy, is a real challenge. Theoretically, three scenarios are possible: return, reset, or restoration. In Poland, it was clear from the outset that a mere return to the status quo of 2015 is not an option. There was no way back. Under PiS rule, Poland saw a legislative inflation in which numerous laws were introduced to enable both organizational and personnel changes within a very short period. Law-making was rushed and, often, rendered unconstitutional outcomes. Such changes are difficult to reverse in lengthy ordinary procedures. Other viable proposals that were made ranged from a principled approach of a complete system reset – a massive ‘zeroing out’ – to a more flexible period of grace, verifying the inherited changes with surgical precision: a cohabitation between democratic nominations and autocratic residue on the way to steady normalization, wearing out the impact of disruptions.
The pro-democratic coalition applied various tactics. For example, the rapid takeover of public broadcasters took place with little self-restraint, by means of ‘procedural transgressions’ and violations. This process was criticized, not only by supporters of the former government, but also by watchdog organizations. Regarding the judicial system, a much slower and more careful modus operandi was chosen. The former Minister of Justice, Adam Bodnar, developed an action plan to restore the Polish judiciary in conformity with domestic and international legal standards. Without being realized, this plan was sufficient for the European Commission to lift disciplinary measures applied against Poland due to rule of law breaches, end the EU treaty infringement procedure, and release RFF funds. Yet, the appeals to PiS appointees to compromise with the KO-led government for the common good, that is, solving the enduring constitutional crisis, failed. As a result, the problem of illegitimately appointed judges in high and ordinary courts persists. Moreover, the EU’s benefit of the doubt backfired, handing a powerful argument to those who had accused it of the politicized use of the rule of law toolbox against Hungary.
Despite Hungary’s competitive authoritarian regime being more deeply embedded, the task might paradoxically be easier thanks to the achieved supermajority and the weaker prerogatives of the President. This will enable the effective modification of ordinary laws and even cardinal laws. Hungary might, in fact, need a new constitution, replacing the Fundamental Law adopted by the first Fidesz government as the cornerstone for a new regime. However, even a new constitution won’t undo the years of bending the judiciary and executive to political will. This has severely weakened these institutions. The blatant partisanship of the public media cost them viewership. The rhetorical battles that invoked slogans such as ‘democracy’, ‘decommunisation’, and ‘sovereignty’, as well as the exclusion of political opponents from the national community, had an impact on society. As a result, institutional trust melts. In Poland, dragging reforms hollowed out the perceptions of courts as an element of democratic checks and balances. Although there has been improvement, the media remains among the least trusted institutions. This extends to both private and public, as well as traditional and digital media. In Hungary, trust in various public institutions has been eroding since 2017. Therefore, next to technical improvements, restoring institutions must first and foremost produce outputs that convince the public.
Transitional Justice as Key
Another challenge for a successful institutional transition is restoring civility and mutual toleration. In Poland, the power struggle did not end on December 13, 2023, when the liberal-conservative government coalition was formed. The following election marathon (European, regional, presidential) only fueled the feud. The rivalry between the new KO-led government, supported by both chambers of the Parliament, and the Presidential Palace, which is loyal to the national-conservative PiS party, persists until today. No law can pass without the signature of the President. And, even if he does not veto them, the President can send drafts to the coopted Constitutional Tribunal, an elegant way to sabotage the governing coalition without getting his hands dirty. As this conflict continues, mutual accusations of betrayal and serving the foreign interests of Brussels, Berlin, or Moscow are commonplace. Without non-partisan cooperation between the two centers of executive power – the Prime Minister and the President – Poland finds itself stuck in a limbo, a never-ending deadlock.
Conflicts also persist beyond high-level power politics. For example, judges who were suspended, degraded, and relegated under the PiS rule demand justice. Others see attempted reforms as unlawful and demand disciplinary proceedings for actions taken after 2024. The rift between those who suffered under the arbitrary rule of PiS and those who exercised that rule is enormous. Hence, some form of transitional justice is needed. While usually coming into play in societies that witnessed severe human rights violations as a consequence of war or tyranny, transitional justice is not completely out of place in the case of recovering from authoritarianism. Without recognition of harm, accountability, and dialogue leading to reconciliation, no progress can be made.
An opposition victory often means a complete pivot in many policy fields and a general rotation of cadres at many levels of the state structure. Seeking revenge can be tempting. Therefore, obeying the rules of civility and mutual toleration must remain a guiding principle of regime transition.
Creating a sustainable rule of law culture is necessary to prevent future authoritarian drifts. Any attempt at doing this effectively must recognize that. Restoring trust in state institutions and public servants is the most urgent task in the post-1989 history of both Poland and Hungary.
Keep It Clean, Keep It Together
Finally, to embark on a mission to restore democracy in Hungary, Péter Magyar and his party will have to demonstrate inner discipline and determination. This victory is also a test of integrity. Magyar was long a member of Fidesz, leaving many bridges burned. Despite winning a supermajority, he will have to convince his opponents or those indifferent to support his government to avoid obstructions.
With the Hungarian parliament practically dominated by two parties, the control role of the opposition rests with the anti-democratic forces of Fidesz and the far-right Mi Hazank. This considerably weakens checks and balances. Watchdog organizations will have to continue their mission to maintain their credibility and ensure the transparency of decision-making processes.
Gathering large societal support and winning big is a tremendous achievement for Tisza. Nonetheless, more than two million Fidesz voters cannot be ignored; these voters need to be included in the process of democratic renewal, and especially in drafting a new constitution.
In Poland, the never-ending wrestle between KO and PiS provided a fertile ground for the anti-establishment radical right, especially among younger voters weary of the same old faces in politics.
Were the parliamentary election to take place today, Tusk’s government would be 23 mandates short of a simple majority in the Sejm, opening the possibility of a very different political constellation to emerge. Public support is not a given. Credibility can only be built by delivering on promises to voters.
These are important lessons for Péter Magyar, who is both a veteran and a novelty on the Hungarian political scene. Personal animosity and the ‘anti-Fidesz’ platform proved to have a great mobilization potential, but the practical challenges of governing in a hostile environment should not be underestimated. Orbán’s outgoing government has set traps, and the remaining ‘autocratic islands’ will likely attempt to sabotage planned reforms. Will there be enough party discipline and loyalty to ensure voting cohesion? Will Magyar’s leadership persist? Tisza is a great unknown. Meanwhile, as can be seen in the United States, one victory is not enough to overcome an autocratic threat. Democracy will remain contested. This is also a challenge facing Poland in 2027. Winning the elections is a significant but not decisive event in restoring the democratic system. Nonetheless, Hungary now has the chance to set a blueprint, again, this time in democratic front-sliding.
Dr Maria Skóra is a Research Fellow at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) and a Policy Fellow at Das Progressive Zentrum in Berlin. In 2024/5 she was a re:constitution Fellow, conducting research at the SWPS University in Warsaw, CEU in Budapest, and EPC in Brussels. From 2022 to 2024, she acted as Lead Researcher for the RESILIO project.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
