By Gabriela Greilinger
Orbán’s defeat in last Sunday’s election rings in a new era for Hungary, but also for its partners to the East and West. In her op-ed, Gabriela Greilinger argues that while Péter Magyar’s calls for more pragmatism and constructive relations with Western partners suggest, in part, a decoupling from the country’s former “Eastern Opening”, some challenges will remain.
Hungary’s April 12 election brought significant relief to many Hungarians and to democratic forces across Europe. Opposition figure Péter Magyar and his Tisza party not only won a landslide victory in the election, but also, to the surprise of many, secured a firm two-thirds constitutional majority in parliament, offering an opportunity to reform the country and dismantle parts of the system Orbán has built over the past 16 years.
Over the next few months, Magyar will primarily focus on rebuilding the country, particularly its public services, and restoring basic democratic principles and the rule of law. This approach aligns with announced efforts to unlock the roughly 18 billion Euros in suspended EU funds, for which improvements to the rule of law are required. As such, his overall ambitions are tightly linked to pursuing a more constructive approach to the EU.
Forging Trust
Rebuilding trust between Hungary and its European partners will be particularly important. In the weeks leading up to the election, reports emerged that Péter Szijjártó – Orbán’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade – was feeding information from key EU meetings to Russia, shedding light on the ties between the Hungarian foreign minister and his Kremlin counterpart while further souring already strained relations between Hungary and its EU partners. Only a couple of days before the election, Bloomberg reportedly received a transcript of a phone call between Orbán and Putin from October, in which the prime minister told him he was “at his service.” This even further entrenched the view that Orbán acts as Russia’s Trojan horse in the EU. All the while, Hungary’s outgoing Prime Minister also cozied up to U.S. President Trump since his return to the White House, who is perceived as increasingly toxic in Europe, even among some far-right parties.
As a result, European leaders expressed cautious optimism about Magyar’s victory. They have lost trust in Hungary as a reliable ally, because they repeatedly saw their work obstructed in the European Council, where Orbán used veto powers to derail and delay decisions, often working in the interests of other authoritarian states to its East.
Legacy of the Eastern Opening Policy
For years, the Fidesz government pursued its so-called Eastern Opening strategy (Keleti Nyitás) as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, seeking to develop relations and foster ties with Eastern partners, most importantly Russia and China. Hungary’s foreign policy direction has increasingly become a thorn in the EU’s side, as it has used its veto power in the European Council to protect Russian and Chinese interests. This has become particularly critical after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as Orbán’s vetoes, while presented as protecting national interests, also directly benefited Russia.
However, Magyar’s planned reorientation towards Europe and open criticism of the Orbán government’s approach to the EU and its Eastern pivot suggest that Hungary’s Eastern ties will weaken and certain projects will be reviewed and potentially halted.
One such project is Paks II. The nuclear reactor financed through a Russian interest loan is largely viewed with suspicion, given the lack of open competition and the financing that would leave Hungary indebted until the middle of the 21st century. Magyar has already pledged to review the contracts and potentially renegotiate or even terminate them. This signals to Moscow that Hungary will no longer accept the terms the Kremlin dictates but will act as an independent actor in its own best interests.
Similarly, Magyar and his foreign policy expert and prospective foreign minister, Anita Orbán (no relation to Viktor Orbán), also announced plans to diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on Russian energy, aiming to phase out Russian energy by 2035. Although the timeline is much slower than European leaders’ 2027 target, Magyar noted that they “cannot change geography,” highlighting that the landlocked country of 10 million people is dependent on other countries for resources. Nonetheless, this demonstrates some good-faith intent towards Brussels while also once more underscoring Hungary’s intention to become independent from Russia.
Meanwhile, Magyar’s approach to projects forged with Asia is rather straightforward. Under Orbán’s Eastern Opening, increased Chinese and South Korean investments in the country’s battery sector have led to guest worker programs that primarily bring in people from Asia to meet the country’s growing needs. Magyar has announced plans to terminate these foreign guest worker programs, prioritizing domestic workers and wage growth, thereby potentially souring relations with Eastern investors. However, in his press conference on Monday, following Tisza’s victory, Magyar also acknowledged that Hungary remains open to continued cooperation and investment from Asian countries under the Eastern Opening Policy, as long as they adhere to the law – thus once again suggesting a pragmatic approach.
