By Maria Skóra
Recently, dramatic images from Poland have circulated globally: the president grappling with judges, and a crowd besieging the Constitutional Tribunal (CT). The constitutional crisis has become hyper-politicized. This stands in stark contrast to what Donald Tusk’s reformist government, formed in 2023, promised: restoring democracy and the rule of law, a return to normalcy, and holding the Law and Justice (PiS) party accountable. With the next parliamentary election in 2027 looming already, these announcements have not quite come to pass.
Deepening Institutional Chaos
Poland’s constitutional crisis dates back to October 2015. Back then, the outgoing Civic Platform-led parliament prematurely appointed two Constitutional Tribunal judges, a move the Law and Justice party (PiS) later used as a pretext to seize the Tribunal. In December 2015, it repeated the election of five judges, including three for already lawfully filled seats, only deepening institutional chaos. President Andrzej Rzepiński refused to recognize these ‘stand-in’ appointments, arguing that the move was unconstitutional – a decision later rejected by Prime Minister Beata Szydło. In response, in early 2016, the incumbent PiS government stopped publishing the Tribunal’s rulings. Once Rzepiński’s term expired, his successor Julia Przyłębska – a political appointee – turned the Tribunal into a partisan instrument. This institutional capture materialized, for example, in judicial appointments of former active PiS politicians – Krystyna Pawłowicz and Stanisław Piotrowicz – who moved directly from the Sejm to the Tribunal in December 2019, and high-profile rulings on abortion (2020) and the primacy of national law over EU law (2021).
These events drew domestic protests and international criticism, including opinions of the Venice Commission (2016) and judgments of the ECtHR (2021) and the CJEU (2025), holding that the CT, including ‘substitute judges’, no longer met the requirement of a ‘tribunal established by law’. The creeping rule-of-law crisis also affected judicial impartiality (‘muzzle law’) and judicial nominations (‘neo-judges’). It cost Poland not only its reputation, but also large sums of money, including a record daily fine of €1 million for disobeying an EU court order and frozen funds from the Cohesion Policy and the National Recovery Plan for missing rule-of-law-related milestones.
After the 2023 elections, a centrist government under Donald Tusk took power, and Justice Minister Adam Bodnar, a law professor and former Ombudsman, pursued a broad remedial strategy. Alongside other goals, the priority was to restore the CT’s functioning. First, a Sejm Resolution declared three appointments of CT judges from 2015 flawed. Then, the ministry put forward a legislative package to amend the Constitutional Tribunal Act. Its goals were to depoliticize appointments, “quarantine” politicians before taking roles in the CT, and ensure a fresh procedural start. However, these plans failed: in 2025, the PiS-backed candidate, Karol Nawrocki, won the presidency, closing any standard legislative path for these reforms. In a following government reconstruction, Adam Bodnar was replaced with Waldemar Żurek, a former judge.
From Marginalization to Open Confrontation
After the 2025 presidential election, relations among the government, the President and the tribunal became even more strained. The government now opted for confrontation. It had started by refusing to recognize the Tribunal’s rulings and halted publication of its judgments in March 2024. However, in Poland’s 2025 budget, it went further by cutting the Tribunal’s funding. In response, in February 2025, Bogdan Święczkowski, the new Tribunal President appointed by former President Andrzej Duda, reported a suspected coup d’état, involving Donald Tusk, to the National Public Prosecutor’s Office. Święczkowski alleged the Polish PM was part of an “organized criminal group” seeking to “alter Poland’s constitutional order”. Further, four judges elected to the Tribunal by the Sejm in March 2026 could not take office because President Nawrocki refused to administer their oaths. In October 2026, Prosecutor General Waldemar Żurek filed applications to lift the immunity of President Święczkowski and his deputy Bartłomiej Sochański. Building on that momentum, the longest-serving CT judge, Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, assumed leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal by removing the incumbent President from his duties. She then convened a General Assembly, despite the absence of some judges.
These events sparked an uproar and reignited the dispute regarding the institution. Tensions are running high. The removed CT judges do not accept the decision, and the PiS party is backing them. As the events unfolded, President Nawrocki was en route to Senegal, but turned his plane around to travel to the Constitutional Tribunal. Photos of his scuffle at the Tribunal circulated in the media, leaving some circles morally appalled and others impressed with his unyielding stance.
Meanwhile, government representatives and legal experts who support them justify these measures by citing a “state of constitutional necessity” to restore the rule of law, and the need to invalidate earlier, flawed appointments. They argue the Constitutional Tribunal may exercise its powers even in violation of the provisions of the act governing its functioning, provided it does so to avert an objectively existing, immediate threat to the primacy of the Constitution.
