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The Institutions Behind American Exceptionalism: How Competing Ideas of Freedom Acquired Political Force

By Percy Yixuanchen Yu

American and European societies drew on overlapping ideas of liberty yet built different political orders. Percy Yixuanchen Yu argues that the institutions through which people exercised freedom also shaped the loyalties that sustained those orders, and the possibilities for changing them.

When Alexis de Tocqueville arrived in the United States in 1831, Massachusetts still provided constitutional support for Protestant worship. The state ended that arrangement in 1833. This timing complicates a familiar story: an America born without established religion confronting a Europe unable to escape it.

Massachusetts’ late disestablishment matters because it shows change within a society often described as having a fixed religious character. At the United States’ 250th anniversary, arguments about American exceptionalism still tend to explain institutions through enduring national preferences: Americans supposedly distrust government, while Europeans expect protection from it. Treating those preferences as permanent makes reforms seem alien to the society they would change.

The history suggests a different explanation. American and European societies inherited overlapping ideas of freedom, but built different institutions through which people could claim rights, organize collectively and obtain public support. These arrangements helped shape the preferences later attributed to national character. They endured partly because they gave people resources and reasons to defend them. The histories of constitutional rights, religion and social provision show how that process worked, and how it could be challenged.

Freedom for Whom?

Louis Hartz’s 1955 book The Liberal Tradition in America offered a powerful explanation for the American pattern. Without a European feudal order to overthrow, Americans inherited a broad liberal consensus that limited the appeal of both aristocratic conservatism and socialism. Liberalism could appear to be common sense rather than one tradition among several.

The absence of a European-style feudal order, however, did not mean an absence of inherited domination. Slavery, Indigenous dispossession and restrictions on women’s political rights existed within the society described as “born free.” Rogers Smith’s multiple traditions argument addresses this difficulty: liberal and republican commitments coexisted with traditions that assigned unequal status by race, sex and ancestry. Exclusion was built into laws and institutions whose defenders could also speak the language of liberty. Expanding freedom required changes in who counted as a rights-holder and which institutions could enforce those rights.

For an enslaved person, protection from federal intervention could mean protection for a local system of domination. For someone resisting arbitrary federal power, local autonomy could offer a safeguard. The political meaning of limited government depended on whose power was limited and whose freedom was secured.

The 14th Amendment made this conflict explicit. It imposed constitutional obligations on states concerning citizenship, due process and equal protection. Yet its uneven enforcement shows the distance between declaring a right and giving it institutional effect. The same language of liberty could support local autonomy or justify national intervention against local oppression. Which interpretation prevailed depended on who could make it enforceable.

The American–French comparison also becomes less tidy when read closely. The French 1789 declaration protected liberty, property, and resistance to oppression; it cannot simply stand for an unlimited collective state. The American Bill of Rights restrained federal authority, but did not immediately establish equal protection against state governments. Comparing founding promises is useful only if we follow their enforcement, exclusions and subsequent revision.

Religion Without a Single Destiny

Religious history reveals a different way institutions gave ideas political force: they shaped how believers could organize and exercise influence. Disestablishment developed unevenly across the American states. The First Amendment barred a national religious establishment, but did not immediately end state establishments such as Massachusetts’. As those arrangements ended, churches could continue to organize beyond the state. Their influence then depended on membership and social activity as well as formal legal privileges.

Legal separation did not fix the level of religious attachment. Pew’s 2023–24 survey found that 62% of U.S. adults identified as Christian, down from 78% in 2007, while 29% were religiously unaffiliated. Pew also found signs that the recent decline had slowed or leveled off. These findings do not establish an inevitable secular future. They do show why religious affiliation, a legal settlement and claims about national identity should not be treated equally.

Europe, meanwhile, offers no single secular model. The Church of England retains an established position; France developed a distinct settlement through its 1905 separation law. The important comparison concerns the relationships among public authority, religious organizations and citizens, rather than a binary opposition between religious America and secular Europe.

