By Zsolt Kapelner
At the latest Hungarian election, the long-reigning Fidesz party led by Viktor Orbán was defeated. Although Hungary has long been held up as an example of democratic backsliding, where a populist strongman eroded the rule of law, the fairness of elections, and sought to hold on to power indefinitely, on April 12, Orbán, accepted defeat, and the peaceful transition of power began. This has signaled to many that the charges of “soft” or “electoral” autocracy or hybrid regime levelled against Hungary in the past have been exaggerated. Indeed, shortly after the election, the Wall Street Journal’s published an op-ed arguing that democracy is well and alive in Hungary, after all. Are these narratives right? Has Hungary been a democracy all along – perhaps an imperfect one, but a democracy nonetheless? How would we even go about answering this question? I believe we must look beyond mere data collection and observation and consider the deeper foundations of democracy and the values it ought to represent to answer this question.
Democracy, autocracy, hybrid regimes
The nature of the Orbán regime has baffled political commentators, political scientists, and political philosophers for a decade and a half. It has long been clear that the political system Orbán and his party built was no run-of-the-mill liberal democracy.
During their 16-year tenure, they heavily tempered with the electoral system, eroded checks and balances and the rule of law, dominated the media, and destroyed much of what is needed for free and fair elections. At the same time, elections were held, opposition parties operated, anti-government protests were regular. This was clearly not a 20th-century style “totalitarian dictatorship” nor a fully functioning liberal democracy. What was it, then?
Three main answers have emerged to this question. According to the first, Hungary was a democracy, just not a liberal one. It may be an “illiberal democracy” as Orbán called it in 2014, or perhaps a “plebiscitary leader democracy” as political scientists András Körösényi, Gábor Illés, Attila Gyulai argue in their book. The second answer is that Hungary was an autocracy, just not a totalitarian one. It is an electoral autocracy which uses the trappings of democracy, including elections, to hide its oppressive nature and gain legitimacy. This is a view defended by political philosopher János Kis, for example. The third option, defended, for example, by András Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs is that Hungary was neither a democracy nor an autocracy, but something in between: a hybrid regime. How could we possibly adjudicate between these different interpretations?
First, it should be noted that the mere fact of Orbán’s electoral defeat does not settle the question one way or the other; each model can perfectly well explain it. If Hungary was a democracy, then it’s only natural that the incumbents can lose an election. But even if Hungary was an electoral autocracy or a hybrid regime, this does not imply that the regime was indefeasible. All regimes have their weaknesses and can fall. Widespread popular dissent, economic stagnation, and unfavorable geopolitical changes can break even violent oppressive dictatorships. Hungary has experienced all of these problems in past years; the Orbán regime has been in decline, and, one may argue, it had neither the capacity nor the competence to exert the same kind of influence over the political sphere it did before. Still, it took an exceptionally charismatic challenger and an unprecedented electoral mass to defeat the regime. This, one may suggest, doesn’t undermine but confirms the autocratic or hybrid nature of the regime.
The line between democracy and autocracy
If the single data point of the April 12 election doesn’t decide the question, then what does? One may be inclined to turn to various democracy scores and indices, e.g., that of Freedom House or V-Dem, and see how Hungary has scored over the past decades. But, of course, such indices themselves rest on prior assumptions about what counts as a democracy. Those who wish to argue that Hungary under Orbán has been a kind of democracy may simply argue that these indices and political scientists who make them simply have a bias toward liberal democracy and are unwilling to recognize alternative models as fully democratic.
This leads us to the underlying theoretical, indeed philosophical question: where is the line between democracy and autocracy? Theories of hybrid regimes, of course, may wish to circumvent the problem by arguing that there isn’t a clear line, but there is a grey zone in-between; that of hybrid regimes. This, however, helps us little, for we still have to explain where full democracy ends and hybrid regimes begin.
One may be inclined to simply throw up their hands and say that as W. B. Gallie noted long ago, democracy is an “essentially contested concept.” It is part of its nature that we disagree about what it is, and resolving this disagreement is neither possible nor desirable. Yet there are reasons why we can’t simply sit with this ambiguity and just agree to disagree. We have legitimate scholarly as well as civic interest in the state of democratization in the world and within our own societies. It matters to us whether we live in a democracy or not, for this has a bearing on how we understand our political situation, and ourselves as political agents within that situation.
Democracy and the nature of political concepts
Democracy is among the many political concepts we use to orient ourselves in the world as political agents, to understand the practical requirements on us, our responsibilities and obligations as citizens, and how we should relate to the political rule to which we are subjected; should we see it as an oppressive, alien force or as something worthy of our support and allegiance. This exact insight may help us answer our initial question.
Democracy is not what philosophers call a “natural kind.” It is not a category that simply exists “out there” independently of our interests, aspirations, and values. To ask if a given regime is a democracy is not like the question of the lepidopterist of whether a given insect is a butterfly or a moth.
The concept of democracy is inherently connected to the kinds of values and political principles we take this concept to embody; it cannot be defined without reference to such values and principles. Thus, the question of whether Hungary was a democracy this past 16 years is inherently connected to the question of what values this political regime managed to realize and what principles it abided by.
On “minimalist” theories of democracy, where the point of democracy is to realize the value of the peaceful transition of power and nothing else, Hungary did quite well; electoral mechanisms did serve to prevent political violence and violent oppression. But even on the critical realist view of Samuel Bagg, far from the high liberal accounts of John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin, where the point of democracy is the dispersion of power, the Orbán regime failed miserably.
One may object that this value-based approach does not help us out one bit. It only makes the debate about the line between democracy and autocracy all the more intractable. For now we must settle famously persistent disagreements over values and fundamental political principles before we can answer such a simple question as “was Hungary under Orbán a democracy or not?”
Of course, this approach does not make this question easier to resolve. It does, however, offer some clarity as to the nature of the question. It clarifies that the question about democracy is a question about what values and principles we want this concept to embody. Consequently, it is not a question we can simply settle through observation and measurement.
The question of whether Hungary was a democracy during the past 16 years is not one we should try to answer by collecting data. By asking if elections were held, protests were allowed, did Orbán admit defeat. Rather, we should ask if the political system embodied a set of values and principles we should aspire to; if this is what we want democracy to look like. This question is of crucial importance not only for the political historian of Hungary, but for the whole of Hungarian society today, which now must decide what kind of political system it wishes to transition into. Indeed, it is an inevitable question in all societies today, in Europe, America, and beyond, where democratic norms are challenged, where democracy is embattled.
Zsolt Kapelner is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Oslo. He works on political philosophy, particularly democratic theory.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