Yet the legality of the government’s acts is being questioned. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights has articulated concerns. The new Polish Ombudswoman denied the legal basis for the “state of constitutional necessity”. Poland’s Supreme Court, however, has decided not to rule on the complaints filed by Bogdan Święczkowski and Bartłomiej Sochański, as its Chamber of Professional Responsibility lacks jurisdiction, referring them to the paralyzed CT.
A Compromised Tribunal Beyond Repair?
The situation regarding Poland’s CT is neither clear nor simple. Most importantly, it is not developing in a vacuum; it is taking place within the heated political atmosphere of the lead-up to the 2027 election campaign. Yet another “historic” election will soon take place in Poland. 2027 will bring a contest between the Civic Coalition (KO), seeking to retain power, and Law and Justice (PiS), aiming to regain it. The current row over the Tribunal is the opening act of this campaign. Mutual accusations of serving foreign interests, be it Moscow or Berlin, are flying.
Obvious legal shortcomings plague the current tribunal, but the problem it represents transcends far beyond the legal sphere. Most Polish people do not grasp the technicalities of a captured court – perhaps even fewer understand who has captured it. They simply want an end to the conflict and a functional Constitutional Tribunal and court system. Yet, the institution is only being instrumentalized further. Used as a partisan tool, the Tribunal has become political. Public opinion on judicial problems in Poland has long been mediated by partisan identification. For example, the attitudes towards the former President Andrzej Duda as ‘guardian of the constitution’, who actively facilitated the rule of law erosion, strongly align with partisan sympathies: PiS sympathizers and more than three-quarters of Karol Nawrocki’s voters see his legislative record positively, as opposed to the former opposition voters who believe that he significantly contributed to the problems within Poland’s justice system.
Meanwhile, the CT is scraping rock bottom. It currently ranks among the institutions with the lowest levels of public trust. In 2010, only 17 % of respondents expressed distrust towards the CT. Fast forward to 2024, and 61% of respondents shared that feeling. In 2026, a follow-up survey showed virtually unchanged results (21% trust, 61% distrust), indicating lasting damage to the Constitutional Tribunal’s reputation. Thus, the negative assessment now extends beyond party preferences.
To Reset or Not to Reset?
Polarization between two competing camps is aggravating in Poland. While some considered the government’s actions regarding the CT necessary, others saw a grave violation of the rule of law. What some see as transformative justice, others consider an act of political revenge.
Overcoming this impasse calls for a “constitutional reset”. Such ideas are brewing from the left, the centre and the right. This is not a new idea; the Batory Foundation coined it in 2024. Re-establishing the Tribunal would be possible only if various political forces in parliament cooperate, or through more transformative means, such as changing the Constitution. But Minister Żurek rejected this scenario as “a dangerous idea for democracy” that could become a recurring tool used every four years. However, current actions justified by ‘constitutional necessity’ not only raise concerns among experts but, more importantly, cause extreme polarization within society and undermine the Tribunal’s authority. Future governments could invoke a “state of constitutional necessity” too; Is it sensible to reject one precedent by creating another?
The government’s actions are not transparent to the public. This results not only from their legal complexity, but also from the political motivations behind actions taken regarding the tribunal over the past decade or more. The current events divide Polish society: 30% of respondents side with the judges who ordered a suspension of the Constitutional Tribunal leadership, 21% support the Constitutional Tribunal president. Most strikingly, almost half of society does not know (24%) or care to take sides (25%) – a sign of democratic fatigue or, even worse, indifference.
The crisis surrounding the tribunal is not only legal, but also political and societal. In these dire circumstances, with the next elections around the corner, the most relevant question might not be who is right or morally superior. The goal should be to restore social cohesion and trust in institutions – through a functioning Constitutional Tribunal. This could be addressed by resorting to extraordinary measures under exceptional circumstances, still without breaking the law. Many comparisons to 1989 have been made and remain somewhat exaggerated. However, perhaps this period can serve as a source of inspiration. For instance, why not consider a “Round Table” specifically dedicated to the future of the Constitutional Tribunal? Every effort must now be made to ensure that the Constitutional Tribunal is no longer used as a pawn in political games.
Dr Maria Skóra is a Visiting Researcher at the SWPS University in Warsaw and a Research Fellow at the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP). In 2024/5, she was a re:constitution Fellow, conducting research at the SWPS University in Warsaw, CEU in Budapest, and EPC in Brussels on the prospects of democratic repair in countries affected by autocratic episodes.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