Institutions can preserve an organization’s legal position while its social authority declines. They can also leave an organization formally independent while making it influential through schools, charities and electoral mobilization. Formal separation tells us something important about religion and government, but does not settle religion’s political reach.

This distinction matters when contemporary politicians invoke Christianity as a civilizational inheritance. Historical influence does not establish a permanent entitlement to public authority. That entitlement still has to be argued within the institutions governing equal citizenship and religious freedom.

How Social Provision Builds Its Constituency

The relationship between institutions and organized support also helps explain the welfare state. Just as churches could retain influence without an established position, citizens could come to defend public provision within a society often described as hostile to government. The American state built programs with different eligibility rules, funding arrangements and administrative structures. Those choices affected how recipients understood their claims and how effectively they could defend them.

The original Social Security Act of 1935 excluded agricultural and domestic employment from old-age insurance coverage. These occupational exclusions disproportionately affected Black workers. Their causes require care: historian Larry DeWitt’s archival analysis challenges accounts that reduce the exclusions to a single racial bargain, emphasizing administrative considerations. Disparate consequences and the intentions behind a provision are related questions, not interchangeable answers.

What followed is equally important. Contributory social insurance could develop a broad constituency around an earned entitlement. Means-tested assistance, administered through different arrangements and exposed to judgments about deservingness, faced different political pressures. Race mattered to these struggles, but so did program design, organized interests and the distribution of administrative authority. A contribution record could support the claim that a benefit was earned; a means test made eligibility depend on an assessment of need. These arrangements gave citizens different grounds on which to demand continued support.

A benefit can make its recipients more capable of collective action, or leave them dependent on decisions they cannot effectively contest. Its political consequences depend on eligibility, administration and access to appeal. Spending totals alone reveal little about the kind of citizenship a program helps sustain.

This is why the presence of welfare provision cannot by itself establish a democratic social contract. As Kutup Aytekin’s RevDem discussion of authoritarian welfare states suggests, social provision can also be reorganized to support political dependence. The relevant question includes whether benefits are accessible on public terms and whether adverse decisions can be challenged.

European comparisons need the same institutional precision. Nordic universalism, German social insurance and British arrangements should not be compressed into one generous European alternative. Their histories involve different coalitions and different relationships among employers, workers, families and public authorities. American reformers can learn from these differences without pretending to transplant an entire society.

Inheritance and Political Choice

Calling these developments “path dependent” is only a beginning. We need to identify what keeps a path in place: organizations defending benefits, administrators reproducing established practices, courts protecting jurisdiction, or citizens investing in arrangements they expect to endure. We also need to identify when those supports weaken.

An institution endures partly because people organize their lives around it and acquire reasons to defend it. That does not make it inevitable. Reform becomes possible when existing arrangements lose support or when previously excluded groups gain the organization and authority needed to change them.

This approach gives the transatlantic comparison a contemporary purpose. Appeals to national character can conceal whose interests an arrangement protects. A demand for smaller government may transfer power to employers, families or local officials. A promise of greater public protection may enlarge citizens’ practical freedom, or strengthen officials whose decisions are difficult to challenge.

History does not supply a universal answer about the correct size of the state. It supplies a better question: how does a particular arrangement distribute effective power, and what can people do when it fails them?

At 250, the United States has ample reason to examine its founding traditions. A tradition remains politically powerful when people can enforce its promises, organize around it and defend the arrangements it supports. Reform therefore requires more than announcing a different set of values. It must give people a workable way to claim the freedoms those values promise. That is what the comparison with Europe can illuminate: which institutions sustain a particular understanding of freedom, whom they exclude, and how citizens might change them.

Percy Yixuanchen Yu is the Inaugural Visiting Fellow at the School of International Studies, Nanjing University, and a Visiting Scholar at the Huazhi Institute for Global Governance. His work examines political institutions, social change and great-power strategy.

This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.

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