Beyond the East, Magyar’s victory may also reshape relations with the U.S. administration. President Trump has repeatedly endorsed Orbán, and Vice-President JD Vance even visited Budapest days before the election to support the Hungarian prime minister’s reelection campaign. With Orbán’s defeat, Trump is losing an ideological ally in the EU and “a friend”, who aligned with him in his skepticism of multilateral institutions and presented a model for an authoritarian takeover. Still, Magyar has good chances of establishing pragmatic ties with the American counterpart, as he envisions Hungary as a strong NATO ally. In fact, even though Hungary may lose its relevance as an ideological resource, Trump has already described Magyar as a “good man” who is going to “do a good job,” thus signaling that they are open to continuing to pursue a constructive relationship with Hungary under different leadership.
Overall, Magyar’s plans suggest a clear prioritization of Hungarian interests in its relations with other countries, while favoring ties with European partners over Eastern nations, thereby potentially setting an end to Hungary’s long-pursued Eastern Opening.
Towards a New Era within the EU?
Stating that Hungary’s future belongs to Europe and “the West”, not Russia or China, Magyar seeks to pursue more constructive relations with the EU and pledged not to instrumentalize Hungary’s veto rights to further the interests of foreign actors. Such rhetorical shifts are significant, as Hungary’s reputation has been defined by its weaponization of institutional rules to serve foreign actors or extort concessions, rather than by representing true national interests (which leaders are generally expected to do). Instead, Magyar plans to work together with the EU to find solutions – a Hungarian form of Realpolitik might return. In practice, this suggests he would not unnecessarily obstruct the adoption of, for example, sanctions against Russia or common positions to extort concessions, a clear departure from Orbán’s playbook over the last few years.
And yet, some challenges and disagreements will remain, particularly regarding Ukraine and immigration. As for Ukraine, while Magyar previously stated that he does not support a fast-track accession to the EU, several other EU governments share that position. Moreover, Magyar intends to maintain Hungary’s previously agreed-upon opt-out from the 90-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine, given Hungary’s difficult financial situation.
Yet there is a crucial difference: Orbán has repeatedly left room for interpretation regarding Russia’s sole responsibility for the war. This ambiguous position has set him apart even from most European far-right parties, such as Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and the Polish PiS party, which opposed Russia’s aggression. In contrast, Magyar has clearly emphasized from the beginning that Ukraine is the victim of an attack. While disagreements over Hungary’s approach to Ukraine will remain – not least due to unresolved questions about the language rights of Hungarian minorities in Western Ukraine, which Magyar says will be key to restoring ties – the relationship may at least be less toxic and more constructive.
On immigration, however, Magyar already announced his rejection of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. He criticized the EU’s approach to immigration and, on this, seems to take a stance similar to Orbán’s government. Yet this view also aligns with that of Polish Prime Minister Tusk, who likewise opposes accepting migrants under the new EU legislation. Magyar’s stance on migration is thus neither an outlier in the EU nor in the European People’s Party – the conservative group in the European Parliament. It remains to be seen what “constructive engagement with the EU” on such differences will look like with Magyar.
In summary, Magyar takes over a country embedded in Western institutions but largely ostracized within them after years of obstructionism. While he has a clear interest in restoring relations and turning Hungary into a trustworthy ally, the pattern that emerges so far is that more productive cooperation will be possible. However, his disclosed foreign policy positions also signal constraints. Overall, this makes Magyar a more constructive partner for the EU – but not automatically a more reliable one.
Gabriela Greilinger is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Georgia’s School of Public and International Affairs. Her research focuses on the far right, political behavior, and democratic erosion in Europe.
This article is published under the sole responsibility of the author, with editorial oversight. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial team or the CEU Democracy Institute.
