By Marius Ghincea
A Russian Geran-2 drone crashed into a residential building in Galați, Romania injuring two people and forcing the evacuation of around 70 residents. Marius Ghincea argues this is not an accident but the predictable result of four years of eroded deterrence credibility, and that Romania’s improved diplomatic response, while welcome, is necessary but not sufficient.
The Drift of the Drones
In the early hours of a recent morning, residents of a 10-story apartment block in Galați, a Romanian port city at the border with Ukraine, were jolted awake. Two people were injured. Around 70 were evacuated into the street. Investigators recovered wreckage bearing Cyrillic markings and components identical to those found in other Russian drones previously confirmed on Romanian territory. The drone that hit their building was a Geran-2. It was in the middle of a Romanian city close but not exactly near the border with Ukraine.
This is not an accident in the ordinary sense. It is part of a worrisome pattern that Romanians have observed developing.
Over the past four years, Russian drones have been “getting lost” with increasing frequency over Romanian airspace. At first, they appeared in the Danube Delta, a remote and lightly populated area. Then at the edges of towns. Now in the center of a county-seat city. This drift is unlikely to be random. It most likely reflects a calculation made by Russian military planners that the cost of violating Romanian airspace is low, because Romania has shown, repeatedly, that it will not respond to Russian drones “getting lost” in its air space.
This is what deterrence theory calls a credibility problem. Deterrence, the strategy of preventing an adversary from acting by convincing them the costs outweigh the benefits, rests on three pillars. The first one is communication, which demands signaling clearly what the red lines are and what consequences follow if they are crossed. The second ones are capabilities, representing the actual means to respond to such incursions. The third one is credibility, and this refers to the ability of convincing the other side that you will follow through with your warnings if the red lines are crossed. Romania has been failing on all three, but credibility has suffered most. Signals only work if they are believed, and after years of inaction, Romania’s signals are not.
The progressive encroachment of Russian drones deeper into Romania may likely reflect a calculation by Russian military planners that the cost of violating Romanian airspace is low, because Romania has shown, repeatedly, that it will not respond.
A Welcome Departure
This time, at least on the diplomatic front, Bucharest’s response was different. President Nicuşor Dan ordered the closure of the Russian consulate general in Constanța and the expulsion of its consul. Romania called an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, the first time Bucharest had done so over a direct threat to its own security, and secured statements of support from more than 50 states.
The logic behind these diplomatic actions is sound. Imposing costs, be it political, diplomatic, reputational, should change the Russia’s military planners calculus. If Romanian airspace violations reliably trigger expulsions and UNSC sessions, Russian military planners may eventually have to factor that in. Deterrence, at its core, is a psychological exercise in shaping expectations, and Romania, for once, is trying to shape them.
Imposing diplomatic costs changes the adversary’s calculus. If Romanian airspace violations reliably trigger expulsions and UN sessions, Russian planners may eventually have to factor that in. Deterrence is a psychological exercise in shaping expectations.
But diplomatic costs are necessary, not sufficient. Russia may absorb reputational costs far more easily than it would absorb a credible military response. As long as Romanian airspace can be violated without physical consequence, as long as a Geran-2 can hit an apartment building and nothing happens on the ground, the fundamental cost-benefit equation on the Russian side remains favorable for continued incursions.
The Strategic Communication Disaster
What undermined the diplomatic signal that the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs skillfully pursued almost immediately was the chaos that surrounded it. Nicușor Dan, the Romanian President, went nearly 10 hours without a public comment after the incident – long enough for heads of state from other European countries to express solidarity with Romania before Romania’s own president had said a word. The MFA communicated promptly; the presidency did not. That gap says something uncomfortable about which institutions have learned from past failures and which have not.
President Dan went nearly 10 hours without public comment after the incident – long enough for other European heads of state to express solidarity with Romania before its own head of state had said a word to his own citizens or to the world.
Worse, Nicușor Dan and Defense Minister Radu Miruță publicly contradicted each other on the role of Ukrainian air defenses in the incident. And Dan’s own statement, urging Russia to be careful not to harm Romanians while conducting its operations against Ukraine, was reproduced widely across regional media and amplified by Russian propaganda. The implicit framing, however unintended, suggested that killing Ukrainians was acceptable, provided Romanians were not caught in the crossfire.
Dan’s statement urging Russia not to harm Romanians while killing Ukrainians made front pages across the region and was amplified by Russian propaganda. Strategic communication should not be seen as a cosmetic function. It is part of deterrence.
Strategic communication should not be seen as a cosmetic function. It is part of deterrence. Mixed messages and internal contradictions do not project resolve. They, unfortunately, project the opposite. The residents of Galați who were evacuated in the night are a human reminder of what eroded deterrence looks like in practice in a Romanian city, affecting the livelihoods of real people, in real cities.
What Restoring Deterrence Requires
Romania must now do much more than simply calling a UN Security Council session. That means setting unambiguous red lines around its airspace and communicating them clearly to Moscow, to NATO allies, and to its own citizens, to deter the former and to reassure the latter. This also means acquiring the hardware to enforce those lines, including air defense systems capable of intercepting drones before they reach Romanian territory. And it also means building the political will to act when those red lines are crossed, consistently and without delay, because, as we know from IR theory, deterrence only functions if the adversary believes you will follow through.
Romania must set unambiguous red lines, acquire the hardware to enforce them, and build the political will to act when they are crossed. Deterrence only functions if the adversary believes you will follow through, and that belief must be earned, not declared.
Four years of acquiescence have sent a strong signal to Moscow that Romania will not respond in any meaningful way to Russian drone incursions into its air space. Reversing it requires more than expelling a consul and convening a meeting, even if that meeting is of the UN Security Council. What it requires is demonstrating, consistently and credibly, that the era of costless incursions is over. Romania’s diplomacy in the aftermath of Galați was a step in the right direction. The residents of that apartment block deserve more than steps.
Marius Ghincea is a Postdoctoral Researcher at ETH Zurich and the co-founder of Quartet Institute, a Bucharest-based think tank specialized in foreign and security policy. His research agenda focuses on great power competition and European integration, as well as on the domestic politics of foreign and security policy.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
